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Abstract
This thesis studies the economics of local labor markets. There are three chapters
in the thesis, and each chapter studies how economic outcomes are affected by local
labor market conditions.
The first chapter studies the incidence of local labor demand shocks. This chapter
starts from the observation that low-skill workers are comparatively immobile. When
labor demand slumps in a city, college-educated workers tend to relocate whereas non-
college workers are disproportionately likely to remain to face declining wages and
employment. A standard explanation of these facts is that mobility is more costly for
low-skill workers. This chapter proposes and tests an alternative explanation, which
is that the incidence of adverse shocks is borne in large part by (falling) real estate
rental prices and (rising) social transfers. These factors reduce the real cost of living
differentially for low-income workers and thus compensate them, in part or in full, for
declining labor demand. I develop a spatial equilibrium model which, appropriately
parameterized, identifies both the magnitude of unobserved mobility costs by skill and
the shape of the local housing supply curve. Nonlinear reduced form estimates using
U.S. Census data document that positive labor demand shocks increase population
more than negative shocks reduce population, that this asymmetry is larger for low-
skill workers, and that such an asymmetry is absent for wages, housing values, and
rental prices. Estimates of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations
GMM estimator suggest that (1) the asymmetric population response is primarily
accounted for by an asymmetric housing supply curve, (2) the differential migration
response by skill is primarily accounted for by transfer payments, and (3) estimated
mobility costs are at most modest and are comparable for high-skill and low-skill
workers, suggesting that the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of
low-skilled workers is not higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of
adverse labor demand shocks.
The second chapter, written jointly with Daron Acemoglu and Amy Finkelstein,
studies how local area health spending responds to permanent changes in local area
income. This chapter is motivated by the fact that health expenditures as a share
of GDP have more than tripled over the last half century, and a common conjecture
is that this is primarily a consequence of rising real per capita income, which more
than doubled over the same period. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by
instrumenting for local area income with time-series variation in global oil prices be-
tween 1970 and 1990 interacted with cross-sectional variation in the oil reserves across
different areas of the Southern United States. This strategy enables us to capture
both the partial equilibrium and the local general equilibrium effects of an increase
in income on health expenditures. Our central estimate is an income elasticity of 0.7,
with an elasticity of 1.1 as the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval. Point
estimates from alternative specifications fall on both sides of our central estimate,
but are almost always less than 1. We also present evidence suggesting that there
are unlikely to be substantial national or global general equilibrium effects of rising
income on health spending, for example through induced innovation. Our overall
reading of the evidence is that rising income is unlikely to be a major driver of the
rising health share of GDP.
The third chapter, written jointly with Kory Kroft, studies theoretically and em-
pirically how optimal Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits vary with local labor
market conditions. Theoretically, we derive the relationship between the moral haz-
ard cost of UI and the unemployment rate in a standard search model. The model
motivates our empirical strategy which tests whether the effect of UI benefits on
unemployment durations varies with the local unemployment rate. In our preferred
specification, a one standard deviation increase in the local unemployment rate re-
duces the magnitude of the duration elasticity by 32%. Using this estimate to cali-
brate the optimal level of UI benefits, we find that a one standard deviation increase
in the unemployment rate leads to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the optimal
replacement rate.
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Chapter 1
The Incidence of Local Labor
Demand Shocksi
When a city experiences an adverse labor demand shock, the share of the adult
population with a college degree tends to decline, as the net out-migration rate of
college-educated workers exceeds non-college workers (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
A standard explanation for this pattern is that barriers to mobility are greater for
low-skill workers (Topel, 1986; Bound and Holzer, 2000).2
This paper proposes and tests an alternative explanation which focuses on why
low-skill workers may be disproportionately compensated during adverse labor de-
mand shocks, rather than why it may be disproportionately costly for them to out-
migrate. This explanation has two components. First, as documented below, adverse
I1 am grateful to Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, and Amy Finkelstein for their guidance and
support. I also thank Leila Agha, Josh Angrist, Fernando Duarte, Tal Gross, Cynthia Kinnan, Jean-
Paul L'Huillier, Amanda Pallais, Jim Poterba, Michael Powell, Nirupama Rao, Bill Wheaton and
participants at the MIT Labor and Public Economics Seminar for helpful comments. I gratefully
acknowledge the National Institute of Aging (NIA grant number T32-AGO00186) and the MIT Shultz
Fund for financial support.
2The existence of greater barriers to mobility for low-skill workers is consistent with a large
empirical literature that has documented that low-skill wages are more responsive than high-skill
wages to local labor market conditions. For example, Bound and Holzer (2000) find that the
elasticity of wages with respect to local labor demand is about 60% higher for workers with no more
than a high school education than for college-educated workers. Similarly, Topel (1986) finds that
local labor demand shifts generate much smaller wage differentials among more educated workers.
Topel writes "consistent with the greater geographic mobility of more educated workers, their wages
are less sensitive to both current and future changes in relative employment."
shocks substantially reduce the cost of housing. This fact and the existing evidence
that the expenditure share on housing declines with income imply that low-skill work-
ers are disproportionately compensated by housing price declines.3  Second, means-
tested public assistance programs disproportionately compensate low-skill workers
during adverse shocks. I document below that, not surprisingly, aggregate transfer
program expenditures are highly responsive to local labor market conditions.
These two different types of explanations - one based on mobility costs and one
based on compensating factors - are not incompatible; however, their relative impor-
tance ultimately determines the actual incidence of local labor demand shocks. If
out-migration of workers is low primarily because of mobility costs, then the inci-
dence of local labor demand shocks will be primarily borne by workers; additionally,
to the extent that mobility costs are greater for low-skill workers, they may dispropor-
tionately bear the incidence of the adverse shock. Alternatively, if the incidence of
adverse local labor demand shocks is primarily borne by immobile housing and social
insurance programs, then low-skill workers will be disproportionately compensated
and, consequently, less likely to out-migrate.
In this paper, I develop and estimate a spatial equilibrium model which captures
how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate following
a shift in local labor demand. The model is based on the spatial equilibrium model
in Roback (1982). Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), the model in this paper
allows for a concave local housing supply curve, arising from the durability of the local
housing stock.4 While the Glaeser and Gyourko model assumes perfect mobility,
I allow for heterogeneous mobility costs which limit spatial arbitrage, as in Topel
(1986). Unlike the preceding models, I explicitly model local labor demand.
To give the basic intuition of the model, consider the following simplified version.
3 0f course, if low-skill workers are homeowners and not renters, then there is a negative wealth
effect in addition to the decline in the user cost of housing following a negative local labor demand
shock. Consistent with much of the recent urban economics literature (e.g., Glaeser and Gyourko
(2005) and Moretti (2009)), I assume in the model below that everyone is a renter.
'Throughout the paper I use the term "concave housing supply curve" to imply that positive
housing demand shocks increase housing prices less than equal-sized negative shocks reduce housing
prices. More formally, a concave housing supply curve implies that 02 (housing price)/(housing
supply) 2 < 0.
Workers in a city inelastically supply labor so that net migration fully determines
local labor supply. Workers do not differ in productivity, and there are no transfer
payments. 5 Firms are perfectly mobile so that labor demand is perfectly elastic. Ho-
mogeneous housing units are supplied by absentee landlords who live in other cities,
and workers consume a fixed expenditure share of housing (Sh). The main conceptual
experiment in the model is that a single city experiences a (positive or negative) labor
demand shock while a large number of other cities remain unchanged. Figures 1 and
2 provide graphical representations of the different equilibrium responses of wages,
population and housing prices for four scenarios, depending on whether housing sup-
ply is constant elasticity or asymmetric and whether workers are perfectly mobile or
face mobility costs when out-migrating.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium response when the elasticity of supply of housing
is constant.' The figure shows a positive shift in the labor demand curve which raises
wages by A. This increase in wages causes in-migration, which bids up housing prices
until the increase in housing costs exactly offsets the wage increase (thus restoring the
equilibrium no-arbitrage condition for workers). If workers are perfectly mobile, then
the figure shows that the effect of a negative shock (-A) is symmetric; i.e., wages,
housing prices, and population adjust by equal and opposite magnitudes (as shown
by L A in the figure). This symmetry comes from the log-linearity of the housing
supply curve and the perfect mobility of workers. If, alternatively, workers face non-
negligible mobility costs, then there will be less out-migration following a negative
shock. With non-negligible mobility costs, the no-arbitrage condition is now that the
marginal worker must be indifferent between staying and paying c to out-migrate. In
this case, both the population and housing price responses are asymmetric: positive
shocks increase population and housing prices more than negative shocks reduce them
(see L' in the figure).
In Figure 2, the housing supply elasticity is no longer constant. Specifically,
housing is more elastically supplied following an increase in housing demand than
5The full model below introduces high-skill and low-skill workers as well as transfer payments6 This is equivalent to assuming that the housing supply curve is log-linear.
a decrease in demand. As discussed in greater detail in the main text below and
in the Appendix, this asymmetric housing supply curve is consistent with a simple
model of durable housing where housing units are not destroyed once created (Glaeser
and Gyourko, 2005). When workers are perfectly mobile, housing prices respond
symmetrically (despite the asymmetry in the housing supply curve). Intuitively,
housing costs still must adjust to exactly offset the wage changes. Only population
responds asymmetrically (as shown by L' in the figure). However, if workers have
heterogeneous mobility costs to out-migrate as described above, then in this case the
asymmetry of the population response is even greater (see LD in the figure), and
housing prices also respond asymmetrically.
These scenarios give the intuition for the following two implications of the model:
(1) if positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks
reduce population, this suggests the existence of a concave housing supply curve
and/or heterogeneous mobility costs, and (2) if positive shocks increase housing prices
more than negative shocks reduce housing prices, that is consistent with the existence
of heterogeneous mobility costs.
The model guides the empirical strategy, which consists of two steps. In the
first step, I test for asymmetric responses of wages, employment, population, and
housing prices to symmetric labor demand shocks. The validity of this exercise
requires constructing plausibly exogenous positive and negative shifts in local labor
demand of equal magnitude. This paper follows Bartik (1991) in constructing an
instrumental variable for local labor demand shocks by interacting cross-sectional
differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment
shares. I find robust evidence using U.S. Census data that positive local labor
demand shocks increase population (and employment) more than negative shocks
reduce population (and employment) and that this asymmetry is greater for low-skill
workers. These robust asymmetric relationships for local population and employment
contrast sharply with the absence of any evidence of a similar asymmetric relationship
for (any measure of) wages, housing values, and rental prices, though all of these other
variables respond strongly to local labor demand.7 As the spatial equilibrium model
makes clear, these results are consistent with a concave local housing supply curve
and limited mobility costs.
To quantitatively estimate the magnitude of mobility costs by skill and the shape
of the housing supply curve, in the second set of empirical analyses I estimate the
full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. The GMM
estimates suggest that the housing supply curve is concave and that (over decadal
time horizons) mobility costs are not large and are comparable for both high-skill and
low-skill workers. 8 The GMM results reveal several other important findings. First,
the observed asymmetric population responses are primarily accounted for by an
asymmetric housing supply curve rather than due to substantial barriers to mobility.
Second, the results suggest that the observed difference in out-migration by skill is
primarily accounted for by transfer payments rather than to differences by skill in
housing expenditure shares. Lastly, the results suggest that the primary explanation
for the comparative immobility of low-skill workers is not higher mobility costs, but
rather a lower incidence of adverse local labor demand shocks. Consequently, much
of the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is diffused to homeowners, landlords,
and public assistance programs.9
7The model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) predicts a concave relationship between housing prices
and the exogenous labor demand, and these authors find supportive evidence of this prediction using
an exogenous shock based on climate. As discussed in more detail in the Appendix, the key difference
between the model in this paper and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) is that the model in
this paper assumes that housing units are homogeneous, while in the Glaeser and Gyourko model
housing units have heterogeneous, location-specific amenities. In other words, in the Glaeser and
Gyourko model, exogenous shocks induce compositional changes in the distribution of location-
specific amenities in the housing stock, and these compositional changes affect the (unconditional)
average housing price. The difference in empirical results comes from the fact that Glaeser and
Gyourko (2005) use mean temperature to construct local amenity shocks based on a dummy variable
for whether or not the January mean temperature is greater than 29.1 degrees whereas I use variation
in local labor demand.
8As discussed in more detail below, mobility costs are defined as a fraction of income, so that
finding comparable mobility costs for high-skill and low-skill workers implies lower absolute mobility
costs for low-skill workers.
9 There is a related literature on the effect of income on migration (Kennan and Walker, 2009)
and the effect of welfare decisions on the individual migration decision (Kennan and Walker, 2008).
Both of these papers are highly complementary to this paper, as they employ a very different
empirical approach. Kennan and Walker (2008) use NLSY data to estimate a rich structural model
of migration. Their data set of welfare-eligible women with a high-school education contains 88
moves (out of 3,466 person-year observations), and the data are used to identify the effect of income
The estimation of the full model necessarily requires stronger assumptions than
were needed to test for asymmetric responses to shocks. In order to be able to
consistently estimate the relative magnitude of mobility costs by skill, I must assume
that unobserved changes in local amenities induced by local labor demand shocks are
not differentially valued by high-skill and low-skill workers. To be able to consistently
estimate the absolute magnitude of mobility costs, however, a stronger assumption
is needed; namely, that unobserved changes in local amenities are uncorrelated with
local labor demand shocks. Because of this, the analysis of the absolute magnitudes
of mobility costs should be treated as more speculative.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the data. Section 4
presents the reduced form empirical results. Section 5 investigates the robustness
of these results. Section 6 presents GMM estimates of the full model. Section 7
concludes.
1.1 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple spatial equilibrium model of a local labor market that
captures how wages, population, housing prices and transfer payments re-equilibrate
following a labor demand shock.10 The heart of the model is a no-arbitrage condition
in which the marginal worker is indifferent between remaining in the city receiving
the shock and moving away (Roback, 1982). This condition implicitly defines a local
labor supply curve which determines the amount of migration in response to a labor
demand shock. The model below allows for mobility costs, which limit spatial ar-
bitrage and cause the incidence of the labor demand shock to at least partially fall
on workers (Topel, 1986).11 Additionally, the model admits two types of workers
on migration probability. Also related to this paper is the recent literature on the causal effect of
education and geographic mobility (Wozniak, 2006; Malamud and Wozniak, 2008).
1 0The model is a "local general equilibrium" model in the sense that labor demand shocks affect
non-labor markets within the city; however, it is not a full general equilibrium model because when
the single city is shocked, the (minimal) effects on the rest of the universe are ignored.
"Topel (1986) is primarily concerned with understanding differences between permanent and
transitory shocks; in the simple two-period model in this paper, all shocks are necessarily permanent.
(high-skill and low-skill) who differ in productivity, imperfectly substitute in produc-
tion, and may also differ in their housing expenditure share, eligibility for transfer
payments, and mobility costs. If an adverse labor demand shock causes relatively
greater out-migration of high-skill labor, the model clarifies when this is because the
incidence of the shock is borne by other factors that disproportionately compensate
low-skill workers and when this is due to greater barriers to mobility for low-skill
workers.
For simplicity, the model is presented as a two-period model in order to rule out
the effects of long-run expectations, the differences between temporary and perma-
nent shocks, option value from moving, and other issues arising in dynamic spatial
equilibrium models. Between the two periods, a single city (out of a large universe
of cities) experiences a labor demand shock between the first and second period.
To give the general intuition of the model, consider an adverse local labor demand
shock in a city. This shock will reduce wages, which encourages out-migration and,
ultimately, lowers housing prices until the no-arbitrage condition is restored for the
marginal worker. The amount of out-migration is determined by the magnitude of
mobility costs, the generosity of transfer payments, and the elasticity of supply of
housing in response to a decline in housing demand.
The four main components of the model (labor demand, transfer payments, hous-
ing market, and labor supply) are now discussed in detail.
1.1.1 Labor Demand
Assume a large number of cities indexed by i, and define the (large) number of high-
skill and low-skill workers in city i and time t as Hi and Li. Production of the
homogeneous tradable good y is given by the following CES aggregate production
function:1 2
yit = O6((1 - A)LP + A((H)p)"
12For simplicity, capital is not included in the model. This could be important if part of the
incidence of labor demand shocks falls on renters of capital. Since the empirical results are based
on decadal changes, it seems reasonable to assume that the elasticity of supply of capital over this
time period is fairly large.
where A is a share parameter, a measures the returns to scale of the labor aggregate,
( is the relative efficiency of high-skill labor and p is related to the elasticity of
substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor by UH,L 1 (1 - p). 13  The 6it
term is a city-specific index of local labor demand. In the empirical section below,
I argue that my instrumental variable for local labor demand is a valid exogenous
source of variation in 60t.
Assuming wages are set on the demand curve, then they are given by the following
marginal productivity conditions:
WH = o6t2 ((1 - A)LP + A((Hjt)P)("~P)/PA(((Hit)P-1
wf = aOit((1 - A)Li + A(CHjt))(a~P)/P(1 - A)(Lit)P~1
Totally differentiating the above wage expressions results in the following condi-
tions for the evolution of wages in terms of exogenous labor demand shock (AOit) and
the endogenous migration responses (AHit and ALit):
Awt - A6oi + ((p
Aw = AO i + ((p
- 1) + (a - p)(7r)) AHit + (a - p)(1 -- r)ALit
- 1) + (a - p)(1 - 7r)) ALit + (a - p)(r)AHit
where ir = A(CH)P/((1-A)LP+A((H)P), and the A operator represents the percentage
change over time.
1 3 Let p be the share of high-skill workers in the labor market. Then if A = (1 - p)P-1/(((p)P +
(1 - p)P-1), ( will give the equilibrium wage premium.
(1.1)
(1.2)
1.1.2 Transfer Payments
Means-tested public assistance programs are available only to low-skill workers and
are modeled as a constant elasticity function of wages:"
tt =T(wit)*
where t it is the transfer income for the representative low-skill worker, T is a constant,
and T is the elasticity of public assistance income with respect to low-skill wages. The
constant elasticity assumption is a simplification; empirically, I find no evidence of
a nonlinear or asymmetric effect of labor demand shocks on transfer payment take-
up, so this assumption appears to be reasonable. The equations above imply the
following expression for the evolution of transfer income in response to changes in
low-skill wages:
Atit = 4Awf (1.3)
I assume T < 0, which implies that transfer programs provide wage insurance. Define
s as the share of total income that comes from transfer programs for low-skill workers;
for high-skill workers, s = 0.
1.1.3 Housing Market
A homogeneous housing stock is supplied by absentee landlords, and the aggregate
housing supply curve is given by Hs(p'), where p' is the price of housing. Workers
have identical non-homothetic preferences over housing and the homogeneous tradable
consumption good. Most empirical estimates find that housing consumption is a
normal good with an income elasticity of demand less than one. For example,
Polinsky and Ellwood (1979), find a (permanent) income elasticity of 0.80 - 0.87.
These results suggest that the expenditure share of housing should be lower for high-
14Using PSID data from 1990, I calculate that 0.5% of households receiving AFDC income during
the past year had a household head with at least a college degree. Among households receiving
food stamps during the past year, the fraction is 0.7%. The percentages for a household head with
a high school education or less are 79.1% (AFDC) and 82.6% (Food Stamps).
skill workers. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, this fact is clearly
present in the cross-section: in 1995, the housing expenditure share declines by more
than 8 percentage points going from bottom 20% in income to top 20% in income
distribution, declining from 38.5% to 30.0%.15 Defining s' and s' as the housing
expenditure shares for high-skill and low-skill workers, respectively, then these facts
indicate that sL > s .
Rather than specifying a specific functional form to derive an expression for ag-
gregate housing demand, I instead approximate housing demand as follows:
HD h)_ s(w[[Hh)+ sh(sit' + (1 - iit hpit
This expression is an approximation since I am implicitly assuming that any changes
in income induced by a shift in labor demand are small so that income effects can be
ignored. Empirically, the changes in wages within skill groups are small relative to
the differences in wages across skill groups.
The initial supply-demand equilibrium in housing market in the first period is
given by Hs(ph) = HD(ph). Totally differentiating this equilibrium condition gives
the following expression for the housing market response:
Ap + AHS(Aph) = v(Ay[ + AHt) + (1 - v)(Ay + ALit) (1.4)
where v is the high-skill share of aggregate housing demand and Ay' gives the change
in total income for skill group j (E {H, L}); i.e., Ay = siAti + (1 - sj)Awji. If
the housing supply curve has constant elasticity, then AHs(ph) = - - Aph. Since
housing is a durable good, however, the housing supply elasticity is not likely to
be constant. Instead, the housing supply elasticity will be larger for increases in
housing demand than for decreases in housing demand due to the durability of the
housing stock (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). Formally, durable housing implies that
AHs(Aph) is increasing in Aph. The Appendix presents a simple model which pro-
15Expenditure share by quintile (going from lowest to highest income quintile) is the following:
38.5%, 32.9%, 31.8%, 30.0%, and 30.0%.
vides microfoundations for a concave housing supply curve based on slow depreciation
of the housing stock and a heterogeneous distribution of costs of supplying housing.
1.1.4 Labor Supply
For simplicity, I assume that workers inelastically supply labor to their local labor
market, so that all variation in local employment comes only from migration decisions.
The local labor supply curve is then implicitly defined by a mobility condition which
states that the marginal migrant must be indifferent between remaining in city i and
moving to any other city.
I introduce costly spatial arbitrage by assuming that workers have heterogeneous
mobility costs. I construe mobility costs broadly to encompass both financial and
psychic barriers to out-migration as well as heterogeneous tastes and distastes for a
given location. Thus unlike Topel (1986), I allow mobility costs to take on positive
and negative values. Positive values encompass both actual moving costs as well as
preferences for the current city, while negative values represent distaste of potential
in-migrants for a given area. Formally, I model this by assuming that mobility costs
for workers in city i are independently drawn from distributions Mf'(m) and MJ"(m)
(with support [0, o)), while the mobility costs of in-migrating into city i for the
workers living in all of the other cities are drawn from the distributions M'(m) and
ML (m) (with support (-oo, 0]).
These mobility cost distributions imply mobility cost functions cH(AHit) and
cL(ALit), which return the mobility cost of the marginal migrant given the change
in population between the first and second period. Mobility costs are defined as
a fraction of total income, so that the marginal migrant receiving (w + t) in city i
will pay (w + t)c to out-migrate. For a smooth distribution of mobility costs, the
mobility cost function will be strictly decreasing, so that the mobility cost of the
marginal migrant increases as more workers out-migrate. 16
16Note that this two-period model contains two important simplifications which make it straight-
forward to study mobility costs. First, following Topel (1986), gross migration will always equal
net migration, so that there is only one marginal migrant per worker type in each city. The work of
Artuc, Chaudhari, and McLauren (2009) and Chaudhari and McLauren (2007) suggest a tractable
To derive the (implicit) labor supply curve for low-skill workers, let vi(w +t , pi)
be the indirect utility function for the marginal low-skill worker in city i. Spatial
equilibrium in the first period requires that the following condition holds for the
marginal low-skill migrant in city i:
vi(wfL + tL,p ) =vj(w4 +L ti) Vj 54 i
Now consider a shock to O in city i. The shock will cause a wage differential which
will encourage costly migration to arbitrage the wage and employment differential,
and the price of housing and transfer payments will also adjust as a local general
equilibrium response to the shock. Differentiating the above spatial equilibrium
condition and applying Roy's Identity results in the following expression:
(1 - sL)AwL + sfAt - sLAph + cL(ALit) = 0 (1.5)
where sf (= tL/(wL + tL)) is public assistance income as a share of total income. An
analogous expression holds for high-income workers (where s' = 0):
Aw[ - s ±Ap + cH(AHit) = 0 (1.6)
Equations (1.5) and (1.6) are implicit labor supply curves because net migration is
determined by the spatial equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant. In words,
the conditions above state that the change in indirect utility in response to changes
in wages, transfer payments, and housing prices must equal the mobility costs of the
marginal migrants. The ALit and AHit terms represent the amount of net migration
that needs to occur to make these two equations hold.
These two equations highlight the three reasons discussed in the introduction
why net migration rates may differ by skill. First, public assistance programs are
way to relax this assumption and allow gross migration flows to exceed net migration flows. Sec-
ond, the mobility cost function is allowed to be asymmetric, but since this is a two-period model the
shape of this function does not depend on the history of past shocks. In a fully dynamic model,
the history of past shocks may affect the elasticity of supply of in-migrants and out-migrants.
means-tested, so that sL > sf' = 0. Second, as documented below, low-skill workers
consume a larger fraction of their income on housing sL > s meaning that housing
price declines disproportionately compensate low-skill workers. Finally, the mobility
cost functions may differ by skill. If low-skill workers typically face higher mobility
costs following a negative shock, then cL(x) > cH(X) VX <0.
1.1.5 Equilibrium
Following an exogenous shock to local labor demand (AOit), the new equilibrium of
the model is defined by the following conditions:
" Labor demand adjusts so that high-skill and low-skill wages equal marginal
products (equations (1.1) and (1.2))
" Transfer payments adjust according to changes in low-skill wages (equation
(1.3))
" Housing prices adjust so that the change in housing demand equals the change
in housing supply (equation (1.4))
* Population adjusts so that the marginal high-skill and low-skill migrant is in-
different between staying and leaving (equations (1.5) and (1.6))
Although the nonlinearities in the housing supply curve (AHs(Ap')) and the
mobility cost functions (cH(AHit) and cL(ALit)) preclude analytical solutions without
particular functional form assumptions, the Appendix derives comparative statics for
specific scenarios under the special case of constant returns to scale of production
(a = 1).
Figure 3 reports results from simulating the model." The figure shows that if
population responds asymmetrically, it suggests the existence of a concave housing
supply curve and/or the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The responsive-
ness of housing prices isolates the importance of heterogeneous mobility costs, since
"The details of the simulation are given in the Appendix.
mobility costs cause immobile workers to bid up the price of housing during negative
shocks, causing housing prices to respond asymmetrically. Therefore, the model sug-
gests that it is possible to identify both mobility costs and the shape of the housing
supply curve by using information on the joint responses of wages, population, hous-
ing prices, and transfer payments to exogenous labor demand shocks. Empirically, I
will first estimate nonlinear reduced form regressions to test for asymmetric responses
to labor demand shocks, and I next carry out a full estimation of the model to recover
the parameters which govern the distribution of mobility costs and the shape of the
housing supply curve.
1.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
As the model makes clear, the reduced form relationships between each of the en-
dogenous variables (AwH AWL, AH, AL, Aph, AtL) and the labor demand shock
AO are informative about the shape of housing supply curve and the presence of
heterogeneous mobility costs. This motivates the following reduced form estimating
equation:
Axit = gx(A it) + at + vit
where i indexes cities, t indexes time periods, x is one of the endogenous variables
above, at captures proportional shocks to all cities in a given time period, vit is an
eiror term, and go is a function to be estimated. Nonparametric estimates of go
are reported graphically below. In addition to the nonparametric estimates, I also
parameterize gx(AO) as 3(AO) + 6(AO) 2 which leads to the following baseline reduced
form empirical specification that is reported in the tables:
Axi = /3 x AOit + 6 x (A642) 2 + at + Vit (1.7)
where x is the endogenous variable of interest, 3 and 6 are the coefficients on a
quadratic in A~it, and at are year fixed effects. This reduced form specification is
estimated by OLS using a proxy for local labor demand (described below). The
quadratic specification allows the elasticity of xit with respect to 6it to vary: specif-
ically, the elasticity at A64,t = 0 is given by ), while ) + 26 A6Ot is the elasticity at
A63t. Since the equation is estimated in first differences it implicitly controls for
time-invariant differences across geographic areas, while the inclusion of year fixed
effects captures any (proportional) changes in xit common to all cities. Formally,
the statistical test of 6 $ 0 is sufficient to establish that positive and negative shifts
in labor demand of equal magnitude have unequal effects. However, this test is
evaluating the null hypothesis of a linear relationship against a specific parametric
alternative. Therefore, I will also report nonparametric specification tests which
test the null hypothesis of a linear relationship against a nonparametric alternative
(Ellison and Ellison, 2000).ls
Lastly, I also estimate the full model developed above to recover flexible estimates
of the mobility cost functions of high-skill and low-skill workers and the housing supply
curve parameters. The estimation is a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem,
and it is implemented using a two-step optimal GMM estimator. The details of this
procedure are described in more detail below.
1.2.1 An Omnibus Instrumental Variable for Local Labor
Demand
In order to estimate equation (1.7) above, a valid instrumental variable for local
labor demand is needed. I follow the empirical strategy of Bartik (1991) and con-
struct a measure of plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks derived by interacting
cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry
employment shares.19 This relative demand index can be used to predict changes
in wages and employment. The identifying assumption is that changes in industry
shares at the national level are uncorrelated with city-level labor supply shocks and
181 view these tests as complementary to the significance tests of the quadratic term; while the
nonparametric specification tests do not require formulating a specific parametric alternative, it is
difficult to ensure that these tests have the right size and power.
19See Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Autor and Duggan (2002), and
Luttmer (2005) for other applications of this instrumental variable.
therefore represent plausibly exogenous (demand-induced) variation in metropolitan
area employment. This predicted employment variable (Eit) is used to create a pre-
dicted change in local area employment (A6it) as follows: A6, = (Et - Ei,tT)/Ei,tT.
This measure is used as a proxy for AOt.2 0
The key identifying assumption is that this proxy is uncorrelated with unobserved
shocks to local labor supply. In this paper a stronger assumption is also needed -
specifically, I must assume that A6Xt = AZ and A64,t = -AZ represent shifts in
local labor demand of equal magnitude. This requirement gives one advantage of
the Bartik procedure over other identifiable shocks to local labor demand, since this
instrumental variable is an omnibus measure of changes in local labor demand. By
contrast, if one were to use identifiable shifts to labor demand such as movements in
oil prices, coal prices, or other natural resource shocks it would require that equal-
sized positive and negative price changes represent equal-sized shifts in local labor
demand. This may be difficult to justify in natural resource industries that are
typically characterized by high amounts of specific capital and/or irreversible invest-
ments. A related benefit of the Bartik procedure is that subsets of industries can be
excluded when constructing the instrumental variable to verify that the results are
not driven by particular sectors.
1.2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data sources are briefly described here. The Appendix gives more detail on how
the data set was created.
Census Integrated Public Use Microsamples (IPUMS) The basic panel of
metropolitan area data comes from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census individual-level
20Formally, predicted employment growth is computed as follows:
K
it -i,k,t i -i,k,t-r
k=1 - -
Eit = (1 + 7ri,t)ni,t
A6,t = (Et - Ei,t_ )/Ei,t-,
where Oi,k,t-T is the employment share of industry k in city i and Vi,kt is the national employment
share of industry k excluding city i.
and household-level extracts from the IPUMS database (Ruggles et al, 2004) .21 The
baseline data are limited to individuals and households living in metropolitan areas.
The IPUMS data are used to construct estimates of local area wages, employment,
population, housing prices, and rental prices in each metropolitan area. The primary
advantage of the Census data is the ability to construct city-level measures disaggre-
gated by skill. These data are also used to construct the predicted labor demand
instrumental variable by using the industry categories of the individuals in the labor
force. See the Appendix for remaining details.
Regional Economic Information System (REIS) The metropolitan-area
measures of expenditures on public assistance programs are computed by aggregating
the county-level aggregate data in the REIS. The REIS contains annual county-level
data on total expenditures broken down by transfer program (e.g., food stamps, in-
come maintenance programs, public medical benefits, veterans benefits, SSI benefits).
Counties are aggregated into metropolitan areas using the 1990 Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area (MSA) definitions. Because of the difficulty in aggregating counties into
MSAs within Alaska and Virginia during this time period, MSAs in these states are
dropped from the baseline sample. Though the data are not disaggregated below
the county-level, the data are based on government agency reports and are therefore
quite reliable. Additionally, according to recent work by Meyer, Mok, and Sulli-
van (2009), aggregate expenditure data may be sometimes preferable to individual or
household survey data due to substantial underreporting in the latter. All transfer
program measures are adjusted per low-skill capita based on the non-college adult
population. 2 2
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the final data set.
2 1The 2007 American Community Survey (ACS) is included as a robustness check. The 1970
Census is not used at all because it identifies only a small subset of the MSAs that appear in later
years.
22Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) find substantial underreporting of benefit receipt in a wide
range of data sets, including the CPS, PSID, SIPP, PSID, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey
for a wide range of transfer programs. They also document that the under-reporting is not consistent
over time.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Graphical Evidence
Figures 4 and 5 report nonparametric reduced form estimates for the primary de-
pendent variables. In addition to the nonparametric estimates, linear estimates are
graphed for comparison. The figures also display bootstrapped (uniform) 95% con-
fidence intervals.2 3 The confidence intervals are very wide at the extremes, which
makes it difficult to reject the null hypothesis that the data are described by a lin-
ear relationship. However, in some cases the confidence intervals reject the specific
linear relationship estimated using a parametric linear model, though this visual test
ignores estimation error in the linear model. Consequently, the nonparametric spec-
ification tests reported below will be useful in assessing whether the data reject the
null hypothesis that the parametric linear model is appropriate.2 4
Overall, across all of the graphs the only suggestive evidence of an asymmetric
response is for employment, population, and transfer payments. The population and
employment graphs show a convex relationship with the labor demand instrumental
variable. By contrast, there is no evidence of a similar asymmetric relationship for
housing values, rental prices, or any measure of wages (wage measures are defined
below). As shown by the simulated data in Figure 3, these results are consistent
with a concave housing supply curve and limited mobility costs. In order to formally
test for the existence of an asymmetric response (and measure the magnitude of
the asymmetry when it exists), the next subsection reports results from quadratic
specifications and nonparametric specification tests.
23The bootstrapped confidence intervals are computed based on 10,000 replications, where MSAs
are sampled with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local linear bandwidth
is chosen following Hall (1992). That paper reports Monte Carlo results which suggest that under-
smoothing produces confidence interval estimates with greater coverage accuracy than confidence
intervals obtained by explicit bias correction. The bandwidth of the Epanechnikov kernel used for
point estimation is 0.041; the undersmoothed kernel bandwidth is 0.75 -0.041 = 0.031.
241n all figures, the nonparametric estimates are local linear regressions. The nonparametric
reduced form estimates are also constrained to be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure
of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The rearranged estimates are more efficient
under the null hypothesis that the true relationship is (weakly) monotonic. In all figures, the
unconstrained estimates are qualitatively similar.
1.3.2 Reduced Form Results
This section reports estimates of equation (1.7) -above to investigate the responsiveness
of wages, employment, and population to changes in local labor demand. The baseline
reduced form estimating equation is reproduced below:
Axit = 0 x Ait + 6 x (Abit) 2 + O't + Avi'
The results are reported in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 presents results for
overall population, employment, and wages. Column (1) shows the results for the
total population between the ages of 18 and 64.25 The estimate of # is precise and
strongly statistically significant (p < 0.001), which verifies that the measure of pre-
dicted employment changes strongly predicts actual shifts in local population. The
estimate of 6 is also precise and strongly statistically significant. The estimate is
positive and large in magnitude (o = 28.004). One way to interpret the magnitude
of this estimate is to calculate the marginal effect at one standard deviation greater
than zero and one standard deviation less than zero; these estimates are -0.115 and
3.716, respectively, and the difference between these estimates is strongly statistically
significant (p < 0.001).26 Additionally, a nonparametric specification test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that the relationship is linear in favor of a nonparametric
alternative (p < 0.001).27 In other words, the results in this column suggest that pos-
itive changes in local labor demand increase population more than negative changes
reduce population. The results for employment in column (2) show evidence of a
similar convex relationship. The results in column (3) using the percentage point
25 Results using the population between the ages of 25 and 54 are very similar.
26 Note that the p-value on the test for whether the marginal effects are the same at one standard
deviation above and below zero is the same as the p-value on the test of whether the quadratic term
is statistically significantly different from zero.
21I use the nonparametric specification test procedure suggested by Ellison and Ellison (2000),
which groups the data into "bins" and creates a test statistic that is asymptotically distributed as
a standard normal random variable. To my knowledge, there is a not a data-driven procedure to
select the proper bin width; therefore, I view the nonparametric specification test as complementary
to the quadratic specification. While the nonparametric specification test does not rely on a
specific parametric alternative, it is not possible to ensure that I have the right size and power in
constructing my statistical tests. In almost all of the results that follow, inference based on the
quadratic specification and the nonparametric specification test is similar.
change in the employment-to-population ratio show that not all of the reduction in
local employment from an adverse shock comes from net out-migration; there is also
a decline in labor force participation.
The remaining columns of Table 2 explore the consequences of local labor demand
shifts on wages. There are two difficulties in finding an appropriate wage measure.
The first difficulty is that the labor demand shock may induce compositional changes
in the population, so that the change in the average wage will be confounded by
compositional effects. The second difficulty is that changes in labor force partici-
pation reduce income per adult, but would be excluded using a measure of average
wages based only on employed workers. I approach this problem by first presenting
two measures of changes in wage income which I believe represent upper and lower
bounds of the true change in income holding characteristics of the workers fixed. The
first measure (following Bound and Holzer (2000)) is the total wage income per 18-64
adult. This measure will account for demand-induced changes in labor force partici-
pation but will also include compositional changes. The results are in column (4) and
show a large effect of local labor demand on wages (0 = 0.959). The second measure
uses the individual-level census data and regresses log wages of employed workers on
a large set of controls and MSA fixed effects (see Appendix for details). The MSA
fixed effect estimated from this regression is a composition-adjusted measure of the
wage premium which I define as the "residualized wage" .28 The results in column
(5) using this measure show a much smaller wage response () = 0.353). However,
this second measure does not account for changes in labor force participation rate.
Assuming that at least some of the observed change in labor force participation is
involuntary, then this measure will understate the total effect. To address this con-
cern, I take the residualized wage measure and multiply it by the observed labor force
participation rate.2 9  I call this the "adjusted wage" and use this as the preferred
28This measure is similar to the local wage premiums calculated in Shapiro (2003) and Albouy
(2009a, 2009b). This measure does not control for unobservable changes in the composition of
labor force. If unobservable changes in composition of labor force move in the same direction as
observable changes, then the measured response of wages will be upward biased, and estimates of
mobility costs will be conservative.
29Note that when I present results by skill below, I use the labor force participation rate in the
given skill group to adjust the residualized wage measure.
wage measure. This measure accounts for both compositional changes in the labor
force in response to the shock as well as changes in labor force participation. Note
that if not all of the observed change in labor force participation is involuntary, I will
be overstating the importance of mobility costs when I ultimately estimate the full
model via GMM. Essentially, the adjusted wage measure assumes that reservation
wages are negligible. 30
As expected, the magnitude of the effect of local labor demand for adjusted wages
lies in between the other two wage measures (/ = 0.520). Since the magnitude of
changes in labor force participation is modest, the estimates for adjusted wages are
closer to the estimates for residualized wages than the estimates using the per capita
income measure. Regardless of the measure of wages used, however, the important
conclusion that emerges from columns (4) through (6) is that there is no evidence of an
asymmetric response of wages to shifts in local labor demand in any of the measures.
It is only population and local employment which respond asymmetrically.
Table 3 reports results on population, employment and wages separately for high-
skill and low-skill workers. I define low-skill workers as those without a college degree,
and high-skill workers as those with at least a college degree. The patterns in Table
2 are reproduced when looking within each skill group: population and employment
respond asymmetrically, and there is no evidence of a similar asymmetric response for
either high-skill or low-skill wages. Additionally, columns (3) and (6) show that the
skill composition of the adult population and labor force also responds asymmetrically.
In other words, negative shocks reduce college share of adult population more than
positive shocks increase college share.
Next, Table 4 looks at three important non-labor outcomes: housing values, rental
prices, and aggregate expenditures on public assistance programs. The measures of
average housing values and rental prices are purged of observable changes in the
quality of the housing stock following a similar procedure to the one used to create
3oAs a way of bounding the estimated magnitude of mobility costs, I also report GMM estimates
below which use the residualized wage instead of the adjusted wage. Under the assumption that
reservation wages are less than offered wages for at least some adults, the residualized wage will give
a lower bound on the estimated magnitude of mobility costs.
the residualized wage measure (see Appendix for details), though the results using
the unconditional average housing values and rental prices are very similar. Column
(1) reports results for housing values, which respond strongly to local labor demand.
The results for rental prices are similar in magnitude and more precise. As with
the wage results, there is no evidence of an asymmetric response. The estimates of
6 in both columns (1) and (2) are statistically insignificant and at most modest in
magnitude, and the nonparametric specification tests fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the deviations from the parametric (linear) model are due to chance.
Column (3) reports estimates using aggregate expenditures on Food Stamps and
Income Maintenance Programs. The results show that expenditures on these pro-
grams respond strongly to local labor market conditions. The estimated magnitude
of the response is large (/ -2.366) and implies that a 1% decline in local labor
demand increases aggregate expenditures on these two programs by 2.4%.
A setting in which population and employment respond asymmetrically to positive
and negative labor demand shocks while wages, rental prices, and housing values
respond symmetrically is consistent with the model simulation where mobility costs
are limited and the housing supply curve is concave. Before moving beyond this
qualitative conclusion to quantitative estimates of mobility costs and housing supply
curve parameters, I next document that these reduced form results are not driven
by unobserved trends, outliers, sample selection, or heterogeneous industry-specific
effects. After that, I conclude by estimating the full model above using a nonlinear
GMM estimator.
3 1Appendix Table A2 reports estimates for various other transfer programs, including Medicare,
Disability Benefits, SSI, and Veterans Benefits, and the results are qualitatively similar. I focus
on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance income because these programs are explicitly designed to
smooth consumption.
1.4 Robustness
1.4.1 Industry Trends
The main results in Table 2 emphasize the importance of asymmetric employment
and population responses to local labor demand shocks, and the absence of a sim-
ilar asymmetric response for wages, housing prices, and transfer payments. The
key identifying assumption in interpreting these results is that equally-sized positive
and negative predicted changes in local employment represent shifts in local labor
demand of plausibly equal magnitude. Because the predicted changes are formed by
interacting cross-sectional variation in industrial composition with national changes
in industry shares, an obvious concern is that qualitatively different industries are de-
clining and expanding. If these industries would not be expected to have otherwise
identical responses to shifts in local labor demand (perhaps because of differences
in relative demand for high-skill labor, the amount of specific human capital in the
industry, or the ability of firms in the industry to respond and adjust to shocks), then
this would cast doubt on the interpretation of the results as tracing out an asymmetric
local labor supply curve.
To investigate this concern, I categorize industries based on their decadal changes
in total national employment. Industries are grouped into one of four categories:
1. Persistently expanding industries. Industries where employment increased ev-
ery decade.
2. Persistently declining industries. Industries where employment decreased in
every decade.
3. Stable industries. Industries where employment did not increase or decrease
more than 20% in any of the decades.32
321f industries are classified as both persistently expanding/declining and stable, I categorize the
industry as stable. This definition and the cutoff of 20% were chosen to give roughly equal-sized
categories. Results are similar with nearby cutoffs.
4. Volatile industries. Industries that experienced employment growth of more
than 20% and decreases of more than 20% during the sample period.
5. Other industries. Industries not otherwise categorized.
The top twenty industries according to average national employment share in each
of these categories are listed in Table Al. The industries in each of the categories
conform to expectations given the secular industry trends during this time period.
Persistently expanding industries are concentrated in services, health care, data pro-
cessing, and leisure goods, while persistently contracting industries are in apparel,
publishing, manufacturing, and tobacco. Volatile industries include natural resource
industries such as oil and gas extraction as well as defense industries. I begin by con-
structing predicted employment excluding variation in national employment shares
for industries that are persistently expanding or persistently declining. 33  The re-
sulting relative demand index is purged of any variation caused by secular trends in
services and manufacturing. Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (1.7)
using this alternative measure of predicted employment as an instrumental variable
for local labor demand. The dependent variable is the change in adult population
in all columns. Column (1) reproduces the results from column (1) in Table 2 for
comparison. Column (2) reports results using the predicted employment measure
that does not use any variation from industries which are persistently expanding
or persistently declining. The point estimates in column (2) are fairly similar to
the baseline estimates reproduced in column (1). Columns (3) through (5) report
results excluding each of the other industry categories when constructing predicted
employment, and the results are also quite similar to the baseline results in column
(1). I interpret these results as suggesting that the estimated asymmetric population
response is not primarily caused by heterogeneous industry-specific effects
33Formally, predicted employment growth is computed by using only the subset of industries which
pass a given filter:
V-i,k,t -- V-i,k,t-r
,t ii~k~t-r
kEK' ( k-Kkt )
where K' is the set of industries which pass the filter.
A related concern is that because of the way that the IPUMS creates consistent
industry codes across time, there are "catch-all" industry codes that collect industries
which are not otherwise categorized. I label an industry code a catch-all industry
code if it contains the word "miscellaneous" or contains the suffix "not elsewhere
categorized." These catch-all industry codes make up roughly 10% of the industry
codes. These catch-all categories may represent different collections of industries in
different decades, which may bias the main estimates. To investigate this concern,
I create an alternative measure of predicted employment which does not use any
variation in national employment shares of these industries. The estimates using
this predicted employment measure are reported in column (6) and are similar to the
results in column (1), suggesting that there is no significant bias from including these
catch-all categories.
Tables 6 and 7 report results which repeat this exercise using as the dependent
variable adjusted wages and rental prices, respectively. Consistent with the baseline
results in Tables 2 and 4, none of the estimates in any of the columns show any
evidence of an asymmetric relationship between adjusted wages or rental prices and
labor demand.3 4
1.4.2 Alternative Specifications
I next turn to an investigation of the robustness of the main results by reporting
alternative specifications which vary the sample definition and the set of time-varying
controls used. The purpose of these specifications is primarily to investigate the
possibility of sample selection bias and the potential bias from unobserved trends
that are correlated with shifts in local labor demand. As with Tables 5 through 7,
Tables 8 through 10 use population, adjusted wages, and rental prices (respectively)
as the dependent variables. All columns report results from estimating variants of
equation (5). In all tables, column (1) reports the baseline results for comparison.
34 Interestingly, the magnitude of the (linear) response of adjusted wages and rental prices to local
labor demand varies somewhat depending on the industries used to generate predicted changes in
employment, suggesting that the strength of the proxy for local labor demand may vary depending
on the set of industries used to generate the proxy.
Column (2) reports results from adding data on the 2000-2007 changes." Column
(3) creates "pseudo-MSAs" by grouping together all individuals in a state who are
not in an MSA. Columns (4) and (5) report results including alternative sets of
geographic and time fixed effects. Column (4) includes region fixed effects for each
of the nine census regions which control for region-specific linear time trends. Column
(5) includes controls for MSA-specific linear time trends. Column (6) reports results
which test for the importance of outliers. This column drops the 5% of the data
with the largest magnitude changes in local labor demand. Finally, column (7) uses
the County Business Patterns (CBP) data set to construct the local labor demand
instrument rather than using Census data (see Appendix for details). The CBP data
contain finer industry categories, which in principle could reduce measurement error
in the instrument, but there are two primary drawbacks: first, there is a high rate of
suppressed data at the county-by-industry level, and, second, the county-level data
must be aggregated. Dealing with both of these drawbacks introduces measurement
error.
Table 8 reports results using population as the dependent variable. Across all
of the columns, the point estimates are very similar to the baseline specification
in column (1). The results in column (5) which include MSA-specific linear time
trends show a substantial loss of precision, but the point estimates remain stable.
The results in column (6) show that the estimated asymmetric response is robust to
dropping outlying observations, suggesting that the convex population response is not
primarily driven by outliers. The results in column (7) show the results are similar
using CBP data to construct the labor demand instrument.
Tables 9 and 10 report results using adjusted wages and rental prices (respectively)
as the dependent variables. The estimates of 6 are never statistically significant at
conventional levels, nor are even consistently the same sign across columns. In other
words, there is no consistent evidence of an asymmetric response of adjusted wages
or rental prices to local labor demand shocks.
35The 2000-2007 changes are translated into implied decadal changes by first calculating annual
percentage changes.
Lastly, Appendix Table A3 reports specifications which drop each one (of nine)
census regions. This table confirms that the results do not appear to be driven by
any particular region.
In summary, the reduced form patterns of a significant asymmetric response of
population and employment to changes in local labor demand appear robust and
contrast sharply with a lack of similar asymmetric responses for wages, housing values,
and rental prices.
1.5 GMM Estimates
The reduced form results presented above directly test for the existence of asym-
metric responses of wages, population, employment, and housing prices to symmetric
labor demand shocks. These results do not directly estimate any of the economic
parameters in the theoretical model and are therefore not precisely informative about
the distribution of mobility costs by skill and the actual incidence of labor demand
shocks. This section reports results from a joint estimation of the full model us-
ing a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. The econometric setup
follows from the theoretical model presented above and imposes moment conditions
which can be used to identify the economic parameters of interest. In particular,
the GMM estimator can recover flexible estimates of the housing supply curve and
mobility cost functions for high-skill and low-skill workers. These estimates can be
used to assess the relative importance of housing expenditures, transfer payments,
and mobility costs in generating the observed migration patterns in the data. Addi-
tionally, because I parameterize the model so that there are more moment conditions
than (remaining) parameters to estimate, the GMM estimator admits a chi-squared
overidentification test of the full model.
To implement the GMM estimator, the following equations (derived from equa-
tions (1) through (6) in the model above) are used:
Ae'H AW H _ + ((p-1)±(a- p)(r)) AHit + (a - p)(1 - )ALit)
Ae'L iAW - (A0it + ((p - 1) ± (a - p)(1 - 7r))ALit + (a - p)(r)AHit)
Aet = At - WAwA
Aeh = Aph + AZH8(Ap) - (v(A wf + AHit) + (1 - v)((1 - sL)AwL + s4At + A Lit))
AeH = - S HAph + cH (A Hit)
Ae = (1 - sf)Awn + si t -- + c(ALit)
where i indexes cities, t indexes time, and Ae represent error terms uncorrelated with
shifts in labor demand.3" These equations jointly solve the local general equilibrium
problem of how wages, employment, housing prices, and transfer payments respond
to an exogenous labor demand shift A~it. The six endogenous variables are the
following: Aph, AWH, AW, AHit, ALi, and AtL. Note that the error terms are
allowed to be freely correlated with each other, which can give rise to simultaneity
bias that the GMM estimator is intended to address. The unknowns in the model
are the following parameters and functions:
* Transfer income and housing expenditure shares (s, s, sfH)
* Labor demand parameters (a, p, 7)
" Transfer payment elasticity (IF)
" Mobility cost functions (cL(-) and cH(.))
* Housing supply function (AHS(-))
In order to reduce the number of parameters to estimate, I first impose values
of s, Is, s' based on external information. I compute sL = 0.05 by dividing
36 These equations can be derived formally by including error terms which proportionally shift
production, housing demand, housing supply, transfer payments, and indirect utility. For example,
re-define the equilibrium condition for transfer payments as follows: tL et - 'L (WL) , where
et is a random variable which represents unobservable shocks to transfer payment expenditures
(and E[et] = 1). Totally differentiating this .condition gives the following expression: Ath
TL (AmW) + Aejt, which is the equation used in the GMM estimation.
aggregate expenditures on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance Programs by the
sum of these expenditures and aggregate low-skill wage income. For the housing
expenditure shares, I use sk = 0.34 for non-college households and sH = 0.30 for
college-educated households based on the data presented in Section 2.
For the labor demand curve, I compute r = 0.37 based on average wages for
high-skill and low-skill workers and average share of high-skill workers in the adult
population. 38  I choose p = 0.29 based on Katz and Murphy (1992).39 This leaves
the returns to scale parameter (a) to be estimated. Although this parameter will
be estimated from functional form assumptions, it is still useful to include the two
moments of the labor demand curve to check the overall fit of the model. I also
report results below which drop the labor demand moments.4 1
Finally, I choose the following functional forms for the mobility cost functions and
housing supply elasticity:
o( (exp(#Px) - 1) .
cd(x) = -i 3 E { L, H}
o -h(exp(h - 1)
,AHsx =- O
These functions are the exponential transformations suggested by Manly (1976),
37Average household income is $82,439 for high-skill households in the baseline sample and is
$48,456 for low-skill households. Assuming Sh = 0.30 for high-skill households and income elasticity
of 0.8, then sh = 0.34 for low-skill households.
381 compute the wage premium (C) as 1.75, which is the average wages of college-educated workers
divided by the average wages of non-college workers. I next compute the average share (over this
time period) of college-educated workers in the labor force (p) as 0.25. Using the formula for 7F
in Section 2, this gives 7r = 0.45. The aggregate housing demand share parameter is given by
v Aps (s' + (1 - p)sf;).39Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill
labor (oH,L) to be 1.4. This gives p = 1 - 1/UH,L = 0.29.
40Since the instrumental variable shifts the labor demand curve, parameters of the labor demand
curve are identified from functional form assumptions.
4 1Because the labor demand instrument is measured with error, when using it in the GMM
estimation, I rescale it by regressing adjusted wages on the instrument and scale the instrument so
that this regression with the rescaled instrument would give a coefficient of 1.0. A more rigorous
alternative is to modify the labor demand moments to include an additional parameter (r,) as follows:
Ae H = AW[ - (KAOit + ((p - 1) + (a - p)(7r)) AHit + (a - p)(1 - 7)ALit)
Ae'L = AWL - (rAOit + ((p - 1) + (a - p)(1 - 7r))ALit + (a - p)(7r)AHit)
This procedure yields very similar results.
which represent Box-Cox transformations of exponentiated variables and are defined
so that if 13 = 0, then the functions simplify to orx. These functions are flexible
enough to accommodate interesting curvature with only two parameters, and they are
everywhere monotonic and have continuous first derivatives, which greatly simplifies
the computation. Ultimately, there are eight remaining parameters to estimate: {L,
#L, o-H o3 H, uh, 1 3h, aI
The resulting GMM estimator solves a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem,
so in order to estimate the nonlinear parameters I need to take nonlinear functions
of the instrumental variable (AO) to achieve identification. I use AO, (AO) 2 , (AO) 3 ,
(AO) 4 , and (AO) 5 as instrumental variables. This results in 30 moment conditions
(the five polynomial functions of the instrument x the six error terms). The full
model is estimated using a standard two-step optimal GMM procedure (see Appendix
for details of this procedure).
The GMM estimates are presented in Table 11. The first row presents the pre-
ferred specification using the external estimates discussed above. Columns (1) and
(2) report estimates of the housing supply curve. The estimates suggest that the
housing supply curve is concave (0h - 3.773, s.e. 1.546). One way to interpret the
housing supply coefficients is to compute the increase in housing supply when housing
prices exogenously rise by 10% (28.3%) and compare it to the decrease in housing
supply when housing prices decline by 10% (-19.4%). In other words, the magnitude
of housing supply response is about 46% larger for a one standard deviation increase
in housing prices than the response to a one standard deviation decrease.
The estimates of the mobility cost function parameters (columns (3) through (6))
give no evidence of an asymmetric mobility cost function for either high-skill or low-
skill workers; the estimates suggest that the mobility cost functions are approximately
linear. The point estimates for oL and a- are precisely estimated and statistically
significantly different from zero, suggesting the existence of non-negligible mobility
costs. To get a sense of the magnitudes, the point estimates imply that the 10th
percentile of mobility costs in a city (i.e., the marginal migrant after 10% of the
population has out-migrated following a negative shock) is roughly 24.9% of annual
income for high-skill workers and 18.1% of annual income for low-skill workers.4 2  In
other words, despite the fact that low-skill workers are disproportionately likely to
remain in declining cities following negative shocks, the point estimates imply that
high-skill workers have larger mobility costs, in both relative as well as absolute terms
(though the difference in relative terms is not large or precisely estimated). Column
(8) reports the estimated transfer payment elasticity, which is quantitatively large
and precisely estimated; the coefficient implies that a 1% decline in low-skill wages
increases transfer payment expenditures by 4.5%. Column (9) reports estimates of
the returns to scale parameter (a = 1.040, s.e. 0.020), which suggests that returns
to scale are approximately constant; this is also consistent with the reduced form
results, which found no evidence of an asymmetric response of wages.4 ' Lastly, the
results in column (10) show that the overidentification test does not reject the null
hypothesis that the deviations of the empirical moments from the model are due to
chance (p = 0.707).
The remainder of Table 11 reports estimates of the full model under alternative
economic assumptions. The second row reports estimates assuming that both housing
expenditure share and public assistance expenditures do not differ by skill and are
negligible (i.e., s H = sL = 0.001 and sfH = S = 0.001). These estimates verify that
ignoring the welfare effects of housing price adjustments and changes in expenditures
on public assistance programs results in much larger estimates of mobility costs for
both high-skill and low-skill workers. In this scenario, the mobility cost estimates
for low-skill workers are significantly larger in magnitude (oL = -0.299 versus o.H _
-0.188). Also, the difference between these coefficients is highly significant (p <
0.001). To compare to the baseline estimates, the mobility costs are roughly four
times larger for low-skill workers and two times larger for high-skill workers when
ignoring housing costs and transfer payments. 44
42I assume the marginal migrant has 25 years of working life remaining and thus must trade
off remaining to face permanently lower wage and employment opportunities against paying the
one-time mobility cost to out-migrate and avoid the adverse wage and employment consequences.
43Wages did not respond asymmetrically but population and employment did, which suggests
constant returns to scale. If there were decreasing returns to scale, then the asymmetric response
of employment to the local labor demand shock would imply an asymmetric wage response, as well.
44 The estimated mobility cost functions are also statistically significantly convex, implying that
The third and fourth rows report model estimates when only housing and only
transfers are "shut down", respectively. The estimated mobility cost functions from
these rows and the first two rows are graphed in Figure 6. Both the figure and
the model estimates (see column (7) of row 4) suggest that transfer payments are
responsible for a majority of the relative difference in mobility by skill. However,
the magnitudes of mobility cost estimates are much larger for both types of workers
when housing expenditures are ignored. In other words, the asymmetric population
response for both high-skill and low-skill workers to exogenous labor demand shocks
is primarily due to the asymmetric housing supply curve.
Rows 5 and 6 in Table 11 report estimates which impose alternative values of cH,L-
First, I impose rH,L = 50, which corresponds to the two types of labor being close
to perfect substitutes. The next row imposes UH,L= 0.05, which corresponds to the
two types being close to perfect complements. In both cases, the estimates of the
housing supply curve and mobility costs are not greatly affected; however, comparing
these two rows to the baseline (row 1), it is worth noting that the fit of the model is
best when using UH,L =1.4 as opposed to the other extreme values.
The next row of Table 11 (row 7) uses an alternative measure of wages. As dis-
cussed above, the preferred measure of wages ("adjusted wages") assumes that most
of the observed change in labor force participation is involuntary. This measure was
chosen to provide an upper bound of estimated mobility costs. As an alternative, row
7 reports results using the "residualized wage" measure (see Section 4 for definition).
Since residualized wages do not account for changes in labor force participation, the
estimated mobility cost parameters are much lower. In fact, for low-skill workers I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that mobility costs are zero. Overall, I conclude
that these results suggest that mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers
are at most modest. Even under the extreme assumption that reservation wages are
negligible, the estimated mobility costs are still much lower than would be implied
by focusing solely on wages.4 5
the mobility cost of the marginal out-migrant rises faster than the marginal in-migrant, although
the magnitude of the convexity is not large.
4 5The final row reports estimates which drop the labor demand curve moments. The reason why
One use of the GMM estimates is to construct out-of-sample counterfactual simu-
lations of alternative policies towards social transfers. Figure 7 reports results from
one such simulation. In this simulation, the system of means-tested transfers (sum-
marized by the parameter I) has been replaced by a system of mobility subsidies
which reduces the mobility costs of all workers by 50%.46 Each panel in the figure
shows the response of a different endogenous variable. The figure shows that the mo-
bility subsidies increase magnitude of low-skill out-migration following adverse shocks
relative to the system of means-tested transfer payments. Therefore, the high-skill
population share is much less responsive to shifts in local labor demand with mobility
subsidies. One motivation for such a policy would be if there are strong negative
externalities from increasing concentrations of low-skill workers in a particular area;
in this case, mobility subsidies appear to provide consumption smoothing to low-skill
workers without reducing their incentive to out-migrate.
1.6 Conclusion
Low-skill workers are comparatively immobile. When labor demand slumps in a city,
college-educated workers tend to relocate whereas non-college workers are dispropor-
tionately likely to remain to face declining wages and employment. These facts may
indicate that mobility is disproportionately costly for low-skill workers. This paper
proposes and tests an alternative explanation, which is that the incidence of adverse
labor demand shocks is borne in large part by (falling) real estate rental prices and
(rising) social transfers. The spatial equilibrium model developed in this paper il-
lustrates how wages, employment, population, housing prices, and transfer payments
re-equilibrate after a local labor demand shock. Appropriately parameterized, this
alternative assumptions on the elasticity of substitution did not substantially affect the estimated
mobility cost functions is that the labor demand moments contribute to identification only indirectly
through the optimal GMM weighting matrix estimated in the first step of the two-step procedure.
Therefore, it is not surprising that dropping the labor demand moments entirely does not significantly
affect the estimates of the mobility cost functions (Table 11, row 8).
46Although this is an obviously stylized form of mobility subisidies, it is not an unrealistic approx-
imation if the policy took the form of a tax credit that was indexed to income. Recall that mobility
costs in the model are defined as a fraction of annual income.
model identifies both the magnitude of unobserved mobility costs by skill and the
shape of the local housing supply curve.
Using U.S. Census data, nonlinear reduced form estimates of the effect of plausibly
exogenous labor demand shocks document that positive labor demand shocks increase
population more than negative shocks reduce population, that this asymmetry is
larger for low-skill workers, and that such an asymmetry is absent for wages, housing
values, and rental prices.
These facts are consistent with the presence of limited mobility costs for high-skill
and low-skill workers and a concave housing supply curve (most likely due to a durable
housing stock). Estimates of a full spatial equilibrium model using a nonlinear,
simultaneous equations GMM estimator are consistent with the reduced form evidence
and suggest that the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of low-
skilled workers is not higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of
adverse local demand shocks.
The finding that mobility costs are limited for both high-skill and low-skill workers
is a necessary condition to be able to properly interpret changes in housing values due
to changes in observed local amenities as a valid marginal willingness to pay for the
amenity (see, for example, Chay and Greenstone (2003)). The results in this paper
suggest that the assumption of perfect mobility may be a valid approximation in some
of these hedonic studies, especially when evaluating changes in local amenities over
decadal time horizons.4 7
One important area of future work is how the incidence of local labor market
shocks is shared between homeowners and renters. On the one hand, homeowners'
''user cost" of housing has declined following a negative labor demand shock; on the
other hand, however, declines in housing values have a negative wealth effect which
may affect how responsive the household is to local labor demand shocks. A full
471t is worth stressing that even over decadal time horizons the assumption of perfect mobility
is only an approximation. The preferred GMM estimates in this paper imply non-negligible mag-
nitudes of mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers following large negative shocks,
suggesting that it may be appropriate to estimate hedonic models which incorporate barriers to
migration when the underlying changes in local amenities are large. See Bayer et al (2008) for work
in this direction.
assessment of the incidence of local labor market shocks thus awaits further study.
Another important area of future work is looking at individual transfer programs.
For example, the federal disability insurance program rules suggest that the take-up
decision is generally a once-and-for-all choice, so that disability insurance receipt is
an absorbing state (Autor and Duggan, 2003). The econometric setup in this paper
could be used to test whether positive shifts in local labor demand increase DI takeup
by less than negative shifts increase DI takeup.
Lastly, the finding that mobility costs are limited suggests that transfer payments
may be significantly crowding out the individual migration decision for low-skill work-
ers, which is consistent with the results in the recent "welfare magnetism" literature
(see, for example, Gelbach (2004)). This implies that the social efficiency of public
insurance programs may depend on the geographic breadth of an adverse labor de-
mand shock, since when a shock is geographically broad (as during a recession), the
gains to relocation are small and there is less scope for transfer payments to crowd
out migration.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Data Appendix
U.S. Census Data
The sample of adults used in the analysis includes all individuals between the age
of 18 and 64, were not in group quarters such as prisons and psychiatric institutions,
and who lived in a metropolitan area available in the Census IPUMS. All available
MSAs are used in analysis except for Biloxi-Gulfport, MS, Flint, MI, and Reno,
NV. These MSAs are dropped because of obvious mismeasurement of the labor
demand shock. Specifically, in at least one of the decades in the sample, these MSAs
experienced a greater than one standard deviation labor demand shock according to
the predicted labor demand instrument but experienced a greater than one standard
deviation change in population and rental prices of the opposite magnitude. All
results including these cities are similar to the main results in Tables 2 through 4.
Individuals are dropped if they report business income, farm income or work in
farming or agriculture. Individual labor supply is measured by multiplying weeks
worked times usual weekly hours worked. To be included in the sample of workers
used to construct the predicted employment measure, the worker must be in the labor
force and have positive and non-missing hours worked and annual income.
Individual hourly wages are computed by dividing yearly wage and salary income
by the product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours worked. Topcoded yearly
wage income values are multiplied by 1.5 and (following Autor and Dorn (2009))
hourly wages are set not to exceed this value divided by (50 weeks x 35 hours).
Local area wage statistics are computed based on the sample of workers who work at
least 35 weeks and at least 30 hours per week. Wages are deflated using the CPI-U
series.
In order to construct an estimate of the local area wage premium, log wages
of the sample described above are regressed on MSA fixed effects, a quadratic in
potential experience (age - years of education - 6), 14 industry dummy variables,
6 occupation category dummy variables, and dummy variables for gender, veteran
status, marital status, and race. This regression is run each decade and in each
decade is run separately for workers with and without a college degree. In each case,
the magnitude of the MSA fixed effects corresponds to the local area wage premium.
All regressions and calculations of local area averages are computed using the Census
individual sampling weights.
The rental price and housing value local area premiums are computed similarly
to the wage premiums; namely, I regress the log of these variables on a quadratic
in the number of bedrooms and the number of rooms and an interaction between
number of bedrooms and number of rooms. These regressions and calculations of
(unconditional) average rental prices and housing values use the Census household
weights since the housing value and rental price data are reported at the household
level. Topcoded rental prices and housing values are multiplied by 1.5.
Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
The REIS data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.4 8 I aggregate the
county-level data into MSAs using the 1990 MSA definitions. When a county spans
multiple MSAs I use 1990 population weights to assign fractions of the county totals
across the various MSAs.
County Business Patterns (CBP)
The County Business Patterns data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau and
the ICPSR data repository.49 I used the 1979, 1989, and 1997 CBP data to match
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census data described above. The 1997 CBP data were
chosen because the 1998 and 1999 CBP data use the NAICS industry codes, while the
CBP data before 1997 used SIC codes. I use 3-digit SIC industry codes to construct
the alternative measure of predicted employment. Roughly 35 percent of the county-
by-industry employment cells are suppressed. In these cases, I observe the number of
establishments in each establishment size bin and a flag indicating the range of actual
48See this website for more information: http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm#step2.
49I downloaded the 1989 and 1997 CBP data from the following URL:
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/historical.htm. The 1979 CBP data were downloaded from
ICPSR at the following URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00022.
employment. To compute predicted employment for these cells, I run a regression
each year using the non-suppressed data and use this regression to compute predicted
employment for suppressed cells from the fitted values. I then compare total county
employment from the raw CBP data to the total county employment computed using
the non-suppressed cells and the predicted employment values. If these two values
are not within 1%, then I scale all of the predicted employment values by a scalar
so as to make the two totals equal, and I then check again that the predicted values
lie within the ranges indicated by the employment flag and I continue to repeat this
procedure until the two totals are within 1%.
1.8.2 Comparative Statics
This subsection derives comparative statics for the model described in Section 2 in
the special case when there are constant returns to scale (a = 1). The comparative
statics are derived for the following three scenarios:
" Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
" Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve
* Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
This case corresponds to the following restrictions on the housing supply curve and
the mobility cost functions: cL(ALit) = 0, cH(AHit) = 0, and AHs(Ap') . AP h
With no mobility costs and a constant housing supply elasticity, the model readily
admits a closed-form solution. Additionally, in this case all endogenous variables
respond symmetrically - meaning that equal-sized positive and negative exogenous
labor demand shocks cause positive and negative shifts of equal magnitude in all of
the endogenous variables (AwH, 'AWL AHit, ALit, Aph, Atit). Mathematically, this
means that changes in the endogenous variables are linear functions of the exogenous
labor demand shocks; i.e., Axit = KXAOit where x is one of the endogenous variables
in the model. To derive these results, first note that with no mobility costs, housing
prices will respond symmetrically to both high-skill and low-skill wages:
1_w
Api = H it
Sh
Apt = (((1 - sL) + sj JL) /S)AWL (FL/SL) AWL
Next, note that with constant returns to scale, wages for high-skill and low-skill
workers can be written as follows:
7r - Awf +(1 -7) _ AWL = Aoi
Combining the three previous expressions gives the following:
Aw/ (sHFL/ (7rSHFL + (1 - 7)S)) Ait RwH A6i
Awf (sL/ (7rsHFL + (1 - 7)S)) Aoit L Ait
A (F'L/ (7Sj/FL ± (1 - 7)SL)) 'AO~t k'p _ 'A62
In other words, with no mobility costs for workers and firms, wages and housing
prices respond symmetrically. Transfer payments will also respond symmetrically
since transfer payments are a log-linear function of low-skill wages: i.e., AtL = XFL.
RwL ,AOt KtR. AOt.
Finally, with a constant housing supply elasticity, the migration response is also
symmetric, since AHit and ALit can be written as linear functions of Aw[/, AWn,
and Apt. Simple algebra gives the following two expressions:
AHt= R HOt
ALit R= LAOt
where RH and RL are constants that can be written in terms of the primitive pa-
rameters of the model (a, p, ir, s/H I SI 50 In summary, the log-linearity of the
housing supply curve and the absence of mobility costs implies that all endogenous
variables respond symmetrically to the exogenous labor demand shock.
Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve
Formally, this case can be written as follows: cL(ALit) = 0, cH(AHit) = 0, and
AHs(Aph) is increasing in Ap'. As in the previous case (and following the same
derivation), wages, housing prices, and transfer payments all respond symmetrically,
with the same constant terms as above:
AwH_ - wHAOit; AWL = wLAO; Aph RpA Oit; AtL = tAO~t
sw w it it0 gw$ i pt $ it i
In case 2, however, population no longer responds symmetrically to the exoge-
nous shock. To see this, go back to the housing market equilibrium condition and
substitute the expressions above:
RPAO0t + AHS(P\Oit) ( gKwH + (1 - s)kwL + sk t )AOit + AHit + ALit
Since the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor is con-
stant, we know that AwH - AwL = (p - 1)(AHit - AL t). Combining these two
expressions gives the following expressions for AHit and ALit:
AHit= -2(A AH ggit+ a Hs t g
AHit = 1l(AHAit + AHs(Rkz6it))21(A
A~e= g AAji ± AHs(RAOt)
50The constants RH and RL are defined as follows:
KH (KwH - KwL) - (p _ 1) KwH + FKwL - KP(1 +a))
2 (p - 1)sH
RL RH _ (kwH _ wL)(p _ 1)
where AH and AL are constant terms. Since AHS(x) is increasing in x, these
expressions imply that AHit and ALit are increasing in A6it. In other words, because
the housing supply curve is concave, the responsiveness of high-skill and low-skill pop-
ulation to exogenous shocks is convex - positive local labor demand shocks increase
population more than negative shocks reduce population. It is also possible to show
that if s"H < sL < l and XpL < 0, and sL > 0, then decreases in local labor demand
will reduce the fraction high-skill workers in the population.5 2
Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
Formally, this case can be defined as follows: cL(ALit) and cH(AHit) are declining
and convex functions and AHs(Aph) = o- Aph. In this case, the convexity of the
mobility cost functions imply that the mobility cost of the marginal migrant is greater
in magnitude for decreases in population than for equal-sized increases in population.
As mentioned in the introduction, one way this could arise is if the city is small
relative to the rest of the world, so that the mobility cost of the marginal in-migrant
is negligible. In this case, cH(AHit) would be defined such that cH(AH) = 0 for all
AHit > 0, but cH(AHit) is decreasing in AHit for all AHit < 0.
In the case where high-skill and low-skill labor differ only in productivity (i.e.,
sHH S qH _ XpL = T, and cL(X) = CH(X) VX), it can
be shown that wages still respond symmetrically as in the previous two cases. By
simplifying the problem to make high-skill and low-skill workers identical except for
their efficiency units of labor, it is straightforward to show that AwHt it
and that AHit = ALit. These simplifications result in the following expressions for
51 The constants AH and AL are defined as follows:
AH - + KwH + KwL _ (KwH _ KwL)/(p _ 1)
AL = AH _ (wH _KwL)/(p_ 1)
52To see this, note that AH -AL = (KwH - KwL) /(p- 1). A. If 3L > S, TL < 0, and sL > 0,
then (KwH - KwL) < 0. Since p - 1 < 0 (since cYH,L > 0), this implies (KwH - KwL) /(p - 1) > 0.
Thus declines in A6 will reduce AH - AL.
housing market and labor supply conditions, respectively:
Apit (1 + o) - 2sh(PAOjt + AHOt) = 0 (1.8)
c(AHit) + FAO6t - sh/pi= 0
where F = (1 - st)+ st. Combining these expressions gives the following:
2ShAHit - (1 + )c(AHit) = (1 + o- - 2sh)FAOt
Since c(AHit) is declining and convex, this implies that AHit is convex in Ait."
Since AHit is convex in A6it, then by equation (1.8), Aph is convex in A6it. In
other words, unlike the other cases, in this case housing prices respond asymmetri-
cally, where positive shocks increase housing prices more than negative shocks reduce
housing prices. The intuition is that the convexity of mobility cost function makes
out-migration disproportionately costly (as compared to in-migration). Because of
these mobility costs, following negative shocks workers are willing to pay more for
housing than they would in the absence of mobility costs, which bids up the price of
housing following price declines.
1.8.3 Model Simulation Details
The data used to create Figure 3 are simulated from the model described in Section 2.
The same parameters used in the GMM estimation are used in the simulation; i.e.,
sL = 0.05, sL = 0.34, s = 0.30, p = 0.29, 7r = 0.45. The returns-to-scale parameter
a = 1 is used, and the transfer payment elasticity used is TL = -5.0. The mobility
cost functions and housing supply function are parameterized as they are in the
GMM estimator: i.e., cL(x) = Ulexp3( LX) _ 1)/L, CH(X) = UH (exp(OHX) _ H
AHS(x) - ah(exp(3hX) - 1)0h. The values of these parameters depend on the
5 3 Formally, a sufficient condition for this result to hold is that (1 - st) + stxP > 0 and sh <
((1 - st) + st')(1 + o). In words, transfer payments provide partial wage insurance, and housing
expenditure share cannot be so large so-that negative shocks would cause net in-migration of low-skill
labor.
scenario as follows:
" Case 1: oH = L = 1 h -4.0 Oh -0
" Case 2: oH _ L =0 1h .0Oh -4.0
" Case 2: (H = -0.2 1  H = = _100, = 4.0, Oh - 0
1.8.4 A Simple Model of Durable Housing
This section outlines a model to provide simple microfoundations for a concave hous-
ing supply curve (i.e., housing supply elasticity that is larger for increases in housing
demand than for decreases in housing demand). As in Section 2, the model here is a
two period model, where a single city is shocked out of a large number of cities. The
model includes a labor market and a housing market. Production of a homogeneous
tradable good is constant returns to scale and uses only (homogeneous) labor as an
input. All workers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences for housing and the
tradable good, so that expenditure share on housing (sh) is constant.
Housing is supplied by absentee landlords who live in other cities. The housing
supply is homogeneous in terms of workers' willingness-to-pay but there are het-
erogeneous costs to supplying housing (arising, perhaps, from topographic features
of the land). This is modeled by assuming that the maximum housing supply is
gs (where Hs is assumed to be large enough so that we are not close to a cor-
ner solution) and that the cost of supplying an infinitesimal unit of housing is dis-
tributed according to the following density function: f(c) =h (c/a)" - , where c
is drawn from the closed interval [0, e]. This results in an aggregate housing sup-
ply curve of Hs(p) = foh [S f(c)dc = js . (ph/ . Thus the initial housing
market equilibrium is given by the following supply-demand equilibrium condition:
fl S .(ph / ) Oh = ft Ds n/ph
Using a similar simplifying assumption as in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), I as-
sume that housing is occasionally (and randomly) destroyed, and that the cost of
rebuilding is the same as the initial cost of building. Mathematically, I assume that
just before the labor demand shock, a random fraction 6 of the initial housing supply
collapses and needs to be re-built. For increases in housing demand, all housing
that collapsed is immediately rebuilt in between periods, and housing supply further
expands according to the elasticity of housing supply (or"). For decreases in housing
demand, however, the "effective" housing supply elasticity is now only 6 - orh because
some of the housing that was previously built does not collapse and cannot be de-
stroyed. Unless 6 = 1 (i.e., housing is not durable at all and completely collapses
between periods), these assumptions imply that the housing supply curve is nonlinear,
asymmetric, and concave.
The equilibrium changes in wages, population, and housing prices following an
exogenous labor demand shock (A632 ) are as follows. The wage change in the city
receiving the shock is Awit = A64t. Perfect mobility of workers implies that Awei =
ShApt. This implies that Ap' = AOit/sh. In other words, both wages and housing
prices respond symmetrically. For positive labor demand shocks, population increases
by Anit = (1+ o h)Aph - Awat = (1 ± Och - Sh)/Sh - AO6. For negative labor demand
shocks, population decreases by Anit = (1 + 6 -o - Sh)/Sh - A63t. Assuming sh > 0,
oh > 0 and 0 < 6 < 1, then positive shocks increase population more than equal-sized
negative shocks reduce population.
The key difference between this model and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko
(2005) is that the marginal value and the average value of housing are equal in the
simple model in this section, while in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) housing units have
heterogeneous, location-specific amenities, which causes average housing prices to re-
spond asymmetrically due to compositional changes in the location-specific amenities
in the housing stock. The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that housing
prices respond symmetrically to exogenous labor demand shocks, which is more con-
sistent with the model in this paper and suggests that location-specific amenities
are not qualitatively important in determining equilibrium housing values and rental
prices.
1.8.5 GMM Estimation
There are 30 empirical moments given by the following vector:
m - (m 1 m 2 , m 3, m 4 m 5 )'
where
d
m=
Aeh(AO)d
AewH (o)d
AeWL (AO)d
AeH (AO)d
AeL (AO)d
zdet (AO)d
The orthogonality conditions are summarized as E[m] = 0. The parameters to
estimate are given by the following vector:
p (oh-, Oh H1 3 H L L 7a)
The two-step GMM estimator is implemented by first estimating /0 as follows:
0 = arg min m'm
This estimate is then used to form the following:
O N
< N mi(/00) - m'i(00)
Next, 2 is re-estimated as follows:
2 GMM _ argminm'( 
-
1 m
Inference is done by computing the following variance-covariance matrix:
11-1
N iv
where s1P is re-estimated using ,L"'I instead of 3O, and C is given by the following:
1 N
i=1
09mi/D/3
&M21ao
Finally, the overidentification statistic is given by:
m'(/GMM). (-O)-1 m( GMM)- 4 X2 (row(m) - row(O))
Table I
Summary Statistics
Standard Percentiles
Variable Name N Mean Dev. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
U.S. Census Data (IPUMS)
Adult population (in millions) 645 0.425 0.856 0.060 0.093 0.177 0.392 1.477
Employment (in millions) 645 0.303 0.596 0.041 0.067 0.127 0.283 1.036
Employment-to-population ratio 645 0.711 0.051 0.625 0.680 0.714 0.748 0.786
Income per adult (in $000s) 645 14.979 3.167 10.516 12.871 14.664 16.674 20.079
Residualized wage ($) 645 11.545 1.207 9.801 10.718 11.399 12.304 13.712
Residualized wage, LFP adjusted ($) 645 8.225 1.131 6.593 7.496 8.142 8.911 10.095
College share of adult population 645 0.190 0.063 0.105 0.143 0.181 0.226 0.305
College share of employment 645 0.221 0.065 0.131 0.173 0.213 0.257 0.341
Average housing value (in $000s) 645 97.449 45.450 58.005 71.527 84.774 107.212 196.809
Average gross rent (in $000s) 645 5.229 1.014 4.055 4.579 5.017 5.581 7.196
REIS Data
Food stamps + Income Maintenance 645 0.652 0.325 0.247 0.429 0.594 0.792 1.286
(in $000s per non-college adult)
Notes: Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 215 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and all observations are MSA-year. IPUMS data are the
1980, 1990, and 2000. The REIS data are county-level and annual, but are aggregated to MSAs using the 1990 MSA definitions. All dollar values
in this table are nominal, but all dollar-valued variables are converted to real dollars in the analysis. All specifications in subsequent tables are in
first differences, so the three decades in this data set become two 10-year changes (thus, N=430 in the regressions that follow).
Table 2
Effects of Local Labor Demand Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Residualized
Wage, LFP
Income Residualized Adjusted
Emp-to-Pop per 18-64 Average ("Adjusted
Dependent Variable: Population Employment Ratio Adult Local Wage Wage")
% Change in predicted employment (fl) 1.800 2.054 0.089 0.959 0.353 0.520
(0.445) (0.466) (0.038) (0.137) (0.086) (0.109)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (j) 28.004 32.529 1.210 0.376 -0.753 1.454
(7.898) (9.096) (0.797) (2.858) (1.640) (2.422)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.130] [0.896] [0.647] [0.549]
Marginal effect at -a -0.115 -0.170 0.007 0.933 0.404 0.420
(0.838) (0.887) (0.054) (0.202) (0.154) (0.171)
[0.891] [0.848] [0.905] [0.000] [0.009] [0.015]
Marginal effect at +a 3.716 4.279 0.172 0.984 0.301 0.619
(0.528) (0.648) (0.076) (0.271) (0.128) (0.222)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.000] [0.019] [0.006]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.523 0.624 0.493
R2 0.318 0.355 0.603 0.671 0.470 0.342
N 430 430 430 430 430 430
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a
balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods, except for column (3) where it is the percentage point
change. The Residualized Wage in column (5) controls for observed compositional changes in the labor force between periods. The Adjusted Wage in
column (6) uses the Residualized Wage and additionally accounts for changes in labor force participation. See text and Data Appendix for more
details. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in
industry employment shares. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix
for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 3
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks by Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Adult College Total Adjusted
Adult Population, Share of Total Employed, College Residualized Residualized Adjusted Wage,
Population, Non- Adult Employed, Non- Share of Wage, Wage, Wage, Non-
Dependent Variable: College College Population College College Employed College Non-College College College
% Change in predicted employment (fl) 1.923 1.607 0.051 2.194 1.858 0.039 0.297 0.345 0.467 0.513
(0.544) (0.436) (0.024) (0.553) (0.458) (0.027) (0.080) (0.085) (0.099) (0.107)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.036] [0.000] [0.000] [0.151] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (6) 35.196 28.051 -0.816 36.970 32.886 -1.021 -1.319 -0.827 -0.498 1.520
(10.359) (7.685) (0.349) (10.988) (8.829) (0.376) (1.397) (1.625) (2.008) (2.367)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.020] [0.001] [0.000] [0.007] [0.346] [0.611] [0.804] [0.521]
Marginal effect at -a -0.484 -0.312 0.107 -0.335 -0.392 0.109 0.387 0,402 0.501 0.409
(0.977) (0.834) (0.033) (0.986) (0.881) (0,037) (0.138) (0.151) (0.166) (0.166)
[0.621] [0.709] [0.001] [0.735] [0.657] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.015]
Marginal effect at +a 4.330 3.525 -0.005 4.722 4.107 -0.031 0.207 0.289 0.433 0.617
(0.801) (0.487) (0.035) (0.876) (0.610) (0.038) (0.109) (0.127) (0.173) (0.218)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.888] [0.000] [0.000] [0.415] [0.059] [0.024] [0.013] [0.005]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.614 0.592 0.663 0.453
R2 0.547 0.243 0.770 0.558 0.264 0.751 0.434 0.659 0.472 0.210
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of215 MSAs. Dependent variable is
always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry
employment shares. See text and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each
metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 4
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks on Housing Market
and Public Assistance Expenditures
(1) (2) (3)
Food Stamps +
Residualized Residualized Income
Housing Rental Maintenance
Dependent Variable: Values Prices Expenditures
% Change in predicted employment (f) 0.718 0.838 -2.366
(0.356) (0.150) (0.615)
[0.045] [0.000] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6) -2.641 -0.998 -21.772
(6.257) (2.742) (12.137)
[0.673] [0.716] [0.074]
Marginal effect at -a 0.898 0.906 -0.877
(0.566) (0.238) (1.017)
[0.114] [0.000] [0.390]
Marginal effect at +a 0.537 0.770 -3.855
(0.548) (0.242) (1.049)
[0.328] [0.002] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.328 0.606 0.149
R2 0.142 0.097 0.401
N 430 430 430
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and
2000 census extracts and the REIS database. The REIS database contains total county-level expenditures on
Food Stamps and Income Maintenance programs. These data are aggregated to MSAs using 1990 MSA
definition and adjusted per non-college capita using MSA population estimates from the Census. Final sample
is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The %
Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition
with national changes in industry employment shares. See text and Data Appendix for more details. All
specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 5
Effects of Alternative Measures of Labor Demand Shocks on Population
Dependent Variable: % Change in Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Change in predicted employment (1) 1.800 3.766 2.169 1.853 1.691 2.193
(0.445) (0.667) (0.538) (0.455) (0.579) (0.546)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (6) 28.004 30.572 35.244 30.646 45.847 43.286
(7.898) (10.671) (13.344) (8.721) (12.446) (13.340)
[0.000] [0.005] [0.009] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Marginal effect at -a -0.115 2.480 0.170 -0.214 -0.984 -0.311
(0.838) (0.567) (1.097) (0.847) (1.105) (1.074)
[0.891] [0.000] [0.877] [0.801] [0.374] [0.772]
Marginal effect at +or 3.716 5.051 4.167 3.920 4.365 4.698
(0.528) (0.986) (0.722) (0.623) (0.709) (0.795)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.001
R2 0.318 0.306 0.306 0.311 0.321 0.312
N 430 430 430 430 430 430
Industries Used to Construct Predicted Employment Change
All Industries X
Drop Trending Industries X
Drop Volatile Industries X
Drop Stable Industries X
Drop Other Industries X
Drop Catch-All Industries X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000
census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across
periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial
composition with national changes in industry employment shares. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification;
remaining columns construct predicted employment changes using subsets of industries. See text, Table Al, and Data
Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 6
Effects of Alternative Measures of Labor Demand Shocks on Wages
Dependent Variable: % Change in Adjusted Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Change in predicted employment (/) 0.520 1.180 0.387 0.531 0.478 0.687
(0.109) (0.208) (0.131) (0.102) (0.134) (0.126)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (6) 1.454 2.575 -0.688 1.896 3.315 0.956
(2.422) (4.075) (2.761) (2.270) (3.417) (2.669)
[0.549] [0.528] [0.803] [0.404] [0.333] [0.721]
Marginal effect at -a 0.420 1.072 0.426 0.403 0.285 0.632
(0.171) (0.161) (0.161) (0.173) (0.212) (0.153)
[0.015] [0.000] [0.009] [0.021] [0.182] [0.000]
Marginal effect at +a 0.619 1.288 0.348 0.659 0.671 0.742
(0.222) (0.345) (0.239) (0.194) (0.265) (0.237)
[0.006] [0.000] [0.147] [0.001] [0.012] [0.002]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.493 0.424 0.082 0.278 0.101 0.168
R2 0.342 0.406 0.350 0.374 0.361 0.383
N 430 430 430 430 430 430
Industries Used to Construct Predicted Employment Change
All Industries X
Drop Trending Industries X
Drop Volatile Industries X
Drop Stable Industries X
Drop Other Industries X
Drop Catch-All Industries X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000
census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across
periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial
composition with national changes in industry employment shares. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification;
remaining columns construct predicted employment changes using subsets of industries. See text, Table Al, and Data
Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 7
Effects of Alternative Measures of Labor Demand Shocks on Rental Prices
Dependent Variable: % Change in Rental Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Change in predicted employment (f)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 ()
Marginal effect at -o
Marginal effect at +or
0.838 1.319 0.809 0.903 0.723
(0.150) (0.302) (0.172) (0.151) (0.175)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.988
(0.188)
[0.000]
-0.998 -6.870 -2.063 0.547 0.995 -4.062
(2.742) (5.482) (3.772) (2.947) (3.631) (3.756)
[0.716] [0.212] [0.585] [0.853] [0.784] [0.281]
0.906 1.608 0.926 0.866 0.665 1.223
(0.238) (0.247) (0.264) (0.240) (0.275) (0.241)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000]
0.770 1.030 0.692 0.940
(0.242) (0.477) (0.285) (0.258)
[0.002] [0.032] [0.016] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test
0.781
(0.274)
[0.005]
0.753
(0.328)
[0.023]
0.606 0.447 0.412 0.581 0.064 0.494
0.097 0.116 0.076 0.109 0.063 0.110
430 430 430 430 430 430
Industries Used to Construct Predicted Employment Change
All Industries X
Drop Trending Industries X
Drop Volatile Industries X
Drop Stable Industries X
Drop Other Industries X
Drop Catch-All Industries X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000
census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across
periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial
composition with national changes in industry employment shares. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification;
remaining columns construct predicted employment changes using subsets of industries. See text, Table Al, and Data
Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 8
Alternative Sample Definitions and Alternative Specifications (Population)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Change in predicted employment (f) 1.800 1.440 1.819 1.326 1.367 1.542 0.803
(0.445) (0.309) (0.414) (0.555) (0.947) (0.668) (0.341)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.018] [0.150] [0.022] [0.0191
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6) 28.004 14.523 24.066 25.088 32.682 39.029 18.147
(7.898) (3.857) (7.525) (7.864) (20.336) (23.016) (6.673)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.110] [0.091] [0.007]
Marginal effect at -- -0.172 0.417 0.124 -0.441 -0.936 -1.207 -0.475
(0.852) (0.369) (0.761) (0.901) (1.440) (2.114) (0.625)
[0.840] [0.260] [0.871] [0.625] [0.516] [0.569] [0.448]
Marginal effect at +u 3.773 2.463 3.515 3.093 3.669 4.292 2.082
(0.538) (0.449) (0.571) (0.648) (1.955) (1.296) (0.532)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.062] [0.001] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.002
R2 0.318 0.825 0.248 0.361 0.614 0.308 0.300
N 430 645 528 430 430 408 420
Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications
Baseline Sample X X X X X
Add in 2000-2007 X
Add in non-MSA regions of states X
Region-Specific Linear Time Trends X
MSA-Specific Linear Time Trends X
Drop Outlying 5% Shocks X
Compute predicted employment from CBP X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final
sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted
employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment
shares. See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results; remaining columns either modify baseline
sample or add time-varying controls. Column (2) includes 2000-2007 changes by adding data from the American Community Survey.
Column (3) includes non-MSA regions of each state as "pseudo-MSAs." Column (4) includes region-specific linear time trends. Column (5)
includes MSA-specific linear time trends. Column (6) drops the 5% of observations with largest magnitude in % Change in predicted
employment. Column (7) uses County Business Patterns (CBP) data to construct the predicted employment variable. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time,
are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 9
Alternative Sample Definitions and Alternative Specifications (Wages)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Adjusted Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Change in predicted employment (fl)
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6)
Marginal effect at -or
Marginal effect at +a
p-value of nonparametric specification test
Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications
Baseline Sample
Add in 2000-2007
Add in non-MSA regions of states
Region-Specific Linear Time Trends
MSA-Specific Linear Time Trends
0.520 0.716 0.431 0.595 0.897 0.384 0.403
(0.109) (0.092) (0.096) (0.103) (0.245) (0.119) (0.086)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
1.454 -0.423 0.920 0.237 3.852 2.073 2.073
(2.422) (1.669) (2.225) (2.263) (4.525) (3.575) (1.289)
[0.549] [0.800] [0.679] [0.917] [0.396] [0.563] [0.109]
0.417 0.745 0.366 0.578 0.626 0.238 0.257
(0.175) (0.124) (0.158) (0.165) (0.363) (0.267) (0.099)
[0.018] [0.000] [0.021] [0.001] [0.086] [0.373] [0.010]
0.622 0.686 0.496 0.612 1.169 0.530 0.549
(0.226) (0.170) (0.206) (0.212) (0.438) (0.290) (0.147)
[0.006] [0.000] [0.017] [0.004] [0.008] [0.069] [0.000]
0.493 0.025 0.317 0.595 0.191 0.322 0.346
0.342 0.087 0.337 0.406 0.547 0.340 0.344
430 645 528 430 430 408 420
X X X X
Drop Outlying 5% Shocks X
Compute predicted employment from CBP X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final
sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted
employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment
shares. See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results; remaining columns either modify baseline
sample or add time-varying controls. Column (2) includes 2000-2007 changes by adding data from the American Community Survey.
Column (3) includes non-MSA regions of each state as "pseudo-MSAs." Column (4) includes region-specific linear time trends. Column (5)
includes MSA-specific linear time trends. Column (6) drops the 5% of observations with largest magnitude in % Change in predicted
employment. Column (7) uses County Business Patterns (CBP) data to construct the predicted employment variable. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time,
are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 10
Alternative Sample Definitions and Alternative Specifications (Rental Prices)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Rental Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Change in predicted employment (/) 0.838 0.973 0.800 0.715 0.927 0.831 0.860
(0.150) (0.134) (0.134) (0.146) (0.363) (0.179) (0.121)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.011] [0.000] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6) -0.998 -0.254 0.173 -2.078 4.139 2.649 1.707
(2.742) (1.808) (2.629) (2.547) (5.964) (5.433) (1.976)
[0.716] [0.888] [0.9481 [0.416] [0.488] [0.6261 [0.389]
Marginal effect at -a 0.908 0.991 0.788 0.861 0.636 0.644 0.740
(0.243) (0.161) (0.216) (0.222) (0.472) (0.380) (0.168)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.180] [0.092] [0.000]
Marginal effect at +a 0.768 0.955 0.812 0.569 1.219 1.017 0.981
(0.246) (0.206) (0.241) (0.241) (0.628) (0.461) (0.200)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.019] [0.054] [0.028] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.606 0.508 0.414 0.585 0.245 0.318 0.181
R2 0.097 0.224 0.072 0.161 0.369 0.082 0.141
N 430 645 528 430 430 408 420
Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications
Baseline Sample X X X X X
Add in 2000-2007 X
Add in non-MSA regions of states X
Region-Specific Linear Time Trends X
MSA-Specific Linear Time Trends X
Drop Outlying 5% Shocks X
Compute predicted employment from CBP X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final
sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted
employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment
shares. See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results; remaining columns either modify baseline
sample or add time-varying controls. Column (2) includes 2000-2007 changes by adding data from the American Community Survey.
Column (3) includes non-MSA regions of each state as "pseudo-MSAs." Column (4) includes region-specific linear time trends. Column (5)
includes MSA-specific linear time trends. Column (6) drops the 5% of observations with largest magnitude in % Change in predicted
employment. Column (7) uses County Business Patterns (CBP) data to construct the predicted employment variable. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time,
are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table 11
GMM Estimates of Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transfer
Housing Supply High-Skill Mobility Low-Skill Mobility HO: Payment Returns to
Curve Cost Function Cost Function or a Elasticity Scale x2 test
Row Model U h fh o H 3" a L fL aL H (/ a statistic
I Baseline Model 0.748 5.283 -0.093 -0.597 -0.070 -0.620 -0.023 -4.467 1.051 19.101
(0.335) (2.436) (0.016) (0.525) (0.015) (0.616) (0.014) (0.420) (0.020) [0.639]
[0.026] [0.031] [0.000] [0.257] [0.000] [0.314] [0.108] [0.000] [0.000]
2 No Housing; No Transfers 1.027 4.733 -0.180 -0.649 -0.289 -0.964 0.109 -4.926 1.042 25.186
(0.314) (2.130) (0.017) (0.291) (0.022) (0.212) (0.016) (0.565) (0.019) [0.288]
[0.001] [0.027] [0.000] [0.026] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
3 No Transfers 1.527 3.177 -0.077 -0.711 -0.137 -0.642 0.060 -5.337 1.047 '20.797
(0.338) (1.274) (0.015) (0.627) (0.017) (0.396) (0.014) (0.539) (0.017) [0.533]
[0.000] [0.013] [0.000] [0.258] [0.000] [0.106] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
4 No Housing 1.039 4.719 -0.180 -0.667 -0.199 -0.990 0.019 -4.834 1.042 25.727
(0.308) (2.054) (0.016) (0.293) (0.016) (0.214) (0.014) (0.483) (0.019) [0.264]
[0.001] [0.022] [0.000] [0.024] [0.000] [0.000] [0.189] [0.000] [0.000]
5 UHL = 50 1.709 3.788 -0.078 0.095 -0.056 0.185 -0.021 -4.400 1.023 29.122
(0.505) (1.495) (0.013) (0.316) (0.013) (0.512) (0.005) (0.392) (0.025) [0.141]
[0.001] [0.012] [0.000] [0.763] [0.000] [0.718] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
6 UHL =0.05 0.072 14.969 -0.108 -1.272 -0.080 -0.931 -0.028 -3.939 1.638 45.799
(0.176) (11.125) (0.011) (0.444) (0.013) (0.430) (0.014) (0.394) (0.020) [0.002]
[0.684] [0.179] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.031] [0.050] [0.000] [0.000]
7 Alternative Wage Measure 0.596 5.856 -0.026 -2.013 -0.003 -10.206 -0.023 -4.594 0.960 25.026
(Residualized Wages) (0.311) (2.679) (0.011) (1.530) (0.004) (3.203) (0.010) (0.438) (0.011) [0.296]
[0.056] [0.029] [0.013] [0.189] [0.462] [0.002] [0.024] [0.000] [0.000]
8 Drop Labor Demand Moments 1.024 4.273 -0.100 -0.384 -0.070 -0.052 -0.029 -4.786 12.460
(0.615) (3.453) (0.021) (0.574) (0.019) (0.648) (0.014) (0.468) [0.490]
[0.097] [0.217] [0.000] [0.504] [0.000] [0.936] [0.040] [0.000]
Notes: All rows report estimates of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. Alternate specifications are presented in each row; parameter
estimates are listed in the columns. See Section 6 of main text and the Appendix for details. Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table Al
Industry Categories (Top 20 List By Average National Employment Share)
Average National Employment
Industry National Growth Rates
Industry Name Code Empl. Share Mean Min Max
Persistently Expanding Industries
Eating and drinking places
Offices and clinics of physicians
Legal services
Computer and data processing services
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
Services incidental to transportation
Services to dwellings and other buildings
Offices and clinics of dentists
Personnel supply services
Landscape and horticultural services
Detective and protective services
Residential care facilities, without nursing
Drugs
Sporting goods, bicycles, and hobby stores
Veterinary services
Retail nurseries and garden stores
Museums, art galleries, and zoos
Offices and clinics of optometrists
Offices and clinics of chiropractors
Persistently Declining Industries
Apparel and accessories, except knit
Aircraft and parts
Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills
Radio, TV, and communication equipment
Railroads
Yarn, thread, and fabric mills
Newspaper publishing and printing
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services
Metalworking machinery
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills
Motor vehicles and equipment
Ship and boat building and repairing
Beverage industries
Air force
Paperboard containers and boxes
Variety stores
Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables
Other rubber products, and plastics footwear and belting
Navy
Other primary metal industries
Stable Industries
Elementary and secondary schools
All construction
Colleges and universities
Grocery stores
Insurance
Department stores
Trucking service
Telephone communications
Motor vehicle dealers
Hotels and motels
Groceries and related products
Religious organizations
Administration of economic programs
Beauty shops
Furniture and home furnishings stores
Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork
Bus service and urban transit
Agricultural production, livestock
Public finance, taxation, and monetary policy
Water supply and irrigation
3.99%
0.93%
0.79%
0.75%
0.47%
0.45%
0.43%
0.43%
0.39%
0.34%
0.30%
0.27%
0.27%
0.23%
0.16%
0.12%
0.11%
0.05%
0.05%
0.89%
0.65%
0.51%
0.48%
0.48%
0.44%
0.44%
0.39%
0.31%
0.31%
0.26%
0.26%
0.20%
0.20%
0.18%
0.18%
0.18%
0.18%
0.18%
0.17%
6.53%
5.94%
2.21%
2.06%
2.02%
1.78%
1.54%
1.21%
0.95%
0.95%
0.74%
0.65%
0.50%
0.44%
0.44%
0.42%
0.40%
0.39%
0.29%
0.18%
14.17% 1.39% 32.78%
25.41% 1.28% 42.59%
32.33% 7.54% 63.76%
75.71% 20.01% 139.09%
15.62% 4.93% 34.52%
50.41% 1.48% 85.46%
30.51% 4.10% 73.12%
26.94% 13.17% 54.00%
35.46% 0.80% 62.28%
55.19% 5.36% 158.68%
42.85% 17.52% 103.97%
86.39% 33.35% 168.29%
12.75% 3.79% 22.01%
17.37% 11.76% 24.11%
40.92% 26.99% 54.86%
61.71% 12.43% 152.46%
56.61% 28.32% 110.27%
25.20% 18.55% 37.94%
92.45% 14.21% 191.25%
-39.17% -59.31% -18.67%
-26.94% -40.51% -10.53%
-26.75% -52.32% -10.65%
-35.55% -42.74% -27.94%
-28.70% -51.27% -6.72%
-33.50% -55.91% -11.45%
-15.78% -20.69% -13.19%
-25.61% -49.71% -6.59%
-26.67% -31.42% -17.49%
-18.36% -32.41% -2.25%
-13.26% -30.43% -5.03%
-21.82% -33.81% -6.93%
-15.67% -31.90% -1.72%
-29.65% -46.78% -12.51%
-21.47% -33.70% -7.28%
-47.74% -48.42% -47.07%
-17.75% -26.05% -8.16%
-33.14% -61.17% -16.64%
-27.63% -41.14% -14.12%
-33.08% -58.09% -8.57%
3.25% -3.59% 7.45%
5.25% 1.61% 7.99%
5.40% -5.68% 16.30%
-0.70% -18.49% 19.74%
-1.90% -10.44% 2.60%
-8.54% -19.40% 11.30%
5.91% 1.36% 10.47%
-9.32% -19.93% 3.16%
-1.76% -8.87% 6.85%
6.60% -9.80% 19.21%
-9.67% -12.00% -6.04%
10.21% 1.45% 19.39%
-11.06% -15.69% 4.20%
-5.35% -16.45% 6.59%
-0.18% -7.68% 5.36%
0.28% -13.17% 10.24%
-8.17% -18.13% 0.34%
-4.56% -13.70% 10.29%
-4.23% -8.72% -0.25%
-1.98% 4.71% 5.08%
Volatile Industries
Justice, public order, and safety 910 2.08% -2.02% -42.53% 26.30%
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 351 1.31% -9.15% -21.15% 24.42%
National security and international affairs 932 1.02% -14.28% -69.36% 50.12%
Automotive repair and related services 751 0.68% 14.32% -23.44% 30.71%
Apparel and accessory stores, except shoe 623 0.64% -5.43% -28.42% 30.70%
Administration of human resources programs 922 0.58% -0.25% -38.36% 29.24%
Management and public relations services 892 0.49% 17.01% -31.54% 54.16%
Radio, tv, and computer stores 633 0.38% 17.95% -32.45% 102.77%
Oil and gas extraction 42 0.38% 7.56% -36.31% 55.97%
Computers and related equipment 322 0.37% -5.86% -39.46% 48.79%
Research, development, and testing services 891 0.36% 31.34% -20.44% 106.12%
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts 362 0.27% 15.85% 48.89% 62.69%
Iron and steel foundries 271 0.23% -22.67% -56.79% 62.60%
Scientific and controlling instruments 371 0.22% 3.56% -22.68% 34.13%
Savings institutions, including credit unions 701 0.22% 8.96% -32.44% 44.24%
Administration of environmental quality and housing programs 930 0.21% 1.66% -50.06% 44.03%
Hardware, plumbing and heating supplies 521 0.20% -2.08% 45.76% 31.74%
Drugs, chemicals, and allied products 541 0.20% 0.38% -26.71% 38.45%
Petroleum refining 200 0.19% -15.09% -32.74% 25.77%
Catalog and mail order houses 663 0.16% 11.19% -23.37% 71.12%
Other Industries
Hospitals 831 4.63% 5.56% -8.14% 22.95%
Banking 700 1.76% 0.40% -20.39% 18.42%
Real estate, including real estate-insurance offices 712 1.26% 11.18% -14.27% 33.53%
Nursing and personal care facilities 832 1.18% 21.88% -8.46% 74.03%
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers 172 1.07% -10.11% -20.00% 10.63%
U.S. postal service 412 0.85% -10.99% -28.24% 1.17%
Agricultural production, crops 10 0.78% -12.45% -28.96% 9.86%
Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 882 0.72% 29.53% -6.11% 67.63%
Machinery, equipment, and supplies 530 0.66% -12.22% -47.76% 19.83%
Child day care services 862 0.66% 39.53% -6.98% 82.69%
Security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies 710 0.63% 29.48% -18.73% 59.34%
Electric light and power 450 0.61% -0.78% -9.00% 21.04%
Air transportation 421 0.59% -8.72% -22.35% 13.89%
Furniture and fixtures 242 0.56% -6.62% -27.01% 4.43%
Drug stores 642 0.53% 4.73% -13.18% 24.10%
Lumber and building material retailing 580 0.52% 15.50% 4.47% 48.91%
Gasoline service stations 621 0.48% -14.80% -28.20% 9.14%
Fabricated structural metal products 282 0.44% -13.01% -27.63% 3.77%
Meat products 100 0.35% -4.13% -25.30% 16.68%
Radio and television broadcasting and cable 440 0.33% 21.23% -5.68% 48.12%
Notes: All industry codes in the Census IPUMS data set are grouped into one of the five categories in this table based on employment
growth during 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2007. The industries within each cataegory are then sorted based on
average employment share of national population and the top 20 industries in each category are listed in this table. See Section 5 in
main text for more details on the industry categories. Industries that are coded as "catch-all" industry codes are excluded from this table.
Table A2
Results for Various Measures of Public Assistance Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Food
Stamps Income Public Retirement
+ Maint- Medical and UL Fraction of
Income Food enance Medicare Benefits Disability Compen- Veterans Population
Dependent Variable: Maint. Stamps Programs Benefits (Medicaid) Benefits SSI Benefits sation Benefits Disabled
% Change in predicted employment (fl) -2.366 -1.965 -4.839 -1.737 -2.150 -1.139 -1.725 -0.377 -0.914 -0.099
(0.615) (0.613) (0.863) (0.631) (1.130) (0.429) (0.639) (0.739) (0.344) (0.023)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.006] [0.058] [0.008] [0.008] [0.610] [0.008] [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6) -21.772 -18.731 -41.354 -22.511 -14.387 -15.743 -3.226 -31.174 1.695 0.429
(12.137) (11.689) (17.538) (12.827) (19.519) (8.952) (11.779) (11.188) (7.369) (0.361)
[0.074] [0.111] [0.019] [0.081] [0.462] [0.080] [0.784] [0.006] [0.818] [0.236]
Marginal effect at -c -0.877 -0.684 -2.010 -0.197 -1.166 -0.062 -1.504 1.755 -1.030 -0.128
(1.017) (0.997) (1.376) (1.184) (1.782) (0.830) (1.202) (0.961) (0.714) (0.029)
[0.390] [0.493] [0.146] [0.868] [0.514] [0.941] [0.212] [0.069] [0.151] [0.000]
Marginal effect at +u -3.855 -3.246 -7.667 -3.276 -3.134 -2.215 -1.945 -2.509 -0.798 -0.070
(1.049) (1.018) (1.572) (0.966) (1.715) (0.654) (0.819) (1.157) (0.484) (0.038)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.069] [0.001] [0.018] [0.031] [0.101] [0.070]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.149 0.230 0.008 0.144 0.026 0.057 0.418 0.015 0.437 0.081
R2  0.401 0.435 0.273 0.796 0.695 0.556 0.531 0.071 0.339 0.045
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430
Nots;. All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data for dependent variables come from the REIS, except for column (10) which uses Census data on disability in the adult
population. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods except for column (10) which reports percentage point changes. The %
Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Section 4 in main text and Data
Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in
parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table A3
Robustness Dropping Each Region
Dependent Variable: % Change in Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop
New Middle East North West North South East South West South Drop Drop
All Regions England Atlantic Central Central Atlantic Central Central Mountain Pacific
% Change in predicted employment (/) 1.800 1.657 2.141 1.658 1.766 1.705 1.836 1.795 1.868 1.762
(0.445) (0.447) (0.545) (0.539) (0.471) (0.380) (0.451) (0.468) (0.455) (0.504)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (6) 28.004 27.833 22.633 29.574 29.336 20.861 27.263 28.835 31.104 30.666
(7.898) (7.975) (8.980) (9.265) (8.347) (7.494) (8.002) (8.161) (8.555) (8.181)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.013] [0.002] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Marginal effect at -u -0.115 -0.246 0.593 -0.365 -0.240 0.279 -0.029 -0.177 -0.259 -0.335
(0.838) (0.869) (1.032) (1.021) (0.898) (0.656) (0.854) (0.873) (0.865) (0.883)
[0.891] [0.777] [0.566] [0.721] [0.789] [0.671] [0.973] [0.840] [0.765] [0.705]
Marginal effect at +a 3.716 3.561 3.688 3.680 3.772 3.132 3.700 3.767 3.995 3.859
(0.528) (0.490) (0.532) (0.584) (0.538) (0.620) (0.526) (0.545) (0.593) (0.596)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2  0.318 0.324 0.338 0.335 0.326 0.229 0.319 0.326 0.300 0.306
N 430 408 382 344 402 360 406 372 404 366
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Columns report results from dropping one of the nine Census regions.
Dependent variable is always the percentage change in population across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial
composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Section 4 in main text and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors,
adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table A4
Alternative Specifications of Adjustment Dynamics (Population)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Change in predicted employment (t)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t)
% Change in predicted employment (t - 1)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 1)
% Change in predicted employment (t - 2)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 2)
1.800 0.783
(0.445) (0.342)
[0.000]
28.004
(7.898)
[0.023]
18.224
(6.699)
[0.000] [0.007]
0.689
(0.336)
[0.041]
19.837
(7.582)
[0.010]
1.260
(1.373)
[0.360]
-7.186
(19.906)
[0.7181
-0.920
(1.767)
[0.603)
18.955
(29.947)
[0.527]
0.476 0.333
(0.284) (0.692)
[0.096] [0.631]
10.668 5.189
(3.435) (6.500)
[0.002] [0.426]
Marginal effect at -a (A)
Marginal effect at +a (B)
p-value of test (A) = (B)
p-value of nonparametric specification test
-0.115 -0.491 -0.699 -0.270 -0.537
(0.838) (0.630) (0.713) (0.459) (0.754)
[0.891] [0.436] [0.329] [0.557] [0.477]
3.716 2.058 2.076 1.222 1.883
(0.528) (0.525) (0.528) (0.258) (0.579)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
0.000 0.007 0.010 0.002
0.000 0.002 0.025 0.439
0.033
0.318 0.300 0.306 0.304 0.310
430 420 420 420 420
Alternative Samples andAternative Specifications
Compute predicted employment from Census
Compute predicted employment from CBP X X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating variants of equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and
2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs in column (1) and 210 MSAs in remaining columns.
Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by
interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.
See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results, while remaining columns construct
predicted employment by using the County Business Patterns (CBP) instead of the Census. All specifications include year
fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area
over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table A5
Alternative Specifications of Adjustment Dynamics (Wages)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Adjusted Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Change in predicted employment (t)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (1 )
% Change in predicted employment (t - 1)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 1)
% Change in predicted employment (t - 2)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 2)
0.522 0.402
(0.109) (0.086)
[0.000] [0.000]
1.458 2.109
(2.427) (1.291)
[0.549] [0.104]
0.347
(0.082)
[0.000]
1.832
(1.196)
[0.127]
0.838
(0.378)
[0.028]
1.603
(3.495)
[0.647]
-0.284
(0.382)
[0.458]
0.398
(3.133)
[0.899]
0.230 -0.134
(0.069) (0.194)
[0.001] [0.489]
0.591 0.183
(0.729) (1.336)
[0.419] [0.891]
Marginal effect at -or (A)
Marginal effect at +a (B)
p-value of test (A) =(B)
p-value of nonparametric specification test
Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications
Compute predicted employment from Census
Compute predicted employment from CBP
0.420 0.255 0.219 0.189 0.264
(0.174) (0.099) (0.103) (0.085) (0.100)
[0.017] [0.011] [0.034] [0.028] [0.009]
0.624 0.550 0.476 0.272 0.575
(0.226) (0.146) (0.130) (0.086) (0.164)
[0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
0.549 0.104 0.127 0.419 0.123
0.494 0.348 0.002 0.013
0.342 0.344 0.337 0.327 0.348
431 420 420 420 420
X X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating variants of equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and
2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs in column (1) and 210 MSAs in remaining columns.
Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by
interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.
See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results, while remaining columns construct
predicted employment by using the County Business Patterns (CBP) instead of the Census. All specifications include year
fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area
over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Table A6
Alternative Specifications of Adjustment Dynamics (Rental Prices)
Dependent Variable: % Change in Rental Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Change in predicted employment ()
(% Change in predicted employment) 2 (t)
% Change in predicted employment (t - 1)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 1)
% Change in predicted employment (t - 2)
(% Change in predicted employment)2 (t - 2)
Marginal effect at -a (A)
Marginal effect at +a (B)
p-value of test (A) = (B)
p-value of nonparametric specification test
0.836
(0.151)
[0.000]
-1.001
(2.756)
[0.717]
0.865
(0.121)
[0.000]
1.753
(1.990)
[0.380]
0.773
(0.122)
[0.000]
1.587
(1.893)
[0.403]
1.466
(0.556)
[0.009]
-0.430
(5.465)
[0.937]
-0.147
(0.589)
[0.803]
1.592
(5.638)
[0.778]
0.518 -0.406
(0.112) (0.282)
[0.000] [0.151]
0.150 0.552
(1.214) (2.240)
[0.902] [0.806]
0.906 0.742 0.662 0.508 0.791
(0.243)
[0.000]
0.766
(0.169)
[0.000]
0.987
(0.164)
[0.000]
0.884
(0.119)
[0.000]
0.529
(0.177)
[0.000]
1.036
(0.246) (0.199) (0.196) (0.158) (0.219)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
0.717 0.380 0.403 0.902 0.436
0.604 0.178 0.184 0.013
0.097 0.141 0.124 0.090 0.152
431 420 420 420 420
Alternative Samples andAlternative Specifications
Compute predicted employment from Census
Compute predicted employment from CBP X X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating variants of equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and
2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs in column (1) and 210 MSAs in remaining columns.
Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by
interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.
See text and Data Appendix for more details. Column (1) reproduces baseline results, while remaining columns construct
predicted employment by using the County Business Patterns (CBP) instead of the Census. All specifications include year
fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area
over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Figure 1: Constant Housing Supply Elasticity
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This figure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply elasticity is constant. The
initial equilibrium wages, labor supply, and housing prices are given by the dot in the center of
the figure. An exogenous increase in wages encourages in-migration until labor supply rises to L+.
At this point, housing prices have risen to completely offset the increase in wages, restoring the
no-arbitrage condition for workers. If there are no mobility costs, then the equilibrium response
of an equal-sized exogenous decrease in wages is symmetric, as shown by LA. If out-migration
is costly, however, then following a negative shock, the marginal out-migrant must be indifferent
between staying and paying c to out-migrate. These mobility costs cause both population and
housing prices to respond asymmetrically: positive shocks increase population and housing prices
more than negative shocks reduce them.
Figure 2: Concave Housing Supply Curve
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This figure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply curve is concave. As the
main text and Appendix describe in more detail, a concave housing supply curve is consistent with
a durable housing stock that is not destroyed once created. As in figure 1, the initial equilibrium
wages, labor supply, and housing prices are given by the dot in the center of the figure. An exogenous
increase in wages encourages in-migration until labor supply rises to L+. At this point, housing
prices have risen to completely offset the increase in wages, restoring the no-arbitrage condition
for workers. If there are no mobility costs, then housing prices still respond symmetrically (pc).
Intuitively, housing costs still must adjust to exactly offset the wage changes. Only population
responds asymmetrically (as shown by LC). If workers have mobility costs, then the asymmetry
of the population response is even greater (see LD), and in this case housing prices also respond
asymmetrically.
DL
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Figure 3: Model Simulations
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This figure displays simulated data from the model described in Section 2. See the Appendix for
more details on the simulation. The graphs clarify that an asymmetric response of population to
the labor demand shock (delta theta) indicates the existence of a concave housing supply curve
and/or the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The response of housing prices isolates the
importance of mobility costs.
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Figure 4: Reduced Form Results
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This figure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data.
See Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparamaetric local linear regressions.
All results include year fixed effects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to
be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Gali-
chon (2003). The 95 percent uniform confidence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap
replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local
linear bandwidth is chosen following Hall (1992).
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Figure 5: Reduced Form Results, Continued
Average Rental Prices
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This figure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data.
See Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparamaetric local linear regressions.
All results include year fixed effects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to
be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Gali-
chon (2003). The 95 percent uniform confidence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap
replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local
linear bandwidth is chosen following Hall (1992).
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Figure 6: GMM Estimates
Estimated Housing Supply Curve
% .5
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This figure reports GMM estimates of the full model. The top figure presents the housing supply
curve that is estimated in the baseline model (Table 11, row 1). The middle and bottom figures
report estimated mobility functions under various assumptions about housing expenditure shares
and transfer payments. See Section 6 and the Appendix for more details on the GMM estimation.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual Simulation
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This figure reports simulations based on GMM estimates of the full model. The GMM estimates
are used to run simulations similar to those presented in Figure 3. The graphs report results of
two simulations: (1) simulation based on estimates of the baseline GMM model using the existing
transfer payment system and (2) counterfactual simulation based on same estimates but transfer
payment system is replaced with mobility subsidies which reduce mobility costs by 50%.
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Chapter 2
Income and Health Spending:
Evidence from Oil Price Shocksi
(Joint work with Amy Finkelstein, MIT and Daron Acemoglu, MIT)
The dramatic rise in health care expenditures is one of the notable economic trends
of the postwar era. As seen in Figure 1, health care expenditure as a share of GDP
in the United States has more than tripled over the last half century, from 5 percent
in 1960 to 16 percent in 2005 (CMS, 2006). A common conjecture is that the rise
in the share of income spent on health care expenditures is a direct, or at least a
natural, consequence of the secular increase in living standards-because health care
is a "luxury good".2 The Economist magazine stated this as a "conventional wisdom"
in 1993, writing:
"As with luxury goods, health spending tends to rise disproportion-
ately as countries become richer." (quoted in Blomqvist and Carter, 1997,
p. 27).
'We are grateful to Amitabh Chandra, Bob Hall, Guy Michaels, Joe Newhouse, and participants
at the NBER Health Care meetings and NBER Labor Studies Summer Institute for helpful com-
ments, to James Wang for outstanding research assistance, and to the National Institute of Aging
(NIA grant numbers P30-AG012810 and T32-AGO00186) for financial support.
2Throughout we use the term "luxury good" to designate an empirical income elasticity greater
than one (and similarly "necessity" refers to an elasticity less than one). This responsiveness to
income may result from preferences, policy or other factors.
This view has recently been forcefully articulated by Hall and Jones (2007). They
argue that the optimal share of spending on health increases as incomes rise, since
spending money on life extension allows individuals to escape diminishing marginal
utility of consumption within a period. The Hall-Jones view also receives indirect
support from the very high estimates of the value of life and value of health provided
by Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy and Topel (2003, 2006). The fact that most other
OECD countries have also experienced substantial growth in their health sector over
the last half century (OECD, 2004) also makes the secular rise in incomes a natural
candidate to explain the rise in the health share of GDP in the United States.
Understanding the extent to which the rise in the health share of GDP is a direct
consequence of the rise in living standards is important for several reasons. First, it
enables a proper accounting of the notable growth in the US (and OECD) health care
sector over the last half century. Second, it is necessary for forecasting how health
care spending is likely to evolve in coming years. Finally, it is a crucial first step
towards an assessment of the optimality of the growth of the health care sector. In
particular, if health spending is strongly increasing in income, so that rising income
can explain most or all of the rising health share, it would be more likely that the
increasing share of GDP allocated to health is socially optimal.3
The relationship between income and health spending is the subject of a volumi-
nous empirical literature. Remarkably, however, virtually all existing estimates are
based on simple correlations of income and health care spending, across individuals,
across countries, or over time. These correlations are consistent with income elastic-
ities ranging from close to zero to substantially above one.4 In light of the paucity of
existing evidence, Hall and Jones (2007) conclude their paper by stating that "Our
3 0f course a large role for income would only be suggestive, not dispositive. A systematic analysis
of social optimality would also have to consider potential externalities in health provision and in
health R&D, as well as informational and institutional constraints in the health care market.
4 OECD (2006) provides a recent survey of the large empirical literature on the correlation between
income and health spending (see particularly Annex 2B). The cross-sectional relationship across
individuals between income and health spending tends to be small or negative (e.g., Newhouse and
Phelps 1976). In contrast, cross-country analysis tends to suggest income elasticities greater than 1
(e.g., Newhouse 1977, Gerdtham and Jonsson 2000), as do time-series analyses of the relationship
between income growth and growth in health spending for individual countries (e.g., Fogel 1999).
model makes the strong prediction that if one looks hard enough and carefully enough,
one ought to be able to see income effects [with elasticities above 1] in the micro data.
Future empirical work will be needed to judge this prediction."
Our objective is to provide "causal" estimates of the effect of income on aggregate
health spending. There are (at least) two important challenges in this exercise. The
first is that income and health covary at the individual or regional level for a variety
of reasons. Therefore, simple correlations are unlikely to reveal the causal effect of
income on health spending.
A second challenge is that an investigation of the role that rising income plays in
the growth of the health care sector requires incorporating the general equilibrium
effects of income on health spending. Partial and general equilibrium income elastic-
ities may differ for a variety of reasons. For example, the general equilibrium effect
of rising income may be larger than the partial equilibrium effect if an increase in the
demand for health care from a community (a "general equilibrium change") prompts
changes in medical practices, including the adoption (and possibly development) of
new technologies.5 Alternatively, if the supply of health care is less than perfectly
elastic and the price elasticity of demand for health care is greater than one, the
responsiveness of health care expenditures to an increase in income may be lower in
general equilibrium than in partial equilibrium. In addition, changes in income may
also affect health care policy through a variety of political economy channels, either
magnifying or curtailing the direct effect of income on health expenditures. Many of
the potential general equilibrium effects are "local" in the sense that they result from
changes in incomes in a particular region or local economy. These effects can be de-
tected by looking at the response of health spending to income in the local economy.
In addition, there may also exist national or even global general equilibrium effects,
which will be harder to detect empirically.
We confront both of these challenges. By exploiting potentially exogenous varia-
tion in local area incomes, we attempt to estimate causal elasticities that incorporate
5 Finkelstein (2007), for example, argues that, for such reasons, the general equilibrium effect of
health insurance coverage on health spending is larger than the partial equilibrium effect.
local general equilibrium effects. On the basis of our estimates and additional evi-
dence, we also argue below that national or global general equilibrium income effects
are unlikely to be significant in this instance.
Our strategy is to exploit the time-series variation in global oil prices between
1970 and 1990, which impacted incomes differentially across different parts of the
(Southern) United States that vary in the oil intensity of the local economy. In
our baseline specification we approximate local economies by economics sub-regions
(ESRs), which consist of groups of counties within a state that have strong economic
ties. We focus on the South of the United States to increase the comparability of
the ESRs, in particular to minimize the likelihood of differential trends in health care
expenditure driven by other factors. Our empirical strategy exploits the interaction
between global oil prices and ESR-level importance of oil in the economy as an instru-
ment for income. Our main proxy for the importance of oil is the size of pre-existing
oil reserves in an ESR. The identifying assumption is that the interaction between
global oil price changes and local oil reserves should have no effect on changes in the
demand for health care, except through income. We provide several pieces of evi-
dence that are supportive of the validity of this identifying assumption. Using this
instrumental-variable strategy we estimate an elasticity of ESR-level hospital spend-
ing with respect to ESR-level income of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21). Point estimates
of the income elasticity from a wide range of alternative specifications fall on both
sides of our baseline estimate, but are almost always less than 1.
Because our instrument impacts incomes at the ESR level (rather than individ-
ual income), our estimates correspond to local general equilibrium effects of income
changes, but will not capture any global or national general equilibrium effects.6 Of
particular concern is that if the growth of the health care market resulting from the
rise in global incomes induced more innovation, our estimates may not incorporate
the implications of these induced innovations on health expenditures. Our analysis
suggests that significantly larger elasticities resulting from these induced innovation
6 We also present results at the state rather than ESR level. This reduces our cross-sectional
variation in oil intensity but alllows us to capture general equilibrium effects at a higher level of
geographic aggregation than the ESR. The results are similar.
general equilibrium effects are unlikely for two reasons. First, the same induced in-
novation effects working at the national or global level should manifest themselves
as increased technology adoption or entry of new hospitals at the local (ESR) level.
However, we find no statistically or substantively significant effects of local income
on hospital entry or on various measures of technology adoption at the ESR level.
In this light, a significant global induced innovation effect seems unlikely. Second,
technological change should be more rapid for sectors that are expanding faster than
others (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002, Acemoglu and Linn, 2004). Since health care appears
to have an income elasticity less than one, induced innovations should relatively favor
the non-health sectors that have an income elasticity above one.7
We therefore use our local general equilibrium income elasticity estimate to per-
form a back of the envelope calculation of the role that rising income has played in
the rising U.S. health share. Our central point estimate of 0.72 suggests that ris-
ing income would be associated with a modest decline in the health share of GDP.
Perhaps more informatively, the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval of
this estimate is 1.13; this allows us to reject the hypothesis that rising real income
explains more than 0.5 percentage points of the 11 percentage point increase in the
health share of US GDP between 1960 and 2005.
We explore below several potentially important caveats to this out of sample
extrapolation. In particular, our empirical work focuses primarily on hospital expen-
ditures from the American Hospital Association data (rather than on total health
expenditures). Hospital spending is the single largest component of total health
care spending, and the time-series evidence in Figure 1 suggests that hospital and
7The fact that income induced innovations in the health care sector are not likely to be quan-
tiatively important does not imply that induced innovation more generally is not important in the
health care sector. Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence of induced innovation effects in
the health care sector arising through such mechanisms such as expected market size (Acemoglu and
Linn, 2004, Finkelstein, 2004, Finkelstein, 2007) and relative factor prices (Acemoglu and Finkel-
stein, 2008). Moreover, the evidence in Acemoglu and Linn (2004) suggests that whether or not
rising income produces induced innovation effects in the health care sector will depend on whether
the heath sector expands relative to other sectors in response to rising income. Given that our
estimates suggest that rising incomes increase the relative market sizes of other sectors more than
that of health care, this suggests that induced innovations arising from increased income are more
likely to be directed towards these other sectors rather than health care.
non-hospital components of health care have grown proportionally over the last half
century. If income elasticities were substantially higher for the non-hospital compo-
nents of health expenditures, and if the rise in income over this time period were
the major driver of the increase in health expenditures, we should (all else equal)
see a decline in the hospital share of total health expenditures. This suggests that
income elasticities of hospital and non-hospital components of health expenditures
should be similar. We also draw on additional data sources to provide suggestive
empirical evidence that the income elasticities of hospital expenditures and overall
health expenditures are similar. This evidence bolsters our belief that our elasticity
estimates for hospital spending are likely to be representative of those for total health
expenditures.
A final point that warrants emphasis at the outset is that our empirical strat-
egy estimates the effect of rising incomes on health care spending in the recent US
context. This empirical relationship is undoubtedly partly shaped by several specific
institutional features of the US health care system. Our evidence does not therefore
directly address the question of whether health care is a "luxury good" in households'
utility function as hypothesized by Hall and Jones (2007).
To our knowledge, our paper represents the first empirical attempt to estimate
the causal general equilibrium income elasticity of health spending.8 Indeed, we are
only aware of two prior studies that attempt to estimate the "causal effect" of income
on health spending; both estimate the partial equilibrium effect of income on own
health spending. Moran and Simon (2006) use the Social Security notch cohort to
examine the effect of plausibly exogenous variation in an elderly individual's income
80ur empirical strategy is related to that used by Michaels (2007) to estimate the long-run
consequences of resource-based specialization, and to those in Buckley (2003) and Black, McKinnish
and Sanders (2005). Michaels also exploits variation in oil abundance across county groups within
the US South and studies the consequences of the availability of greater oil resources on changes
in the sectoral composition of employment and in education. Buckley (2003) exploited the same
source of variation within Texas to investigate the effect of income on marriage and divorce. Black,
McKinnish and Sanders (2005) use a similar strategy focusing the coal boom and bust. Davis and
Haltiwanger (2001) investigate the impact of changes in oil prices on sectoral job creation and job
destruction. Kilian (2008) provides a review of the literature on the economic effects of energy price
shocks on a variety of different sectors and macroeconomic aggregates. None of these papers study
the effect of income on the health care sector.
on the elderly's prescription drug use; they estimate an elasticity of drug use with
respect to income of above one. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment finds that a
small, unanticipated, temporary increase in own income has no significant impact on
own health expenditures or utilization (Newhouse et al., 1993, p. 78).9
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 describes our empirical
strategy and data. Section 2.2 contains our main results. It shows the first-stage rela-
tionship between ESR income and our instrument, presents our instrumental variable
estimates of the local general equilibrium income elasticity of hospital expenditures
and their components, and investigates whether national and global general equilib-
rium income effects are likely to be quantitatively important. Section 2.3 discusses
the implications of our elasticity estimate for the role of rising income in explaining
the rise in the health share of GDP in the United States; it also discusses in some
depth some of the most salient potential threats to extrapolating from our estimates
in this manner, and summarizes our robustness analysis. Section 2.4 concludes. The
on-line appendices (which are not for publication) provide further theoretical and
empirical results.
2.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.1.1 Motivating Theory
We start with a simple theoretical model which provides a framework for interpreting
our results. The model clarifies the distinction between three different income elas-
ticities: the "partial equilibrium" income elasticity that measures the responsiveness
of health spending to a change in an individual's income, the "local general equilib-
rium" income elasticity from a change in an area's income, and the "global general
equilibrium" income elasticity that measures the responsiveness of health spending
9 These results are from the so-called Super Participation Incentive in which a sub-sample of
families were given an unanticipated, small (a maximum of $250 in the mid 1970s) additional lump
sum payment for one year in the penultimate year of the experiment. Note that this sub-experiment
was not designed to estimate the income elasticity of demand for health care but rather to test
whether the income side payments made to families as part of the experimental design (whose focus
was to estimate the effect of cost sharing) impacted utilization.
to national or global income changes.
Consider an individual i residing in area j at time t with a utility function given
by
7r (Qjthig) u (cit) , (2.1)
where hig denotes this individual's health expenditures and cig corresponds to his
nonhealth consumption expenditures; Qjt is the "quality of health care" per unit of
health care expenditure in area j at time t. Here by "area" we refer to geographic
areas approximating local health care markets. In our empirical work, we will look at
economic sub-regions and then aggregate the data to state level to investigate whether
some of these technology and policy responses might be more pronounced at a higher
level of aggregation. The functional form in (3.1), that is, multiplicatively separable
in health and nonhealth consumption, is adopted both to simplify the exposition and
to link our equations to Hall and Jones (2007), whose dynamic model also has a static
representation identical to (3.1). The budget constraint of the individual is written
as
cipj + hig < yijt, (2.2)
where recall that both cij and hijt are expenditures (and we therefore have no prices
on the right-hand side; the relative price of health care is already incorporated into
Qg). Assuming that both 7 and u are concave and differentiable, the individual's
optimal demand for health expenditures leads to the following simple equation for
the share of income spent on health:
hig Trit /7lUit (2.3)
Yijt 1 + rt /27u
where Q, ghig7'(Qthig) /7 (Qjhig) and , - cigtu' (cigt) /u (cit) are the
elasticities of the 7r and a functions evaluated at the expenditure levels of individual
i in area j and time t.
As emphasized by Hall and Jones (2007), we expect the share of income spent
on health to increase as incomes rise if yu,, decreases more rapidly than 7, with
income. However, the behavior of the quality of health care in the area, Qg, also
plays an important role in the evolution of health expenditures. To see this more
clearly, we take logs of both sides of (2.3), then take a first-order Taylor expansion of
log[(7rij /my) / (1 + n /9riutq )] in terms of log hig, log Qg and log yijt and rearrange
to write
log hit = Clog Qt + / log yijt + ijt, (2.4)
where (jjt is an error term capturing approximation errors as well as any omitted
factors. In practice, we expect the error term to have a representation of the form
(jjt = 5j + ~'t + ?ijt, with &j and ~t corresponding to systematic differences in the
demand for health care across areas and over time. In equation (2.4), # measures the
individual income elasticity for health expenditures holding Qg constant. This is the
elasticity we would measure if we could have random variation in individual incomes
within an area, holding quality of health care Qjt constant; it thus corresponds to
what we referred to as the "partial equilibrium" income elasticity.
Since we are interested in the role that rising income has played in the rising health
share of GDP, we wish to obtain estimates that incorporate the general equilibrium
effects of income on health spending, which are captured in the model by Qjt; in
general equilibrium, income changes may affect the "quality" of health care. 10 In this
context, it is important to distinguish between "local" general equilibrium effects-
corresponding to the effects of changes in income in area j on health expenditures
working through their effects on Qjt-and national (or global) general equilibrium
effects-whereby changes in national (or global) income impact health expenditures
via their effect on some "frontier" quality or the aggregate of the area qualities,
i.e., the aggregate of the Qts. Examples of local general equilibrium effects of
area income on area health care quality would include hospital entry and technology
adoption decisions in response to changes in local income, and local health policy
decisions (such as funding of public hospitals or state-level public health insurance
eligibility rules) that are responsive to local area income. Examples of national or
10We note that our use of the term "quality" does not imply a normative assessment of the net
social benefit of changes in Qt.
global general equilibrium effects of income would include the development of new
technologies induced by national or global income changes and the responsiveness of
national health policy decisions (such as Medicare policy) to national income.
To capture these two distinct mechanisms we write
log Qjt = aj + ro log yjt + ri log yt + As, (2.5)
where yjt is average (per capita) income in area j at time t and yt is average national
income,"11 Ko measures local general equilibrium effects and ji captures national or
global general equilibrium effects; in addition as captures other (orthogonal to in-
come) sources of variation in the quality of health care across areas, and st captures
other (orthogonal to income) factors affecting the quality of health care in the aggre-
gate, such as autonomous scientific advances. Substituting (2.5) into (2.4), averaging
across all individuals within area j, and proxying the average of logs with the log of
the average, we obtain
log hjt ~ aj + 7t + 0log yjt + Ejt, (2.6)
where hjt is average health expenditure in area j at time t, and we have a ~ dz + (j,
7y ~ ~t + ( (i1 log y + Ast), and 3 ~ # + ( o. Note also that equation (2.6) could
have been equivalently written in its "aggregate form," with the log of total area
health expenditure, log Hjt, on the left-hand side, and the log of total area income,
log Yjt, on the right-hand side. In our empirical work, it will be more convenient to
start with this version, though our main estimates will come from equations expressed
in variants of per capita units as in (2.6).
Equation (2.6) emphasizes that the income elasticity # we estimate will differ from
the partial equilibrium income elasticity (/) due to local general equilibrium effects
((Ko). For example, when the income of a single individual in an area increases,
the types of health care that this individual has access to will remain constant and
this may limit his willingness to spend on health care. In contrast, if the entire
"For induced innovation, we could also take yt to represent average income in the OECD.
area becomes more prosperous, local hospitals may adopt new technologies or new
practices that increase the willingness of (a subset of) the local population to spend
on health care. Thus, while the partial equilibrium income elasticity # might small,
the local general equilibrium elasticity f could be substantially larger.12
Equation (2.6) also emphasizes that national or global general equilibrium income
effects-such as induced innovation or national policy responses-are absorbed by
the time effects, the 'yts, and are thus not captured in our estimates of 13. To the
extent that these national or global general equilibrium income effects are quanti-
tatively important, our estimates will understate the national or global relationship
between income and health. We view this as an important but inevitable casualty of
our empirical strategy, which attempts to obtain "causal" estimates of the impact of
income on health expenditures. We are not aware of alternative empirical strategies
that could generate convincing estimates of national and global general equilibrium
effects of rising income (in particular, any pure time-series strategy would confound
the effects of income with those represented by st in equation (2.5)). Instead, our
strategy is to provide credible estimates that incorporate both partial equilibrium and
local general equilibrium income effects. We then draw on supplementary evidence to
try to gauge whether there are likely to be quantitatively important national general
equilibrium income effects not captured by our analysis. As we discuss in Section
2.2.3 below, this supplementary evidence and analysis suggest that the national re-
lationship between income and health expenditures is not significantly different than
the relationship estimated from our empirical approach.
2.1.2 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to estimate (2.6) using plausibly exogenous variation in
income across areas. In particular, we will instrument for income in different geo-
graphic areas (approximating local economies) with time-series variation in oil prices
interacted with cross-sectional variation in the oil intensity of the different local
economies. We then examine the relationship between the resulting changes in in-
12As noted in the Introduction, # could also be smaller than #3.
come and changes in health care spending using panel data on area-level health care
spending. Let us first write (2.6) in its aggregate form and with covariates as follows
log Hjt = aj + 7t+ log Yt + X #+ Et, (2.7)
where Yjt is total area income, Xjt denotes a vector of other covariates that are
included in some of our specifications (and XTe denotes its transpose). In our baseline
specification, there are no Xjts, and Hjt is total hospital expenditures in area j at
time t. The as are area fixed effects measuring any time-invariant differences across
the different geographic areas. The Yts are year fixed effects, capturing any common
(proportional) changes in health care spending each year." For convenience and
transparency, we begin by estimating this aggregate form of (2.6), and then turn to
estimating variants of the per capita specification shown in (2.6).
The simplest strategy would be to estimate 3 in equation (2.7) using ordinary least
squares (OLS). However, OLS estimates of 13 are likely to be biased. Moreover, the
sign of the bias is a priori ambiguous. For example, if income is positively correlated
with (unobserved) health and healthier areas have lower health care expenditures, the
OLS estimates would be biased downwards. If, on the other hand, income is positively
correlated with insurance coverage and insurance encourages increased health care
spending, OLS estimates would be biased upwards.
Our empirical strategy attempts to isolate potentially-exogenous sources of varia-
tion in local area income, Yt (or equivalently in local per capita income, yjt, in later
specifications). We instrument for changes in area income by exploiting the differen-
tial impact of (global) changes in oil prices across areas of the country in which oil
plays a more or less significant role in the local economy. In particular, we instrument
for log Yjt in equation (2.7) with the following first-stage regression:
log Yt = a + 7' + 6(log ptI x Ij) + X4'+uyt, (2.8)
1 3 The specification with the dependent variable, hospital expenditures, in logs rather than in
levels is attractive both because the distribution of hospital expenditures across areas is highly right
skewed (see Figure 4b below) and because it implies that year fixed effects correspond to constant
proportional (rather than constant level) changes in health spending across all areas.
where pt-i1 is the global spot oil price in the previous year, and Ij is a (time-invariant)
measure of the role of oil in the local economy. The a's and -yts are defined similarly
to the ajs and -yts in equation (2.7). In our baseline specifications, Ij will be proxied
by the total amount of oil reserves in area j. Throughout, we use oil prices dated t -1
in the regression for income at time t to allow for a lag in the translation of oil price
changes into income changes. We show in the on-line Appendix (Section B) that the
estimates and implied elasticities are similar when we instead use oil prices at time
t. The year fixed effects in both the first and second stage will capture any common
(proportional) effects of oil price changes on area income and health care expenditures
that are independent of the role of oil in the local economy; these may be operating,
for example, through the effects of oil prices on costs of living or production.
Our identifying assumption is that, absent oil price changes, health expenditures in
areas with different oil reserves would have grown at similar rates. This is reasonable
since both global oil prices and the location of oil reserves are not affected by, and
should not be correlated with, changes in an area's demand for health care. Naturally,
areas with different amounts of oil reserves may differ in ways that could affect health
expenditures. Any such differences that are time-invariant will be captured by the
area fixed effects (the ajs and a's) in equations (2.7) and (2.8). Only differential
trends in health expenditures across these areas would be a threat to the validity
of our instrumental-variables strategy. As a basic step to increase comparability
across areas and to limit potential differential trends, our baseline analysis focuses
on the Southern United States-which contains about 50% of the oil in the United
States (Oil and Gas Journal Data Book, 2000). We show in the next subsection
that areas of the Southern United States that differ in terms of the role of oil in the
local economy (Ij in (2.8)) have similar levels of income and hospital expenditures
at the start of our sample period (when oil prices had been relatively constant for at
least 20 years). More importantly, in the on-line Appendix (Section B), we provide a
variety of evidence to support our identifying assumption that there were no major
differential trends in health expenditures across local economies correlated with their
oil intensity.
Our baseline specification focuses on the period 1970-1990, which encompasses the
major oil boom and bust, and uses economic sub-regions (ESRs) as our geographic
units (local economies). We construct our ESRs by splitting the economic sub-regions
produced by the Census ("Census ESRs") so that our ESRs do not straddle state
boundaries. Census ESRs are commonly used geographic aggregations that were
last revised for the 1970 Census; they consist of groupings of State Economic Areas
(SEAs)." There are 247 ESRs in the United States overall, and 99 in our sample of
16 Southern states." We discuss below the results of analyses at different levels of
aggregation (in particular, state) and also explore the implications of expanding the
analysis to include longer time periods and other parts of the United States.
2.1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Estimation of equations (2.7) and (2.8) requires time-series data on oil prices, cross-
sectional data on the oil intensity of the local economy, panel data on the income in
each area, and panel data on health expenditures in each area. We briefly describe
the construction of our main data series here. Table 1 provides summary statistics
on some of our main variables.
Oil prices We measure oil prices by the average annual spot oil price from the West
Texas Intermediate series. 16 Figure 2 shows the time series of average annual spot oil
prices from 1950 to 2005. We focus primarily on the period 1970-1990, as these two
decades encompass the major oil boom and bust. Oil prices rose dramatically over
the 1970s from $3.35 per barrel in 1970 to a high of $37.38 per barrel in 1980. This
oil boom was followed by an oil bust; oil prices declined starting in 1980 to a trough
14ESRs frequently cross state boundaries. In contrast, SEAs do not cross state boundaries and
are defined on the basis of a combination of demographic, economic, agricultural, topographic and
natural resource considerations. In metropolitan areas, SEAs are based on standard metropolitan
areas (SMSAs); for SMSAs that straddle two or more states, each part becomes a separate SEA.
15 0ur baseline sample is 2065 observations instead of 99x21=2079 observations because of four
ESR-years of missing hospital data and because Washington D.C. does not appear in the hospital
data until 1980. Restricting the sample to include only ESRs that appear in all years does not
affect results.
16These data are available at http://research. stlouisf ed. org/f red2/series/ILPRICE/
downloaddata?cid=98.
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of $15.04 per barrel in 1986. We discuss below the effects of extending the analysis to
include the later oil boom that began at the end of the 1990s, and show in the on-line
Appendix (Section B) the results of falsification exercises during the pre-boom 1950s
and 1960s.
It is worth noting at this point that, as also documented by several other re-
searchers (e.g., Hamilton, 2008, Kline, 2008), oil price shocks appear to be perma-
nent. This suggests that our empirical strategy will be informative about the effects
of permanent (rather than transitory) changes in income on health care expenditures.
We discuss and further document this in subsection 2.3.4 below.
Oil intensity Our primary measure of the oil intensity of area j is an estimate of
the total oil reserves in that area (since discovery). We draw on data from the 2000
Edition of the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book, which includes information on all 306
oil wells in the United States of more than 100 million barrels in total size. Total
oil reserves are calculated as estimated remaining reserves plus total cumulative oil
production as of 1998; they are thus not affected by the prior intensity of oil extraction
in the area. Throughout, we refer to these as "large" oil wells. Our baseline analysis
is limited to the Southern United States, which contains 161 of the 306 large oil wells
in the United States and 51% of the total oil reserves of these oil wells. 17
Figure 3 shows the cross-sectional variation in oil reserves across different areas
of the South. It indicates that the importance of oil to the local economy varies
substantially across different areas of the South, including substantial within state
variation. For example, approximately 70 percent (69 out of 99) of the ESRs in the
Southern United States have no large oil wells. Conditional on having a large oil well,
the standard deviation in oil reserves across ESRs in the Southern US is more than
2500 million barrels (relative to a mean reserve conditional on having any reserves
of 1700 million barrels). As a result of this variation, as we shall see, different areas
17 According to the 2000 Edition of the Oil and Gas Data Book, there is only one large well in the
South that is listed as having been discovered after 1970 (Giddings, TX in 1971). Excluding this
well has no effect on our results. There are also 60 (out of the 306) oil wells that are located off-shore
and thus were not assigned to any county. These off-shore wells account for 12% of the oil reserves
in the data.
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experienced differential changes in income in response to changing oil prices; this is
the basis of our first stage.
In some of our analyses we also draw on data from the 1970 Census on the mining
share of employment in 1970 to help measure oil intensity of an area. The mining
share includes all workers in oil mining, natural gas and coal mining (it is not available
separately for oil mining).18
Area income Our primary data on ESR income comes from aggregating up county-
level annual payroll (for all establishments) from the County Business Patterns (CBP).19
We also obtain ESR-level employment data from the CBP in the same manner. The
CBP data are attractive for our purposes because of their level of disaggregation, en-
abling us to construct ESR-level measures of income. Figure 4a provides a histogram
of the logarithm (log) of income from the CBP across ESRs. The distribution of log
income appears to be well approximated by a normal distribution.
A potential drawback of these data is that they do not include capital income.
To investigate whether the exclusion of capital income has a systematic effect on our
results, we also repeat our analysis at the state level using annual data on gross state
product (GSP), which includes both labor and capital income. We also use industry-
specific GSP estimates as a dependent variable to provide comparative estimates of
income elasticities in different industries. 2 0
Area health spending Our primary data on area health spending are obtained by
aggregating up hospital level data from the American Hospital Association's (AHA)
annual census of all US hospitals. We use these data to construct our main dependent
18Mining share of employment is defined based on the 1970 Census of Population (Volume 1:
Characteristics of the Population, Table 123, Parts 2-9 & 11-52).
19The CBP is an annual establishment survey of all establishments in the Business Register at the
Census Bureau. The CBP data are available on-line at the Geospatial & Statistical Data Center
at the University of Virginia for the years 1977 through 1997 (http: //f isher. lib. virginia. edu/
collections/stats/cbp/county.html) and at the U.S. Census Bureau for the years 1998 through
2006 (http://censtats.census.gov/cbpnaic/cbpnaic.shtml). Earlier years were hand-entered
from bound volumes available at the MIT Library Storage Annex. For more information on these
data see http: //www. census. gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpmethodology. htm).20GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/).
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variable, total hospital expenditures in area j and year t. Figure 4b shows a histogram
of the logarithm of hospital spending from the AHA, which also has the standard
shape of a normally-distributed variable.
The AHA data also contain other measures of hospital activity, which we use
below to investigate which components of health expenditure respond to the rise in
income and to investigate the impact of rising income on hospital technology adoption.
Specifically, the AHA data contain total hospital expenditures, payroll expenditures,
full time equivalent employment, admissions, inpatient days, beds, and a series of
binary indicator variables for whether the hospital has a variety of different technolo-
gies. For about three quarters of the years, we also have information on the levels
of full-time equivalent employment of two types of nurses in the data: Registered
Nurses (RNs) and Licensed Practitioner Nurses (LPNs), which together constitute
about 20% of total hospital employment. RNs are considerably more skilled than
LPNs and we use the ratio of RNs to RNs and LPNs combined as a proxy for the
skill mix.2 '
There are three key advantages of the AHA data. First, they are extremely high
quality. Relatedly, they appear to be unique among annual sub-national data on
health expenditures from our time period in that they are constructed independently
each year, and therefore do not rely on some degree of interpolation between years.
Second, they allow us to conduct our analysis at a level of aggregation below the
state and thus to exploit the substantial within-state variation in oil intensity shown
in Figure 3a. Third, they allow us to measure other components of health care
activity. In particular, using these data we can measure hospital technology adoption
decisions and thereby investigate potential global general equilibrium effects through
induced innovation.
The major drawback of the AHA data is that they do not contain information on
non-hospital components of health expenditures. To investigate whether the focus on
hospital spending may lead to biased estimates of the income elasticity of total health
2 1RN certification requires about twice as many years of training as LPN cettification and RNs
are paid substantially higher hourly wages (see Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008).
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expenditures, we use data from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
which produces state-level estimates of total personal health care expenditures and
its components, although only for a subset of our study years (Levit 1982, 1985).22 In
addition, we also examine decadal state-level Census data on the earnings of various
groups of health care providers.
Population To investigate the extent of migration in response to our income varia-
tion, we use annual data on total area population and on area population by five year
age groups from the Current Population Reports (CPR). Crucially, for our purposes,
population is not interpolated between censuses but rather is imputed annually based
on a variety of administrative data sources including data on births, deaths, school
enrollment, and tax returns (US Census Bureau, various states and years, and Siegal,
2002).2
Finally, to gauge the relative intensity of hospital use among individuals of differ-
ent age groups, we use data on the age profile of hospital use constructed from the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), which we pool between 1973 and 1991.
Comparison across areas with different oil intensity Table 2 examines whether
there are significant differences in income and various measures of hospital activity
in 1970 across ESRs with different levels of oil reserves. We look at this relation-
ship in our baseline sample of the 16 Southern United States. Columns 3 and 4 of
this table show that there is no statistically or economically significant relationship
between oil reserves and any (or all) of population, total employment, hospital ex-
2 2 As we discuss in more detail in Section 2.3 below, the HCFA data are constructed
partly based on interpolation between years, which is an important caveat for regres-
sion analysis based on these data. Data from 1972 and 1976-1978 were obtained from
Levit (1982, 1985). Data for 1980-1990 were obtained from the Centers of Medi-
care & Medicaid Services on-line at http://www.cms.hhs. gov/NationalHealthExpendData/05_
NationalHealthAccountsStateHealthAccountsResidence . asp. The data include total health ex-
penditures and expenditures on the following components (which sum to the total): Hospital Care,
Physicians' Services, Dentists' Services, Drugs and Other Medical Nondurables, Eyeglasses and Ap-
pliances, Nursing Home Care, and Other Health Services (which include Home Health Care, Other
Professional Services, and Other Personal Services).
2 3 The Current Population Reports data are available on-line at the U.S. Census Bureau (http://
www. census.gov/popest/archives/pre-1980/ and http://www. census.gov/popest/archives/
1980s/).
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penditures, hospital beds and total income. In each case, the association with oil
reserves is statistically indistinguishable from zero and the magnitude of variation is
small (one standard deviation change in oil reserve is associated with only about one
tenth of one standard deviation change in each of these variables). This offers some
preliminary support for our exclusion restriction that, absent the oil price changes
in the 1970s and 1980s, ESRs with different levels of oil reserves would have been
on similar trends in terms of their hospital expenditures and utilization. The on-line
Appendix (Section B) provides a much more systematic investigation of the validity
of our exclusion restriction.
2.2 Main Results
2.2.1 First Stage
Table 3 shows the relationship between ESR income and our instrument. The first
column shows the results from estimating equation (2.8). In this and all subsequent
estimates, we allow for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each state.
The results in column 1 indicate a positive and strong first stage: ESRs with greater
oil reserves experience greater changes in income in response to oil price changes than
areas with less oil. The F-statistic is 18.74. We defer a discussion of the magnitude
of the first stage until a little later in this section.
To examine the sources of the increase in income, column 2 re-estimates the first-
stage equation (2.8) using log area employment on the left-hand side instead of log
area income. The results indicate that areas with more oil also experience greater
change in employment when oil prices change. The coefficient on our instrument,
6, is of approximately the same magnitude in columns 1 and 2, suggesting that all
(or most) of the changes in income associated with oil price movements across areas
with different levels of oil reserves may be due to changes in employment at constant
2 4 Because of concerns of the small sample properties of clustering with only 16 states, we exper-
imented with alternative small sample corrections, as well as alternative strategies to correct for
potential serial correlation. The alternative procedures produce similar results, and are discussed in
the on-line Appendix (Section B).
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wages. This is consistent with our prior expectations that oil workers should be close
substitutes to other workers and have a relatively elastic labor supply in the local
labor market. It is also consistent with the stylized fact that labor income changes at
short-run frequencies (e.g., over the business cycle) are largely driven by employment
changes, with little movements in wage per worker. 25 In contrast to our source of
income variation, about half of the growth in income between 1960 to 2005 is due to
increased employment, while the other half is due to increased wages per employee
(US Census Bureau, 2008). In Section 2.3, we discuss the possible implications of
extrapolating from our income changes to the effects of the secular increase in incomes
in the US economy.
The impact of our instrument on employment and existing evidence on migration
responses to local economic conditions (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992) suggest that
our instrument may also affect area population. Any increase in population in high oil
areas relative to low oil areas may increase health expenditures directly, potentially
over-stating the effect of increased income on hospital spending among a (constant)
population. Column 3 explores this issue by re-estimating equation (2.8) with log
population as the new dependent variable. The results indicate that our instrument
also predicts population, so that part of the increase in area income we estimate
reflects increases in area population; a comparison of columns 2 and 3 suggests that
about one third of the effect of the instrument on employment can be accounted for
by its effects on population.
A natural solution is to convert both income (our endogenous right-hand side
variable) and hospital expenditures (our dependent variable of interest) into per capita
terms, so that the structural equation focuses on the impact of income per capita on
hospital spending per capita (the same instrument now used for income per capita
in the first stage); this also matches more closely our estimating equation (2.6) from
the motivating theory. The first-stage results from estimating equation (2.8) with
log income per capita on the left-hand side are shown in column 4. Consistent with
25See, for example, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995). This does not imply that the wage per
efficiency unit of labor is constant, since there may be composition effects (see, Solon, Barsky and
Parker, 1994).
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a comparison of columns 1 and 3, the per-capita specification shows a statistically
significant but smaller first-stage effect than unadjusted specification in column 1. In
particular, the first-stage coefficient is smaller than that in column 1 by 5 log points
or by about 40 percent.
While the per capita specification is natural, it may in turn understate the effect
of increased income on hospital spending because the population changes associated
with our instrument are from disproportionately low users of hospital care. This
can be seen in columns 5 and 6, in which we estimate equation (2.8) using as the
dependent variable the log of the total population under 55 and the log of the total
population 55 and over, respectively. The results indicate that the population re-
sponse to our instrument is concentrated among the non-elderly (those under 55). In
fact, it appears that the population response is concentrated among those younger
than 45 (not shown in Table 3 to save space). Younger individuals consume dis-
proportionately lower amounts of hospital care than the elderly. To illustrate this,
Figure 5 shows the average annual number of hospital days for individuals in five-year
age brackets estimated from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), pooled
between 1973 and 1991. The under 55 average 0.6 hospital days per year, while indi-
viduals aged 55 and older average 2.3 hospital days per year. As a result, even though
the 55 and older are only 23% of the population, they consume 38% of hospital days.
To obtain more accurate estimates of the impact of rising incomes on health ex-
penditures'(and, if anything, to err on the side of over-estimating, rather than under-
estimating, income elasticities), in our baseline analysis we correct for the changes
in the composition of the population rather than simply using per capita estimates.
In particular, we construct a measure of "hospital utilization weighted population"
in area j in year t, denoted by HUWPt. This measure is computed as the inner
product of the vector of populations in each five year age bin in area j and year t
(popait) with our estimate of the national average of hospital days used by that age
bin (hospdaysa) from the pooled 1973-1991 NHIS. Namely:
HUWPy = >3 PoPajt x hospdaysa (2.9)
a
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Our preferred specification adjusts (i.e., divides) income in both the structural
equation (2.7) and the first-stage equation (2.8) and hospital expenditures in the
structural equation (2.7) by HUWPg as constructed in equation (2.9). This leads to
our baseline structural equation, closely resembling our motivating theoretical equa-
tion, (2.6):
log It = a, + 7t +# log 9jtjt + X4+Et, (2.10)
and our baseline first-stage equation:
log 99t = a' + 7Y' + 6' (log pt_-1 x Ij) + XT 0' + Upt, (2.11)
where adjusted income ( jt) and adjusted hospital expenditure (hyt) are defined as
Yt~ -I and hjt
HUWPjt HUWPg'
Intuitively, both income and hospital expenditures (or other outcomes) are adjusted
for hospital-use weighted population (HUWP) to capture any direct effect of our
instrument on hospital-use weighted population.
The estimates of the first-stage coefficient, ', from equation (2.11) are shown
in column 7. Its magnitude lies (mechanically) in between the first-stage estimates
without any migration adjustment (column 1) and with the per capita adjustment
(column 4). In practice, the magnitude is about one third of the way from the per
capita adjustment to the unadjusted specification. The IV estimate of the effect
of income on hospital spending using the hospital utilization weighted population
adjustment should therefore similarly lie in between the unadjusted estimates and
the per capita adjusted estimates (and we find below that it does).
In what follows, we take the estimates from equations (2.11) and (2.10), which cor-
rect for the age-adjusted hospital utilization of the population, as our baseline/preferred
specification. Because even conditional on age migrants may be healthier than the
general population, the estimate of # from (2.10) might understate the effects of in-
come on health expenditures. We therefore also report results without any adjustment
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for migration as well as results using the per capita adjustment. One might consider
the unadjusted estimates as an upper bound on the income elasticity, and the per
capita adjusted estimates are a lower bound (provided that the marginal migrant
into a high-oil area in response to an oil price increase is "healthier" than the average
population in the area, which seems like a reasonable assumption).2 6 In practice, we
will see below that these "bounds" on the income elasticity are relatively tight.
Finally, column 8 shows the HUWP-adjusted first stage but now aggregated to
the state level (rather than the ESR level as in column 7); the first stage is robust to
aggregation to the state level (F-statistic = 24.05).27
To gauge the magnitude of the first stage, we calculated that in our preferred
specification (column 7) the oil price change from 1970 to 1980 is associated with
a 3.6 percent larger increase in area income in areas with a one standard deviation
larger amount of oil. The first stage in our preferred specification has an F-statistic
of 16.58.
2.2.2 Income Elasticity of Hospital Spending and Compo-
nents
Table 4 presents our central estimates of the impact of income on hospital expendi-
tures. Column 1 reports the OLS estimate of equation (2.10) in which both hospital
expenditures and income are adjusted for HUWP. The estimate of / in (2.10) is -
0.027 (standard error = 0.074). This indicates that when income in an area increase
by 10 percent, hospital expenditures fall by about 0.3 percent. This relationship is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. As previously discussed, the OLS correlation
26This last presumption is both intuitive and consistent with the fact that migration is concen-
trated among younger individuals (see Table 3).
27Although the first stage is robust to aggregating up from ESR to state, it is not robust to dis-
aggregating the data to a lower level of aggregation than the ESR (not shown). For example, we
explored analyses conducted at the level of the State Economic Area (SEA); there are 194 SEAs
in our sample of Southern States compared to 99 ESRs. The major concern with the SEAs is that
some of them are closely linked to each other economically and residentially, thus would not be
experiencing independent income variation. In this case, we would expect a significant amount of
attenuation in the first stage. Consistent with this expectation, the first stage becomes weaker, with
an F-statistic of only 2.06 at the SEA level. As a result, we do not report IV estimates for lower
levels of aggregation.
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between income and hospital spending may be biased in either direction relative to
the causal effect of income on hospital spending. Our subsequent analysis suggests
that in our setting the OLS estimate is downward biased.
Column 2 shows the results from the reduced form corresponding to (2.10) and
(2.11) (without covariates):
logh3 t = a + +y" ± 6"(logpti x I) + e'. (2.12)
This reduced-form estimation shows a positive and statistically significant relationship
between our instrument and log hospital expenditures.
Column 3 presents our baseline IV estimate of equation (2.10). The estimated
elasticity of health expenditure with respect to income is 0.723, with a standard error
of 0.214.28
Columns 4 and 5 show IV results without any population adjustment and with
a per capita population adjustment, respectively, to both hospital expenditures and
income. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, these estimates can be interpreted as upper
and lower bounds on the income elasticity of hospital spending. In both alternative
specifications the income elasticity ranges between 0.665 and 0.801, suggesting that
these bounds are reasonably tight.
The last column of Table 4 reports the results from our baseline, HUWP-adjusted
specification (from column 3) but now aggregated to the state level. We estimate
an income elasticity at the state level of 0.550 (standard error = 0.230). The point
estimate at the state level is similar to our estimate at the ESR level of 0.723 (see
column 3). We provide a more detailed discussion of state-level results in Section 2.3
but note here that, among other things, the state-level estimates allow us to capture
potential general equilibrium effects, such as political economy effects, that may be
more likely to occur at the level of the state than at the sub-state ESR.
Table 5 investigates which components of hospital expenditures are affected by
28 Since we have only one instrument and one endogenous right-hand side variable, the point
estimate in the IV specification can also be obtained by dividing the reduced-form estimate in
column 2 by the first-stage estimate from column 7 of Table 3.
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income changes. It reports the results from IV estimation of equation (2.10) using
different hospital outcomes as the dependent variable.29 Several interesting findings
emerge. First, the results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the impact of income on
hospital payroll expenditures (which are about one half of total hospital expenditures)
can explain all of the effect of income on total hospital expenditures. There is no
evidence in column 3 of an economically or statistically significant effect of income on
hospital employment. This suggests that the increase in payroll expenditures comes
from a combination of an improvement in the quality of employees and/or a bidding
up of the wages of (quality-adjusted) employees.
Second, we find evidence of economically and statistically significant skill up-
grading associated with increased income. Column 4 shows an increase in the skill
composition of employment, proxied by the ratio of skilled nurses (RNs) to all RNs
and LPNs.3 0 This does not rule out wage (price) effects, but suggests that at least
some of the increase in payroll expenditures in column 2 comes from quality improve-
ments. More importantly, evidence of skill upgrading also suggests that our empirical
strategy is able to uncover (at least some) local general equilibrium effects; skill up-
grading of hospitals is likely to be a response to the ESR-level increase in the demand
for hospital services.
Third, we find no evidence that rising income is associated with an increase in
hospital utilization (as measured by either admissions or patient days) or in hospital
capacity (as measured by beds). These results are shown in columns 5 through 7.
29As detailed in the notes to Table 5, we adjust both the dependent variable and income for
hospital-utilization weighted population (HUWP) to account for population migration in response
to our instrument. The exceptions are in columns 4 and in columns 8-11 in which income is still
adjusted for (i.e., divided by) HUWP, so that we are measuring the increase in income per adjusted
population, but the dependent variable is not adjusted for HUWP. In column 4 the dependent
variable is a ratio (of skilled nurses to total nurses) which would not increase mechanically with
population; in columns 8-11, the dependent variables (number of hospitals, number of technologies,
or indicator for specific technologies) are count variables or indicators, which would not be expected
to scale linearly with population in the same way as, e.g., spending or admissions are likely to. For
these reasons, we do not adjust these dependent variables for population. As discussed above, not
adjusting for migration could be interpreted as providing upper bound estimates of responsiveness
to income.
3 0 We only have information on RN and LPN employment for the following years: 1970, 1972,
1974, 1976, 1978, 1980-2005. Our baseline elasticity estimate for hospital expenditures declines to
0.449 (s.e. 0.181) when the odd years in the 1970s are excluded.
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The point estimates are uniformly negative. For admissions and patient days, the
estimates are statistically significant, though this is far from a robust result. In the
robustness analysis in the on-line Appendix (Section B), we document that, in con-
trast to the other statistically significant results in Table 5 which are highly robust,
both the statistical significance of the estimated declines of admissions and patients
days and the sign of their point estimates vary across specifications; in addition, the
coefficient on beds changes sign (and is rarely statistically significant) in alternative
specifications.31 We therefore interpret these results as showing no response of hos-
pital utilization or capacity to changes in income. This pattern is consistent with
the time-series evidence suggesting that hospital utilization has not been increasing
as incomes have risen; indeed, age-adjusted admissions rates appear to been roughly
constant since 1960, while length of stay has fallen (Newhouse, 1992).
The remaining columns of Table 5 document the impact of rising income on hos-
pital entry and technology adoption; we discuss these results in the next subsection. 3 2
2.2.3 National and Global General Equilibrium Effects
As noted at the outset, our empirical strategy is designed to capture (and, as indicated
by the skill upgrading results in Table 5, does capture) general equilibrium effects that
occur at the level of the local economy. However, a thorough empirical examination
of the role that rising income plays in the growth of the health care sector requires
incorporating any general equilibrium effects of income on health care spending that
occur at the national or global level. Two such effects that could potentially increase
3 1 See in particular Appendix Table A6 for a summary of the results of the robustness analysis for
these variables.
32We also explored the relationship between our income variation and public funding of health
care, using data from the Regional Economic Information System; these data are available at the
ESR level annually for our entire study period. Public spending on health care appears to fall as
income rises, with Medicaid spending falling substantially more than Medicare spending. Since the
income of either Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries should not be affected much by our instrument
(the former are predominantly retirees with a pre-determined income stream and the latter are, by
definition, constrained to be very low income), these results likely reflect a potential crowding out
of scarce hospital resources from those whose incomes have risen and perhaps also policy responses
of state governments to changing incomes. The decline in Medicaid spending may further reflect
reductions in eligibility for Medicaid resulting from the increase in employment. These results are
available upon request.
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the income elasticity of health expenditures above what we have estimated are induced
innovations (which could occur at the national or global level) and national political
economy responses to rising income. In this section, we explore each of these potential
mechanisms in turn.
Endogenous technology responses While our estimates incorporate the impact
of income on technology adoption and entry of new hospitals at the ESR level, they
may understate the effects of rising incomes if these induced the development of major
new global technologies, which then led to a sizable expansion in health expenditures.
This concern is particularly important since technological change in health care is
commonly believed to be one of the key drivers of rising health care expenditures
(e.g., Newhouse, 1992, Fuchs, 1996, Congressional Budget Office, 2008).
In this subsection, we argue that an induced technology response to rising in-
come is unlikely to have contributed to the increase in the health share of GDP. Our
argument has two parts. First, if present and economically significant, an induced
innovation response to rising income should also manifest itself at the ESR level in
the form of entry of new hospitals (which presumably embody new technologies)
and/or adoption of new technologies at existing hospitals. In particular, even though
innovations take place at the national or global level, the same mechanism leading
to induced innovations at the national or global level should also lead to faster adop-
tion of these technologies in areas with greater increases in demand (e.g., Acemoglu,
2002, 2007). Second, existing theory suggests that induced innovations should be
directed to sectors that are otherwise expanding rapidly (see in particular our on-
line Appendix, Section A), while our estimates suggest that, all else equal, health
expenditures increase less than proportionately with income.
Turning to the first component of the argument, we find no evidence that rising
income is associated with an increase in hospital entry or technology adoption. These
results are summarized in columns 8 through 11 of Table 5. Column 8 of this table
shows a negative and statistically insignificant impact of income on the number of
hospitals (so that the number of hospitals appears to have grown relatively more in
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areas experiencing slower income growth).
The rest of Table 5 turns to technology adoption. The AHA data contain binary
indicators for whether the hospital has various "facilities", such as a blood bank, open
heart surgery facilities, CT scanner, occupational therapy services, dental services,
and genetic counseling services. These data have been previously used to study
technology adoption decisions in hospitals, and in particular hospital responsiveness
to economic incentives including the insurance regime and relative factor prices (see,
e.g., Cutler and Sheiner, 1998, Baker and Phibbs, 2002, Finkelstein, 2007, Acemoglu
and Finkelstein, 2008). Since they contain only indicator variables for the presence of
various facilities, we cannot investigate the potential upgrading of existing technology
or the intensity of technology use, but we can study the impact of changes in income
on the total number of facilities, proxying for technology adoption decisions on the
extensive margin.
During the time period we study, the AHA collects information on the presence
of 172 different "facilities". These are listed, together with their sample means (the
fraction of ESRs each technology is in) and the years in which they are available in
Appendix Table Al. On average, a given facility is reported in the data for 7 out
of the possible 21 years; only nine of the technologies are in the data for all years.
Moreover, as is readily apparent from Appendix Table Al, the list encompasses a
range of very different types of facilities. Given these two features of the data, we
pursue two complementary approaches to analyzing the relationship between income
and technology adoption with the AHA data.
Our first approach to investigating the impact of income on technology adoption,
which is shown in column 9, treats all facilities equally and measures technology as
the log of the number of distinct technologies in a given ESR in a given year. The
year fixed effects in our IV estimate of equation (2.10) adjust for the fact that the
set of technologies reported in each year differs. The results show no substantively or
statistically significant evidence of an increase in the number of distinct technologies
in the area in response to the increase in income. The point estimate on income is
negative and statistically insignificant. It is also substantively small, suggesting that
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a 10 percent increase in area income is associated with a statistically insignificant
decrease in the number of technologies in the area of 1.3 percent.3 3
A drawback of this approach is that it treats all technologies as perfect substitutes.
As an alternative, we estimated hazard models of the time to adoption for specific
technologies that are in the data for at least 15 years of our 21 year sample period. As
in Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008), we limit our analysis to technologies that were
identified as "high tech" by previous researchers (Cutler and Sheiner, 1998, Baker,
2001, and Baker and Phibbs, 2002). Unfortunately, there are only two technologies
that meet these criteria in our sample: open heart surgery and diagnostic radioisotope
facility. Both have been found in other work to be responsive to economic incentives
(Finkelstein, 2007, Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008). Both of these technologies were
diffusing over our sample period, though open heart surgery started from a lower
prevalence and diffused more rapidly.34 To investigate the impact of ESR income on
local technology adoption decisions, we estimate semi-parametric Cox hazard models
for these two technologies as functions of income. In particular, the conditional
probability that ESR j adopts the technology in question at time t (meaning that at
least one hospital in the ESR adopts the technology conditional on there being no
hospital in the area that had previously adopted this technology) is modeled as
Ajt = Aot exp(0 log 9t + X0#), (2.13)
where Aot is a fully flexible, non-parametric baseline hazard, jt is our baseline mea-
sure of (HUWP-adjusted) income, and Xj is a vector of (time-invariant) covariates.
Since we have at most a single transition (adoption) for each ESR, we cannot in-
clude ESR fixed effects in the hazard model. Instead, we include time-invariant ESR
33 To provide some context for comparison, using the same technology measure (but at the hospital
level rather than at the ESR level) Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) show that, in its first three
years, the introduction of Medicare PPS was associated with, on average, the adoption of one
new technology at the hospital level (about a 4 percent increase in the average number of distinct
technologies that the hospital has).
34Open heart surgery is in our data for all 21 years (1970-1990) and diagnostic radioisotope
therapy for 19 years (1972-1990). Only 43 percent of ESRs had open heart surgery technology in
1970, whereas about three quarters of ESRs did so by 1990. About three quarters of ESRs had
diagnostic radioisotope faciltiies in 1972 and 92 percent had it by 1990.
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characteristics in the vector Xj, in particular, region fixed effects for the three cen-
sus regions within the South, total hospital expenditures in 1970, and total hospital
beds in 1970. The fully flexible baseline hazard in the Cox model is specified with
respect to calendar time and thus controls for time effects. As in our baseline specifi-
cation, income is an endogenous right-hand side variable, which we instrument with
log pt1 x Ij. We implement our instrumental variables estimator using a control func-
tion approach (Newey, Powell, and Vella, 1999). Specifically, we include the residual
(n4t) from the first-stage regression in equation (2.11) as an additional covariate in
equation (2.13). We report bootstrapped standard errors and p-values for this two-
step estimator. The results reported in columns 10 and 11 in Table 5 show no evidence
of a significant increase in technology adoption associated with an increase in income.
The point estimates suggest a negative relationship between log income and adoption
of open-heart surgery, and a positive relationship between log income and adoption
of the diagnostic radioisotope facility. However, both estimates are imprecise and not
statistically different from zero.3 5
Next, turning to the theoretical argument, the on-line Appendix (Section A) out-
lines a simple model of induced innovations and demonstrates that development of
new technologies will tend to be directed toward sectors that are expanding more
rapidly. The implications of this theory are consistent with existing empirical evi-
dence, which indicate that medical innovation responds to expected market size (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Linn, 2004, Finkelstein, 2004). In the present context, these theoreti-
cal expectations imply that innovations induced by the secular rise in incomes should
not be favoring the health care sector. In particular, our point estimates suggest
that, ignoring induced technology effects, health care expenditures increase less than
proportionately with aggregate income. Thus, as incomes rise, the market size for
health care technologies will increase less than the market size for a range of other
technologies. As a consequence, the induced technology channel suggests that there
3 By contrast, Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) find statistically significant increases in the adop-
tion of both of these technologies in response to a change in Medicare's hospital reimbursement
policy for labor inputs. This suggests that the. adoption of these technologies is generally responsive
to economic incentives.
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should not be disproportionate technological advances in the health care sector in
response to the secular increase in incomes. As the model in the on-line Appendix
highlights, the main exception to this conclusion is that even a less than proportion-
ate increase in the size of the market for health care technologies might jump-start
medical technological advances if technological change in the health care sector was
unprofitable prior to income reaching a certain minimum threshold. This exception
seems implausible (at least to us) given that advances in medical technologies have
been ongoing for more than a century and plausibly at roughly a constant rate (as
mortality has been declining at a roughly constant rate over this same period, e.g.,
Cutler and Meara, 2003).36
Limited income-induced technology effects for the health care sector are also con-
sistent with the results reported in Table 5, which show no significant effects on
hospital entry or technology adoption driven by ESR-level income changes. The lack
of a response in hospital entry and technology adoption bolsters the argument that,
because the relative market size for the health care sector does not increase dispro-
portionately following an increase in income, the induced technology effects should
also be limited.
Overall, while we cannot conclusively rule out major national or global induced
technology responses to the secular increase in income in the United States, which
could in turn have further effects on health expenditures, our empirical evidence and
theoretical expectations suggest that these effects should be relatively small and thus
should not change our basic conclusion that rising incomes are unlikely to be the
major factor in the run-up in the share of GDP spent on health care.
Political economy effects of rising incomes Although our empirical strategy
would not capture any effect of income on health care expenditures that operate via
a national political economy response to rising income, our state-level results incor-
360f course, the specific nature of medical technological progress has varied over time. For exam-
ple, improvements in sanitation and other public health measures were a primary factor in mortality
declines early in the 20th century, while penicillin and other antibiotics were a key factor mid-
century, and medical interventions that reduce cardiovascular disease mortality were critical in the
latter part of the century (Cutler and Meara, 2003).
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porate potential responses at the state and sub-state levels. The similarity between
the estimate of the income elasticity at the state level and at the ESR level (com-
pare columns 6 and 3 of Table 4) suggests that these state-level policy responses do
not significantly increase the responsiveness of health care expenditures to income,
although there may be substantial sub-state level policy responses captured by both
our ESR- and state-level estimates. 37
While our empirical strategy does not incorporate national political economy ef-
fects resulting from rising incomes, health policy in the United States is highly decen-
tralized, with much of the public involvement occurring at the state (or lower) level
of government. Therefore our empirical strategy likely captures much of the potential
political economy responses. This holds for both public provision and public financing
of health care, both of which are potentially affected by changes in income.
In terms of public provision of health care, about one third of hospitals in the
United States (accounting for about one third of hospital expenditures) are publicly
owned. About 85 percent of these hospitals (constituting about three-quarters of
public hospital expenditures) are non-federal (i.e., state-, county-, or city-owned).
Thus most of any effect that income changes have on public support for hospital
financing would be incorporated into our state-level analysis.
In terms of public financing of health care, by far the two largest sources are
Medicare and Medicaid, which have similar levels of spending (CMS, 2006). Medicaid
is jointly financed by the federal and state governments but the states are given
considerable autonomy in the design of program eligibility and benefit requirements
(Gruber, 2003). Political economy effects of changing income on Medicaid design are
likely to be captured by our estimates using state-level variation.
Medicare, in contrast, is a fully federal program, so that any political economy
effects of income on Medicare design would not be captured by our estimates. This
is a potentially important channel through which rising income may affect health
37This observation also underscores that, as already emphasized in the Introduction, the empirical
relationship between income and health spending in the United States in the latter half of the 20th
century, which we are exploring, may reflect a variety of institutional factors beyond the willingness
of households to spend more on health care as their incomes grow.
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spending, and not one that we can directly estimate. Nevertheless, it is reassuring in
this regard that Medicare spending per beneficiary over our time period has not risen
faster than overall health spending per capita.38 If rising income had quantitatively
important national political economy effects in terms of Medicare generosity, one
might expect to see Medicare spending per beneficiary growing faster than overall
health spending per capita as incomes have risen. The fact that it has not offers some
suggestive evidence that any potential political economy responses to rising incomes
working through Medicare does not introduce a serious downward bias in our estimate
of the role of income growth in the run-up of the health share of GDP.
2.3 The Role of Income in Rising Health Share of
GDP
We now present the implications of our estimates for the role of rising income in
explaining the rising health share in the United States. The bulk of the section
is then devoted to a discussion of several potential concerns and caveats with this
out-of-sample extrapolation exercise.
2.3.1 Income and the Rising Health Share of GDP
Let us focus on the results from our baseline specification (Table 4, column 3), which
are roughly in the middle of the range of elasticities we report in various alternative
specifications below.
The point estimate of an elasticity of 0.72 implies that the approximate doubling
of real per capita GDP between 1960 and 2005 (from $19,212 to $41,874 in $2005)
should have caused a decline in the health share of GDP from 5 percent to about
38We compared the growth in per capita health expenditures to the growth in per beneficiary
Medicare spending from 1975 to 2005. We started in 1975 to allow the Medicare program (which only
began in 1965 and expanded to cover SSDI recipients starting in 1973) to be fully phased in. Between
1975 and 2005 Medicare spending per beneficiary grew at an average annualized rate of 7.86%, while
health spending per capita grew at 7.62%. Data on total and Medicare health expenditures and
Medicare- beneficiaries can be found at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/
and http: //www. cms.hhs.gov/MedicareEnRpts/.
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4 percent. The upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval from our baseline
estimate is an income elasticity of 1.13. This allows us to reject a role of rising
income in increasing the health share of GDP by more than 0.5 percentage points
between 1960 and 2005, i.e., it does not explain more than 5 percent of the overall
increase in health share over this time period.
We can also interpret our estimates in terms of their implications for rising income
in explaining rising health expenditures (rather than the rising health share of GDP).
The point estimate suggests that rising real per capita income may be able to explain
about 15 percent of the rise in real per capita health expenditures, while the upper
end of the 95 percent confidence interval allows us to reject a role for rising real per
capita income in explaining more than one quarter of the rise in real per capita health
spending. 39
Therefore, our results suggest that while rising income may be an important com-
ponent of growing health expenditures, it is unlikely to have contributed much to the
increase in the share of GDP spent on health care in the United States. We next turn
to several potential concerns with this extrapolation exercise.
2.3.2 Hospital Spending Versus Total Health Expenditure
An important limitation of our estimates is that the dependent variable measures
hospital expenditures rather than total health expenditures, which may have different
income elasticities. Hospital expenditures are the single largest component of health
care expenditures, accounting for close to two-fifths of the total. By contrast, spending
on physicians accounts for about one fifth of total health expenditures, and spending
on drugs accounts for about one-tenth; these shares have been roughly constant since
1960 (CMS, 2006).
Our reading of the available evidence is that total health expenditures are unlikely
to have a significantly higher income elasticity than hospital spending. The first piece
390n the basis of the existing correlation studies (described in the Introduction), past studies that
have attempted to decompose the causes of the rise in health spending have concluded that the rise
in income may account for anywhere from 5 percent (Cutler, 1995) to a quarter (Newhouse, 1992)
of the spending growth.
120
of suggestive evidence comes from Figure 1, which shows that the hospital share of
total health expenditures has been roughly constant over the last half century. If in-
come elasticities were higher for the non-hospital components of health expenditures,
and if the rise in income over this time period were the major driver of the increase
in health expenditures, we should see (all else equal) a decline in the share of hospital
spending in overall health expenditure. The fact that Figure 1 shows no such decline
supports our overall conclusion.
Our second piece of evidence comes from estimates of income elasticities of overall
health care expenditures and of the hospital- and non-hospital components thereof,
based on several complementary data sources. We use these data to investigate
whether there is any evidence that overall health expenditures are more responsive
than hospital expenditures to changes in income. To preview, although estimates from
the other available data sources are often quite imprecise (motivating our preference
for the AHA data set), we do not find any evidence that overall health expenditures
are more income elastic than hospital expenditures.
We have state-level data on total health expenditures and its components from
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for 1972, 1976-1978 and 1980-
1990 (instead of our baseline sample 1970-1990). The HCFA estimates are based on
a combination of administrative and survey data. An important problem with these
data is that each component is interpolated whenever data are missing between years
(Levit, 1982, 1985). Such interpolation may bias the estimated coefficients, so the
results from this data set have to be interpreted with caution.
Table 6 presents estimates from the HCFA data. Since we lose some variation
by aggregating from the ESR level to the state level, we report results both for our
baseline sample of the 16 the Southern states (Panel A) and for the entire United
States (Panel B). Column 1 shows that our first stage is robust to state-level analysis
for the subset of years for which we have HCFA data. Columns 2 and 3 show
our estimated income elasticity from the HCFA data for total health expenditures
and the hospital subcomponent, respectively. Both estimated income elasticities are
positive but quantitatively small and imprecise, and thus statistically insignificant.
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The income elasticity of hospital spending using the HCFA data is also noticeably
smaller than that estimated using the AHA data.4 0
However, most importantly for our purposes, the point estimates in columns 2
and 3 of Table 6 suggest similar income elasticities for hospital expenditures and total
health expenditures. Columns 4 through 9 present results for the other components
of health expenditures, and provide some intuition for why hospital and total health
expenditure income elasticities may be similar. The point estimates suggest that the
income elasticities of spending on physician services, on dental services, on drugs
and other medical non-durables, and on vision products are greater than the income
elasticity of hospital spending, while nursing home care and other health services
have large negative income elasticities.41 Overall, the results in Table 6 are generally
imprecisely estimated, but the point estimates are uniformly consistent with similar
income elasticities for total health expenditures and for hospital expenditures.
Results from several other data sources are also consistent with this conclusion,
though again are similarly imprecise. We examined the income elasticity of state-level
Health Services Gross State Product (GSP) from 1970-1990. Health services GSP
account for roughly 26% of total health expenditures. Our estimates using health
services GSP show no evidence of a greater income elasticity than that for hospital
spending; indeed the point estimates are considerably smaller than our estimates for
hospital expenditures, although they are quite imprecise.
4 0The hospital expenditure data in the HCFA series are estimated using the AHA data for non-
federal hospitals, but use unpublished Federal agency data for federal hospital expenditures (Levit,
1982). There are also several differences between how we use the AHA data and how they are used
in creating the HCFA data. Most importantly, the HCFA estimates interpolate missing data (Levit,
1982, 1985). Average state-year hospital expenditures are similar in the two data sets ($2,641
million from the HCFA data compared to $2,333 million for the same state-years in the AHA data).
Log hospital expenditures are also highly correlated across the two data sets at the state-year level
(correlation = 0.98). However, conditional on state and year fixed effects, the correlation in the
residual log hospital expenditures is only 0.67. This presumably helps explain why the income
elasticity estimates differ. Using our AHA hospital data at the state level for the full United States
and limiting the sample to the years for which the HCFA data are available (i.e., the analog of Table
6 column 3 panel B), we estimate a statistically significant income elasticity of 0.509 (standard error
= 0.225). This is statistically indistinguishable from the HCFA estimate of 0.139 (standard error
0.151).
41The large negative income elasticity for nursing home care strikes us as intuitive. Wealthier
individuals can more easily pay for assistance at home to substitue for nursing home care (which
Medicaid will cover) than can poor individuals. -
42The results for state-level Health Services GSP are shown in Table 8, column 6, Panels A and
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We also examined the impact of area income on the income of different groups
of health care providers (results available on request). If non-hospital components
of health care expenditures-such as physician expenditures-are substantially more
income elastic than hospital expenditures, we would expect to find that the earnings
of the non-hospital based health care providers are also substantially more income
elastic than hospital expenditures and than the earnings of health care providers
that contribute to hospital expenditures, such as nurses and health care technicians.
Using decadal Census data aggregated to the state level, we estimated the income
elasticity of the earnings of the following groups of health care providers: physicians,
nurses, health care technicians (including clinical laboratory technicians and therapy
assistants), and other health services workers (including health aids, nursing aids and
attendants)." Our IV point estimates show no evidence that physician earnings are
more responses to area income than hospital expenditures or than the earnings of
other health care providers. However, the estimates using the Census income data-
particularly those for physician income-are noticeably less precise than those from
comparable specifications using the AHA data on hospital expenditures, so that one
should not place too much emphasis on these results.4 4
Overall, while there are important limitations to each data source, a number of
complementary data sets with information on state-level health expenditures suggest
B). The rest of that table is discussed in subsection 2.3.4 below. Comparable state-level estimates
for hospital expenditures are show in Table 7, Panel A, columns 1 and 3. The Gross State Product
(State GDP) estimates are produced annually by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The specific
industries within health services (SIC code 80) are listed at http: //www. census.gov/epcd/naics/
NSIC8B.HTM#S80. The major source of state data for the health services GSP estimates are sales
and payrolls from the (quinquennial) census of service industries; intercensal years are interpolated
and extrapolated using wages and salaries reported annually to the BEA (see http: //www. bea. gov/
regional/pdf/gsp/GDPState.pdf).
43Our first stage is robust to aggregation to the state level and to decadal (vs annual) analysis;
the IV estimate of AHA hospital expenditures in this specification is generally similar in magnitude
although somewhat less precise than that in our baseline specification.
4 4 We also examined the elasticity of various components of state-level health care utilization from
the NHIS. The NHIS data cover 1973-1990 (data before 1973 do not have state identifiers) and are
not interpolated, which is a clear advantage relative to the HCFA data. On the other hand, the
NHIS only measures utilization on the extensive margin. This implies that NHIS data will not be
informative about increases in expenditure on the intensive margin. As in the AHA data, we find no
evidence in the NHIS of a positive income elasticity of hospital utilization. We also find no evidence
of a positive income elasticity of doctor visits (indeed, the point estimates are negative, though not
statistically significant). Results available on request.
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that the income elasticity of overall health expenditures is unlikely to be significantly
higher than the income elasticity of hospital spending. This is also consistent with
the time-series evidence in Figure 1. We therefore conclude that our estimates of the
income elasticity of hospital spending are likely to be representative of the income
elasticity of total health expenditures.
2.3.3 Labor Income Versus Total Income
Another potential concern with our main data is that our baseline income measure
captures only the effect of our instrument on labor income. If capital income and labor
income do not respond proportionately to our instrument, we may be under-stating
(or over-stating) the first-stage relationship, and consequently, over-stating (or under-
stating) the income elasticity in the second stage. Unfortunately, annual data on labor
and capital income do not exist for our time period at a level of disaggregation below
the state.
We therefore investigate how our estimates at the state level change when we
use Gross State Product (GSP) as our measure of income, rather than our baseline
payroll measure; unlike payroll, GSP includes both labor and capital income. Table 7
shows the results of this exercise. Panel A shows the IV estimates, and Panel B shows
the first-stage estimates. Columns 1 and 2 compare results at the state level when
labor (payroll) income and GSP are used, respectively, as our income measure. The
first stage suggests that, in response to our instrument, non-labor income appears to
rise by the same proportion, or by slightly more, then our primary measure of labor
income (compare columns 1 and 2 of Panel B). If anything, therefore, the results
suggest that the estimates using labor income only may be slightly over-stating the
income elasticity of health expenditures (compare columns 1 and 2 of Panel A).
Since, as discussed, we lose variation by aggregating to the state level, we also
report results at the state level when we include the entire US in the sample rather
than just the 16 states in the South. Column 3 shows the results when we use labor
income (from the CBP payroll data) as our measure of income and column 4 shows the
results when we use the GSP measure, which incorporates capital income. Once again
124
the results suggest that non-labor income may rise slightly more than proportionately
with labor income, so that our income elasticities in our baseline estimates may be
slightly overstated."
2.3.4 Heterogeneity in Income Elasticities
Another potential concern with our conclusions concerning the role of rising incomes
in explaining the rising health share of GDP is that our IV estimates are based
on a specific type of income variation as well as a specific area of the country and
time period. If there is substantial heterogeneity in the income elasticity of health
expenditures across any of these dimensions, out-of-sample extrapolations may be
particularly unreliable. We therefore explored whether there appears to be substantial
heterogeneity in our estimated income elasticity. All in all, we read the available
evidence as suggesting that the quantitative estimates are reasonably similar across
different sources of income variation, geographic samples, time periods, and time
horizons; we therefore do not see any reason to suspect that heterogeneous elasticities
are likely to lead to a serious underestimation of the effect of rising incomes on health
care expenditures.
Source and extent of income variation At a general level, one might be con-
cerned that the source and range of the variation in income that we are exploiting
may be insufficient to estimate (or detect) income elasticities significantly greater than
one. To alleviate this concern, we estimated similar IV regressions with spending on
goods that can be classified as a luxury on a priori grounds (e.g., recreation). Since
we do not have data on spending on other goods at the ESR level, we pursued this
strategy at the state level using data on industry-specific Gross State Products (GSP)
for other service industries. Specifically, we used our instrument at the state level
to examine the income elasticity of four potential luxury goods: "amusement and
recreation services," "hotels and other lodging places," "legal services" and "other
45The results in column 3 also suggest that our estimates are not sensitive to using the entire
United States. In later robustness analysis we show this is true at the ESR level as well (see Table
10 below).
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services," which includes (among other things) record production, actuarial consult-
ing, music publishing, and other consulting.46 We also estimated the income elasticity
of "food and kindred products," which we expect to be a necessity. The results are
shown in Table 8."
The results suggest that our source of variation in income is strong enough to
uncover elasticities greater than one at the state level.48 Legal services and "other
services" both appear to be strong luxuries. Amusement services and hotels also show
an income elasticity of close to or above 1. By contrast, food stores appear to be a
necessity, with an income elasticity that is virtually the same as what we estimate for
health services (see column 6).
A more specific concern is that, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, we cannot reject that
our income variation at the ESR level comes entirely from changes in employment
at roughly constant wages (see Table 3), while about half of income growth in the
United States over the last half century comes from increased wages per employed
individual (US Census Bureau, 2008).49 This raises the potential concern that, if
the elasticity of health spending with respect to income is increasing in income, the
elasticity of health care spending with respect to increases in wages may be larger
than the elasticity with respect to increases in employment.
Table 9 investigates whether there is any evidence of this type of convexity in
Engel curves for health expenditures. Column 1 reports results from the baseline IV
specification, while column 2 adds an interaction of the ESR's (log) income with its
(log) income in 1970. This strategy allows the effect of changes in income to vary
based on initial income levels and provides a simple check against the possibility that
46A complete definition of "other services" can be found here: http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/
sic-manual.display?id=1014&tab=description.
47An estimate for health services GSP, which was already discussed in subsection 2.3.2, is also
included in this table.
48 More information on each of these categories can be found here: http://www.bea.gov/
regional/gsp/def ault . cfm?series=SIC. First-stage results for this same specification are shown
in Table 7, Panel B, columns 1 and 3. Second stage results for this same specification using the AHA
hospital expenditure data as the dependent variable can be found in Table 7, Panel A, columns 1
and 3.
49 At the state level we estimate that our instrument is associated with a statistically significant
increase in wages, although the increase in income is still predominantly due to an increase in
employment (not shown).
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the income elasticity of health expenditures may vary systematically with the level of
income of the area. We instrument for log income and the interaction of log income
with 1970 ESR log income with our standard instrument (oil reserves times log oil
prices) and the interaction of this instrument with 1970 ESR log income. The results
show no evidence that the Engel curve for health expenditures is convex; if anything
the point estimates suggest a (statistically insignificant) concave Engel curve.
As another check on the potential convexity of the relationship between income
and hospital spending, we looked for nonlinearities in the reduced-form relationship.
Column 3 reproduces the baseline reduced-form results for comparison and column 4
reports the results of a modified reduced-form specification, which also includes the
square of the baseline instrument (i.e., (logjp x I)2 as well as logpt_1 x Ij). The
estimates in column 4 also show no evidence of a convex relationship between income
and health expenditures. The lack of any convexity in the relationship between income
and health spending further suggests that the income elasticity of health expenditures
is unlikely to be significantly greater at higher levels of income or for larger income
changes.
Finally, we note that because oil prices both rise and fall over our time period, our
instrument predicts both increases and decreases in income. From a purely estimation
standpoint, this is a strength of our instrument, since it makes it less likely that it
simply captures differential (monotonic) trends across different areas of the country.
Nevertheless, since much of the motivation of our paper is related to the effects of
rising incomes on health care expenditures, we also investigated whether the effects
of rises and declines in income are asymmetric. In particular, we re-estimated our
baseline models allowing positive and negative changes (between t and t- 1) in income
to have different effects (and we instrumented these income variables with our baseline
instrument interacted with an indicator for whether oil prices rose between dates t
and t - 1). We found no evidence of such asymmetric effects (results available upon
request).
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Different areas and time period Table 10 explores the sensitivity of our es-
timates to defining the sample based on different geographic regions and different
time periods. Panel A shows the IV estimates and Panel B shows the corresponding
first-stage results. Column 1 reproduces our baseline estimates, which are for the 16
Southern states focusing on the time period 1970-1990.
As discussed above, we chose to limit our baseline sample to the Southern United
States both because the oil reserves are concentrated in the South and because the
ESRs in this region are more comparable, thus less likely to experience differential
trends in hospital spending owing to other reasons. In column 2 we further limit the
sample to the 7 Southern states that have oil reserves in our data. The results are
quite similar. In column 3 we go in the opposite direction, and look at the entire
United States. The results in this column show that expanding the sample to the
entire United States (not including Alaska and Virginia) results in a very similar
point estimate of the income elasticity (0.804 vs. 0.723 in the baseline), though the
estimate is less precise (standard error = 0.631 compared to 0.214 in the baseline).50
We also explored whether within the South our estimates were sensitive to ex-
cluding a particular state. Appendix Table A2 shows the results from estimating our
baseline specification (from column 1) dropping each one of the 16 states at a time.
The results indicate that the estimates are generally quite robust both in terms of
magnitude and precision to the omission of a single state. The exception occurs when
we exclude Texas. In this case, the point estimate falls by about 40 percent; combined
with the increase in standard error, this makes the estimate of the income elasticity
of hospital expenditure no longer significant at the 5% level. This is not surprising
since much of the variation in oil intensity in our sample is within Texas (see Figure
3).
Our baseline time period is for 1970-1990 and covers the original oil boom and
bust. In column 4 of Table 10, we return to our baseline Southern states sample,
but now expand the time period 1970-2005 (thus including all available years with
50We do not include Alaska because of the Alaska Permanent Fund (established in 1976), as well
as the difficulty in forming consistent data by ESR between 1970 and 1990. We do not include
Virginia because of the difficulty in forming consistent data by ESR between 1970 and 1990.
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data). Figure 2 shows that oil prices experienced a second boom starting in 1999.
Nevertheless, we lose the first stage when we include the post 1990 years (and therefore
do not report the corresponding IV estimate). This weaker first-stage relationship
appears to reflect the inadequacy of imposing constant ESR fixed effects over a 36
year period. Indeed, when this assumption is relaxed in column 5 by including state-
specific time trends, the first-stage relationship is again statistically significant and
leads to an IV estimate of similar magnitude to the baseline.
Permanent versus transitory elasticities The interpretation of our estimates
depend on whether oil price changes are permanent or transitory. This is investigated
in Table 11 using the time-series data shown in Figure 2. Column 1 shows that a
regression of the log oil price at time t on its one year lag produces a coefficient of
1.009 (standard error = 0.043). The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test reported
at the bottom comfortably fails to reject the null hypothesis that log oil prices follow
a unit root. The remaining columns of this table show several different specifications,
all indicating that we cannot reject that changes in oil prices are permanent. These
findings are consistent with those of previous researchers.5 1 The available evidence
therefore suggests that our empirical strategy speaks to the effects of permanent
(rather than transitory) changes in income on health care expenditures.
Short-run versus long-run income elasticities Since we focus on annual vari-
ation, our empirical strategy estimates the short-run response of health expenditures
to (permanent changes in) income. This may naturally be different from the long-run
response of health expenditures. For example, increased demand may result in the
short run in higher prices, with the response of quantities emerging with a delay as
capacity expands. However, there are no strong theoretical reasons to expect the
long-run income elasticity to be greater than the short-run elasticity. For example, if
health care demand is inelastic (with price elasticity less than one, which is plausible,
5Kline (2008) conducts a more detailed analysis of the time-series behavior of oil prices and
concludes that oil prices are "well approximated by a pure random walk". See also Hamilton (2008)
for a similar conclusion.
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for example, because of insurance), as capacity expands in the long run in the face
of rising incomes, overall health expenditures will increase less than in the short run.
In addition, if long-run increases in income also improve overall health, the long-run
increase in health expenditures may again be less than in the short run. Neverthe-
less, even though there are no a priori reasons to expect long-run effects to be greater
than short-run effects, it is important to understand whether our empirical strategy
is estimating the former or the latter.
To investigate this issue, we re-estimated our regressions using decadal observa-
tions, thus removing the source of variation due to short-run changes in our instru-
ment. Table 12 compares our baseline results-which use annual observations from
1970-1990 in columns 1 through 3-with the estimates using only decadal observa-
tions (1970, 1980, 1990) in columns 4 through 6. With only the decadal observations,
the first stage is only slightly weaker (compare columns 4 and 1). The IV elasticity
estimate from the decadal estimate is similar to the baseline annual estimate (0.794
compared to 0.723) although the standard error of the decadal estimate is roughly
double what we obtain with annual data. We read these results as suggestive of a
long-run income elasticity that is similar to the short-run elasticity.
This conclusion also receives support from the lack of capacity responses. If long-
run effects were significantly larger than short-run effects, we would expect to see
hospitals expanding capacity (either simultaneously with the increase in health ex-
penditures or gradually as they reach their capacity constraints). However, Table 5
showed no evidence of an increase in hospital capacity or utilization (in particular,
there was no increase in admissions, patient days, hospital beds, and hospital entry
in response to the rise in local income).
A related issue is that there might be heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics
of hospital spending in response to increases in income. For example, suppose that
some of the ESRs respond immediately to increases in income, while other ESRs take
one or two years to respond. In this case, results using the annual panel and assuming
immediate and complete adjustment would underestimate the true long-run income
elasticity. We show in the on-line Appendix (see section C) that specifications using
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3-year averages typically perform better when there are heterogeneous adjustment
dynamics by ESR. Thus in column 7 we report results based on 3-year averages. The
estimated elasticity increases slightly (from 0.723 to 0.826).
2.3.5 Robustness
We also performed a large number of robustness checks of our baseline estimates,
designed to explore the robustness of our instrumental-variables estimates along a
number of dimensions and to examine the validity of our identifying assumption.
Specifically, we explored a variety of alternative specifications designed to investigate
the validity of our identifying assumption; we examined the robustness of our results
to alternative specifications of our instrument; and we explored alternative ways to
address potential serial correlation in the residuals. The results from these additional
analyses were in general quite reassuring. They are presented in detail in the on-line
Appendix (Section B and Tables A3-A6).
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of the secular rise in incomes in the dramatic run-up
in the health share of GDP in the United States, which increased from 5 percent of
GDP in 1960 to 16 percent in 2005. A common conjecture is that rising incomes
have played a primary role in the increase in the health share of GDP. A finding of a
primary role for rising incomes would have important implications for forecasting the
future growth of the health share of GDP. It would also provide crucial input into an
investigation of the potential optimality (or sub-optimality) of rising health share of
GDP. Yet, surprisingly, little is known about the empirical impact of rising aggregate
incomes on health spending.
We attempted to estimate the causal effect of aggregate income on aggregate
health expenditures by instrumenting for local area income with time-series variation
in global oil prices interacted with cross-sectional variation in the oil reserves in
different areas of the Southern United States. This strategy is attractive not only
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because it isolates a potentially-exogenous source of variation in incomes but also
because it incorporates local general equilibrium effects, as we estimate the response of
health expenditures in the area to an aggregate change in incomes. We also presented
evidence suggesting that national or global general equilibrium effects of rising income
on health expenditures - which our estimates would not capture - are unlikely to be
quantitatively important.
Across a wide range of specifications, we estimate a positive and statistically
significant income elasticity of hospital expenditures that is almost always less than
1. Our central estimate is an income elasticity of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21). This
estimate is reasonably robust to a range of alternative specifications.
Our central point estimate suggests that rising income did not contribute to the
rise in the health share of GDP between 1960 and 2005. Our 95 percent confidence
interval-which includes at its upper end an income elasticity of 1.1-suggests that
we can reject a role of rising income of explaining more than a very small part, 0.5
percentage points, of the 11 percentage point increase in the health share of GDP
over that time period. Although considerable caution is warranted in extrapolating
estimates from a particular source of variation, time period, and part of the country
to the overall impact of rising incomes in the post-war period, we provided addi-
tional evidence suggesting that many of the most salient potential concerns with such
extrapolation are not likely to pose major threats to our conclusions.
While our findings suggest that the increase in income is unlikely to be a primary
driver of the increase in the health share of GDP, they do not provide an answer to
the question of what is behind this notable trend. There is general consensus that
rapid progress in medical technologies is a (or "the") major driver of increasing health
expenditures (e.g., Newhouse, 1992, Fuchs, 1996, Cutler, 2002, Congressional Bud-
get Office, 2008), though presumably technological progress itself is being spurred
by other factors. Our analysis thus indirectly also suggests that rising incomes are
unlikely to be the major driver of medical innovations either. An interesting pos-
sibility is that institutional factors, such as the spread of insurance coverage, have
not only directly encouraged increased spending but also induced the adoption and
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diffusion of new medical technologies (Weisbrod 1991, Finkelstein 2004, Finkelstein
2007, Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008). This channel of induced innovation could not
only account for the increase in the health share of GDP in the United States, but
provided that technological advances in the United States spread relatively rapidly to
other advanced economies, it could also be a major contributor to the similar trends
experienced by other OECD countries. An investigation of this possibility, as well as
more general analyses of the determinants of technological change in the health care
sector, are important and interesting areas for further work.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
ESR-year data State-year data
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Oil and Gas Data Book Data
Oil Reserves (million barrels) 532.3 1596.1 3371.7 9124.3
County Business Patterns Data
Total Income (Payroll); ($millions) 2916.9 6066.7 18494.4 20751.0
Total Employment (millions) 0.21 0.35 1.32 1.13
AHA Hospital Data
Total Expenditures ($millions) 292.61 636.31 1854.22 2257.94
Hospital Payroll ($millions) 139.87 284.12 886.40 1011.38
Admissions (millions) 0.11 0.16 0.73 0.55
Inpatient Days (millions) 1.08 1.47 6.85 4.76
Beds (thousands) 4.15 5.65 26.29 19.06
Full-time Equivalents (thousands) 9.58 14.55 60.72 48.58
RN / (LPN + RN) 0.63 0.12 0.69 0.09
# of Technologies 46.98 18.10 48.37 19.53
# of Hospitals 24.67 26.57 156.43 126.71
Current Population Reports and NHIS Data
Population (millions) 0.68 0.89 4.44 3.40
HUWP (millions) 0.60 0.84 3.88 3.02
BEA GSP Data (all in $millions)
Total GSP 54559.5 60731.7
(Industry-Specific GSPs)
Health Services 1639.9 2182.0
Amusement and Recreation Services 150.3 266.4
Hotels and Other Lodging 237.7 343.6
Legal Services 312.9 575.2
Other Services 624.5 995.6
Food 524.3 485.0
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Data (all in $millions)
Total Health Care Expenditures 5923.8 6447.2
Hospital Expenditures 2641.1 2663.7
Physician and Other Services 1626.0 2065.4
Dental Services 303.3 330.7
Drugs and Other Medical Non-durables 654.7 685.4
Vision Products 106.2 130.8
Nursing Care 390.7 382.2
Other Health Services 201.8 425.2
Notes: Summary statistics in columns I and 2 are for the baseline sample of 99 economic sub-regions (ESRs)
in the 16 Southern states between 1970 and 1990 (i.e. all statistics are ESR-year); columns 3 and 4 report
summary statistics for the State-year data for the same baseline sample of 16 southem states between 1970 and
1990. Source for variables is given in italics. BEA and HCFA data are only available at state level. N = 2065
at ESR-year except for RN/(LPN+RN) which is 1576 and Inpatient Days which is 1967. N = 326 at State-year
except for HCFA data and except for RN/(LPN+RN) which is 251 and Inpatient Days which is 311. Data on
RNs and LPNs are only available in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980-1990. Data on Inpatient Days
are not available in 1979. N = 236 at State-year for HCFA data which are only available in 1972, 1976-1978,
and 1980-1990. HUWP is a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population. See text for more details.
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Table 2: Comparing economic sub-regions in 1970 With Different Oil Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean for Mean for
ESRs with ESRs without
Large Oil Large Oil
Variable Wells Wells Coefficient p -value
Population (in millions) 0.687 0.521 0.113 0.155
Total Employment (in millions) 0.168 0.137 0.075 0.306
Hospital Expenditures (in $thousands) 0.059 0.050 0.072 0.356
Hospital Beds (in thousands) 4.671 3.940 0.094 0.184
Total Income (in $thousands) 0.989 0.778 0.077 0.298
p-value of F -test ofjoint significance 0.357
(F -statistic = 1.12 for F (5,92))
Notes: All results based on 1970 cross-section of the ESRs in the baseline sample (i.e. the 16 Southern
states). Column 3 reports the coeffient from a regression of Oil Reserves on the variable in the row header
and a constant term; in these regressions in column 3, both dependent and independent variables are
standardized to have standard deviation of 1. Column 4 reports the associated p-value (based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). The final row of table reports results from a regression of Oil
Reserves on all of the variables listed in table and a constant term. N = 98 in the regressions reported in
columns 3 and 4 because AHA data for Washington, DC are not available in 1970. N = 30 in column 1 and
68 in column 2.
Table 3: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Geographic level of
analysis: economic sub-region State
Total Income per Population Population Income per Income per
Dependent variable: Total Income Employment Population capita < 55 >55 HUWP HUWP
Oil Reserves; x 12.900 15.542 5.252 7.648 6.421 1.545 9.245 2.564
log(oil price), (2.980) (2.572) (1.491) (1.937) (1.756) (1.531) (2.271) (0.523)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.329] [0.001] [0.000]
R2 0.994 0.969 0.997 0.984 0.997 0.996 0.983 0.989
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 326
F-statistic 18.74 36.53 12.40 15.58 13.37 1.02 16.58 24.05
Notes: Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (8) and (11) by OLS. Dependent variables are defined in column headings and
are all in logs; in column 7 and 8 the dependent variable is income divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP).
The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990. Unit of observation is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year except in column 8 where
it is State-year. All models include ESR (or state in column 8) and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Table 4: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geographic level of analysis: economic sub-region State
Population adjustment: HUWP HUWP HUWP None Per Capita HUWP
Reduced
Form
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
log(Income), -0.027 0.723 0.801 0.665 0.550
(0.074) (0.214) (0.155) (0.263) (0.230)
[0.723] [0.004] [0.000] [0.023] [0.030]
Oil Reserves, x 6.680
log(oil price),.t (2.048)
[0.005]
R2 0.973 0.973 0.968 0.989 0.970 0.992
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 326
Notes: Table reports results of estimating equations (7), (10) or (12) by OLS or IV as indicated. Dependent variable is
log hospital expenditures. In columns 1, 2, 3, and 6, both hospital expenditures and income are divided by a hospital-
utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs (see equations (10) through (12)). In column 4
hospital expenditures and income are not adjusted before taking logs, and in column 5 both hospital expenditures and
income are divided by the total population before taking logs. The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990.
Unit of observation is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year except in column 6 where it is a state-year. All models
include ESR (or state in column 6) and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
Table 5: Other Hospital Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total
Dependent Hospital Total Hospital RN/ In-Patient # of Open-Heart Radioisotope
Variable: Expenditures Payroll FTE (RN+LPN) Admissions Days Beds # of Hospitals Technologies Surgery Therapy
log(Income), 0.723 0.934 0.039 0.329 -0.430 -1.034 -0.698 -0.552 -0.132 -3.163 1.083
(0.214) (0.233) (0.222) (0.089) (0.193) (0.488) (0.455) (0.358) (0.221) (11.334) (2.575)
[0.004] [0.001] [0.862] [0.002] [0.042] [0.051] [0.146] [0.144] [0.558] [0.169] [0.545]
R
2  0.968 0.958 0.893 0.868 0.788 0.884 0.871 0.981 0.945
N 2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065 2065 849 262
Notes: Columns 1 through 9 report IV estimates of equation (10) with the first stage given by equation (11). Column 1 reproduces baseline results from column 3 in Table 4. Unit of
observation is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year. The baseline sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990. Each column shows results for a different dependent variable, as
indicated in the column heading. Dependent variables in columns 1-3 and 5-7 are in logs and are divided (before taking logs) by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population
(HUWP). Dependent variables in columns 8 and 9 are in logs but not adjusted by any population measure; dependent variable in column 4 is not adjusted by any population measure and
is not in logs. Columns 10 and 11 report results from an instrumental variables estimator of the Cox proportional hazard model shown in equation (13). Dependent variable in columns 10
and 1I is an indicator variable for whether an at-risk ESR adopts the technology in that year and sample size reflects the number of ESRs "at risk" for adoption in each year. In column 10,
there are 56 ESRs that have not adopted open-heart surgery technology by 1970 and 22 ESRs that have not adopted by 1990. In column 11, there are 21 ESRs that have not adopted
radioisotope therapy by 1972 (the first year data are available) and 8 ESRs that have not adopted by 1990. Data for RNs and LPNs (column 4) only exist in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976,
1978, and 1980-1990. Data for in-patient days (column 6) do not exist in 1979. All models include ESR and year fixed effects, except columns 10 and 1I which have region fixed effects
and controls for total hospital beds and hospital expenditures in 1970. In all columns income is divided by HUWP before taking logs. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets; in columns 10 and I1 the standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped (clustered by
state).
Table 6: Hospital Spending Versus Overall Health Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Stage
Regression: OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Drugs and
Other
Physician Medical Other
Dependent Total Health Hospital and Other Dental Non- Vision Nursing Health
Variable: Income Care Exp. Exp. Services Services durables Products Care Services
Panel A: Southern States Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil Reserves; x 3.626
log(oil price),-, (0.776)
[0.000]
log(Income);, 0.055 0.067 0.179 0.622 0.248 1.187 -1.302 -0.359
(0.077) (0.157) (0.152) (0.100) (0.120) (0.516) (0.321) (0.228)
[0.484] [0.675] [0.257] [0.000] [0.057] [0.036] [0.001] [0.137]
R2 0.985 0.998 0.995 0.996 0.991 0.993 0.914 0.926 0.963
N 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
F-statistic 21.81
Share of Total 46.30% 24.73% 5.17% 11.33% 1.80% 7.02% 3.44%
Health Care Exp.
Panel B: All US.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil Reserves; x 3.162
log(oil price), (0.586)
[0.000]
log(Income);, 0.098 0.139 0.365 0.650 0.307 0.748 -1.944 -0.953
(0.167) (0.151) (0.186) (0.173) (0.112) (0.824) (0.968) (0.758)
[0.558] [0.361] [0.056] [0.000] [0.009] [0.368] [0.050] [0.214]
R2 0.98 0.996 0.965 0.974 0.986 0.989 0.879 0.918 0.915
N 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 729
F-statistic 29.11
Share of Total 45.06% 25.04% 6.07% 10.40% 2.02% 8.57% 3.39%
Health Care Exp.
Notes: Table reports first stage results of estimating equation (11) by OLS in column 1; remaining columns report estimates of variants of
estimating equation (10) by IV. Unit of observation is a State-year in all columns. Dependent variables are various measures of health care
expenditures from the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA). HCFA data are available in 1972, 1976 - 1978, and 1980-1990. All
dependent variables and income are in logs and divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP). In all columns
income is divided by HUWP before taking logs. Sample is Southern states in Panel A and All U.S. (except Alaska and Virginia) in Panel B.
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in
brackets.
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Table 7: Labor Income vs. All Income
log(Income),
R2
N
Oil Reserves; x
log(oil price),.,
R 2
N
F-statistic
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2)
0.550 0.451
(0.230) (0.160)
[0.030] [0.013]
0.992 0.993
326 326
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
(1) (2)
2.564 3.128
(0.523) (0.851)
[0.000] [0.002]
0.989 0.990
326 326
24.05 13.50
Specific
Income definition
Geographic sample
Notes: Table reports estimates of variants of
and equation (11) by OLS in Panel B. Unit o
In all specifications income and hospital exp
wei hted m r of o (HWTXXP) a
(3)
0.740
(0.359)
[0.045]
0.981
1015
(3)
2.220
(0.443)
[0.000]
0.985
1015
25.10
(4)
0.568
(0.263)
[0.036]
0.982
1015
(4)
2.895
(0.682)
[0.000]
0.983
1015
18.05
Table 8: Income Elasticity of Other Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry-specific Gross State Product
Amuse- Legal Other Health
ment Hotels Services Services Food Services
Panel A: Southern States Only
log(Income), 0.900 0.835 1.635 1.375 -0.009 -0.048
(0.385) (0.319) (0.317) (0.387) (0.416) (0.181)
[0.034] [0.019] [0.000] [0.003] [0.984] [0.793]
R2 0.984 0.984 0.991 0.989 0.965 0.996
N 326 326 326 308 324 326
Panel B: All U.S.
log(Income), 1.080 0.940 1.749 1.400 0.255 0.207
(0.384) (0.397) (0.291) (0.270) (0.356) (0.412)
[0.007] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000] [0.477] [0.617]
R2 0.975 0.978 0.988 0.984 0.977 0.994
N 1013 1015 1015 989 1013 1015
ation Notes: Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (10) by IV, Dependent
(1) (2) (3) (4) variables are given in column headings. All dependent variables are in logs, and all dependent
Payroll GSP Payroll GSP variables and income are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population
South South USA USA (HUWP) before taking logs. The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990 in Panel
A and all US states (except Alaska and Virginia) between 1970 and 1990 in Panel B. Unit of
estimating equation (10) by IV in Panel A analysis is a state-year. All columns include state and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is
f observation is a State-year in all columns. the Gross State Product for various industries, as indicated by column headings. Standard
enditures are divided by hospital-utilization errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are
vA th- 1 - in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
vaibesadicoeae iie b osia-tiiaio egt  e ueo opl o
specification variants; these are the definition of income (Payroll as in the baseline
specification or Gross State Product (GSP)) and the geographic sample (South or all
US). In all columns the years of analysis are 1970 - 1990. The sample is all Southern
states between 1970 and 1990 in columns I and 2; columns 3 and 4 expand sample to
all US (except Alaska and Virginia). Column I reproduces results from column 6 in
Table 4 (Panel A) and column 8 of Table 3 (Panel B). All regressions include state and
year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in
brackets.
Table 9: Decomposition and Tests for Nonlinear Effects
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Reduced
Form Form
Regression: IV IV OLS OLS
Oil Reserves; x 6.680 10.567
log(oil price),., (2.099) (7.511)
[0.006] [0.180]
log(Income);, 0.725 0.833
(0.216) (0.369)
[0.005] [0.040]
log(Income);, x -0.066
log(Income);m=197o (0.143)
[0.652]
{ Oil Reserves x -487.728
log(oil price),-i }2 (717.177)
[0.507]
R2 0.967 0.965 0.973 0.973
N 2054 2054 2065 2065
-1 standard deviation 0.725 0.862 6.680 11.855
Marginal Effect at Mean 0.725 0.833 6.680 10.567
+1 standard deviation 0.725 0.804 6.680 9.278
Notes: Table reports IV estimates of variants of equation (10) in columns 1 and 2 and
OLS estimates of a variant of equation (12) in columns 3 and 4. The unit of anlaysis is an
economic sub-region (ESR)-year, and the regressions include ESR fixed effects and year
fixed effects. All dependent variables are in logs. In all columns hospital expenditures
and income are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP)
before taking logs. The sample is all Southern states between 1970 and 1990. Note that
the results in columns I and 3 differ slightly from baseline results in Table 4 because the
sample does not include Washington, DC (DC is dropped because there is no data for DC
in the 1970s). Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
Table 10: Heterogeneity Across Geography and Time
log(Income),,
R 2
N
Oil Reserves; x
log(oil price),-,
R 2
N
F-statistic
Years
Geographic sample
State-specific time trends
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3)
0.723 0.700 0.804
(0.214) (0.368) (0.633)
[0.004] [0.106] [0.210]
0.968 0.967 0.956
2065 1070 4915
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
(1) (2)
9.245 6.237
(2.271) (1.655)
[0.001] [0.009]
0.983 0.985
2065 1070
16.58 14.21
Specification
(1) (2)
1970-1990 1970-1990 19
(3)
7.094
(2.375)
[0.004]
0.982
4915
8.92
(4) (5)
N/A 0,853
(0.439)
[0.071]
0.970
3547
(4)
1.481
(1.882)
[0.443]
0.984
3547
0.62
(3) (4)
70-1990 1970-2005
South Southern All US
States w/
Large Oil
Wells
South
(5)
7.966
(1.930)
[0.001]
0.986
3547
17.04
(5)
1970-2005
South
N N N N Y
Notes: Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (10) by IV in Panel A and
equation (11) by OLS in Panel B. All dependent variables and income are in logs and divided by a
hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. Unit of analysis is
an economic sub-region (ESR)-year in all columns, and all columns include ESR fixed effects and
year fixed effects. Bottom rows define the specification variants. The baseline sample is all
Southern states between 1970 and 1990. Column 1 reproduces baseline results from column 7 in
Table 3 and column 3 in Table 4. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. Because
there is no statistically significant first stage in column 4, the IV results are not reported.
Table 11: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Dependent Variable: log(oil price), - log(oil price),-,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(oil price),-, 0.034 0.005 0.014 0.010 -0.090 -0.156 -0.151 -0.175
(0.054) (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) (0.089) (0.093) (0.101) (0.107)
[0.537] [0.927] [0.816] [0.880] [0.315] [0.098] [0.141] [0.107]
log(oil price),-, - log(oil price), 2  0.249 0.254 0.264 0.318 0.319 0.351
(0.158) (0.160) (0.167) (0.156) (0.159) (0.166)
[0.120] [0.119] [0.121] [0.046] [0.050] [0.041]
log(oil price), 2 - log(oil price), 3  -0.121 -0.123 -0.038 -0.034
(0.166) (0.170) (0.167) (0.169)
[0.469] [0.474] [0.819] [0.840]
log(oil price), 3 - log(oil price), 4 0.047 0.125
(0.172) (0.170)
[0.786] [0.467]
t 0.111 0.142 0.141 0.157
(0.064) (0.065) (0.070) (0.075)
[0.088] [0.035] [0.050] [0.040]
N 55 54 53 52 55 54 53 52
Dickey-Fuller test statistic 0.621 0.092 0.234 0.151 -1.014 -1.686 -1.498 -1.642
Approximate p-value 0.988 0.966 0.974 0.969 0.942 0.757 0.830 0.776
Notes: Table based on annual data on oil prices from 1950 to 2005 (see Figure 2). Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are
in brackets.
Table 12: Short-run versus Long-run Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital
Dependent variable: Income Expenditures Expenditures Income Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Baseline Baseline Baseline 10-year 10-year 10-year 3-year avg.
FS RF FS RF
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV IV
Oil Reserves; x 9.245 6.680 7.621 6.050
log(oil price),1  (2.271) (2.099) (2.643) (2.628)
[0.001] [0.006] [0.011] [0.036]
log(Income);, 0.723 0.794 0.826
(0.214) (0.411) (0.231)
[0.004] [0.073] [0.003]
R2 0.983 0.973 0.968 0.986 0.986 0.981 0.976
N 2065 2065 2065 296 296 296 690
F-statistic 16.577 8.318
Notes: Table reports results of estimating equations (10), (11) or (12) by OLS or IV as indicated. All dependent variables are in logs. Unit
of analysis is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year, and all columns include ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects. In all columns income
and hospital expenditures are divided by a hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. Columns I
through 3 are the baseline sample of all Southern states between 1970 and 1990; in columns 4 through 6, only observations from 1970,
1980, and 1990 are included. Column 7 uses 3-year averages of all variables (see Appendix Section B for more details). Standard errors,
adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Figure 1: Health Spending Trends
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Note: This graph displays the trends in hospital spending from 1960 until 2005. Source: CMS
(2006).
Figure 2: Oil Price, 1950-2005
19 150 .1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Note: This graph displays the annual average oil price, calculated from the monthly
spot prices in the West Texas Intermediate series. The data are available here:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE/downloaddata?cid=98.
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Figure 3a: Map of Large Oil Well Reserves by ESR
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Note: This map displays the total amount of oil in large oil wells for each economic sub-region in
the South. Large oil wells are defined as having ever had more than 100 million barrels of oil. The
data come from the 2000 Edition of the Oil and Gas Data Book.
Figure 3b: Large Oil Well Reserves by ESR
5 10
Oil Reserves (in billions of barrels)
Note: This figure displays the cross-sectional distribution of oil reserves by economic sub-region
(ESR) among the ESRs containing large wells. Of the 99 ESRs in the South, 69 ESRs do not have
any large oil wells. This figure shows the amount of oil reserves (in billions of barrels) for the 30
ESRs with large oil wells. The data come from the 2000 Edition of the Oil and Gas Data Book.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Income and Hospital Expenditure Data
Figure 4a: Total Income by ESR Figure 4b: Total Hospital Expenditures by ESR
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Note: This figure contains histograms of the total income and total hospital expenditures by eco-
nomic sub-region (ESR). Income is measured using the payroll data from the County Business
Patterns (CBP), and the total hospital expenditures come from the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Surveys. Both variables are displayed in logs. The data displayed are for ESRs in
the South for the years 1970 to 1990.
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Figure 5: Hospital Days by Age Bucket
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Age Bucket
Note: This chart displays the average annual number of hospital days for various age buckets. The
data come from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for years 1973 to 1991.
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2.5 Appendix A: Induced Innovation Effects
In this Appendix, we present a simple model to illustrate why, given an income elas-
ticity of health expenditure less than one, any induced innovation effects in the health
care sector due to rising income are unlikely to be large. We first present a simple
model incorporating endogenous technology responses to changes in market size. To
economize on space, the reader is referred to Acemoglu (2002, 2007, 2009) or Ace-
moglu and Linn (2004) for the details (and microfoundations for various assumptions
imposed here for simplicity).
Consider an infinite-horizon, continuous-time economy with g = 1, ... , G goods.
To communicate the basic ideas, we take expenditures on these goods as given, rep-
resented by [Eg (t)]'1 for good g (in terms of some numeraire). We also assume
that all of these goods have unit price elasticity (otherwise, we could not take these
expenditures as given). We then ask how changes in these expenditure levels affect
the types of technologies developed by profit-maximizing firms. These assumptions
imply that at time t the demand for good g will be
D9 (p9(t),t0 = ,g(tp,(t)
where pg (t). Suppose, in particular, that each good can be supplied in different
qualities, denoted by q, (t) E R+, and consumers will purchase whichever variety of
the good has the highest price-adjusted quality. That is, among varieties of good g,
gi,..., gV, available in the market, they will choose the one with highest qg, (t) /Pg, (t).
This implies that whichever firm has the highest quality variety for good g at time
t will generate revenues equal to Eg (t). Suppose also that all goods, regardless of
quality, can be produced at marginal cost equal to 1 (in terms of the numeraire).
This implies that the firm with the highest price-adjusted quality for good g at time
t (presuming that there is a single such firm) will make profits equal to
79 (t = (p9 (t - 1) .9M (14)
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Innovation and technological progress are modeled as in the quality ladder models
of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) (see also Acemoglu,
2009, for a textbook treatment). Suppose that starting from leading-edge quality
qg (t) at time t, R&D directed to good g generates (stochastic) innovations for this
good. An innovation creates a new leading-edge quality Aq (t), where A > 1. There is
free entry into R&D and each firm has access to an R&D technology that generates
a flow rate og of innovation for every dollar spent for research on good g. So if R&D
expenditure at time t for good g is zg (t), the flow rate of innovation is
6z(t ).
Differences in 6,'s introduce the possibility that technological progress is scientifically
more difficult for some goods than for others. A firm that makes an innovation has a
perpetual patent on the good that it invents, and will be able to sell it until a better
good comes to the market.
Consider good g, where current quality is q, (t). Consumers will purchase from
the highest price-adjusted quality and, by definition, the next best firm must have
quality qg (t) /A and can price as low as its marginal cost, 1. This implies that the
leading-edge producer must set a limit price
p9 (t) = A for all g and t. (15)
Then (14) gives the time t profits of the firm with the leading-edge variety of good g,
with quality q, (t) as
Al
?rg (qg (t)) = Eg (t) . (16)
Firms are forward-looking, and discount future profits at the interest rate r. We
assume that this interest rate is constant. The discounted value of profits for firms
can be expressed by a standard dynamic programming recursion. V (t 1. q,), the value
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of a firm that owns the most advanced variety of good g with quality q, at time t, is
rV(t | q9) - Vg(t | q9) = g (q(t)) -6gzg(t)Vg(t | qg) , (17)
where 7rg (qg (t)) is the flow profits given by (16), and zg (t) is R&D effort at time t
on this line by other firms. Throughout, we assume that the relevant transversality
conditions hold and discounted values are finite. Moreover, because of the standard
replacement effect first emphasized by Arrow (1962), the firm with the best technology
does not undertake any R&D itself (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Acemoglu, 2009). Intuitively, the value of owning the best technology for good g,
rV, (t I qg), is equal to the flow profits, 'rg (qg (t)), plus the potential appreciation of
the value, V (t I q.), and takes into account that at the flow rate 6gz, (t) there will be
a new innovation, causing the current firm to lose its leading position and to make
zero profits thereafter.
Free entry into R&D for developing new technologies for each good implies that
there will be entry as long as additional R&D is profitable. Therefore, free entry
requires the following complementary slackness condition to hold:
if z. (t) > 0, then SVg (t I qg) = 1 for all g and t (18)
(and if zg (t) = 0, 6gVg (t I qg) < 1 and there will be no innovation for this good at
time t).
An equilibrium in this economy is given by sequences of prices pg (t)|g=1,..G that
satisfy (15), and R&D levels zg (t)Ig|i ..g that satisfy (18) with V (-) given by (17).
An equilibrium is straightforward to characterize. The free entry condition must
hold at all t. Supposing that it holds as equality in some interval [t', t"), we can
differentiate this equation with respect to time, which yields 1 (t I qg) = 0 for all g
and t (as long as zg (t) > 0). Substituting this equation and (18) into (17) yields the
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levels of R&D effort in the unique equilibrium as
(6g (A - 1) A-1E g (t) - r .zg(t) =max j 9 ; 0 for all g and t. (19)
Equation (19) highlights the market size effect in innovation: the greater is ex-
penditures on good g, Eg (t), the more profitable it is to be a supplier of that good,
and consequently, there will be greater research effort to acquire this position. In
addition, a higher productivity of R&D as captured by og also increases R&D, and a
higher interest rate reduces R&D since current R&D expenditures are rewarded by
future revenues.
Given equation (19), we can now ask how a rise in overall income in the economy
will affect the direction of technological change. Such a change will shift the expen-
ditures from t . However, expenditures onI~~~~  
~E 0"0g1..Gt k ot=0 1g=1,...,G
some good will increase by more, in particular, those that are "luxury goods" will
see their expenditures increase by more. Equation (19) then implies that innovations
will be tend to be directed towards those goods.
To highlight the implications of this type of induced technological change for
our purposes, suppose that the economy consists of two goods, health care and the
"rest". Suppose also that equation (19) leads to positive R&D for both groups of
goods. Moreover, let us parameterize expenditures on these two groups of goods
as Ehealth (t) = ahealth (t) Y (t) and Erest (t) = arest (t) Y (t), where Y (t) is total in-
come (GDP). Our ESR-level estimates imply that, without the induced technology
responses, arest (t) > ahealth (t), so that with the rising incomes Erest (t) increases more
than Ehealth (t). Equation (19) then implies that Zrest (t) will increase (proportion-
ately) by more than Zhealth (t), or that Zrest (t) /Zhealth (t) will increase. Importantly,
this conclusion is independent of the values of the 6g's as long as they are such that
both Zrest (t) > 0 and Zhealth (t) > 0. This result is the basis of our argument that,
given the relationship between health care expenditures and income we observe at
the ESR level, national-level directed technological change is unlikely to significantly
increase the responsiveness of health care expenditures to aggregate income changes.
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Equation (19) also highlights the conditions under which this conclusion needs to
be modified. If it happens to be the case that Zhalth (t) = 0 and zrest (t) > 0 to start
with, then an increase in Ehcalth (t) that is proportionately less than that in Erest (t)
may still have a disproportionate effect on innovation in the health care sector by
making Zhalth (t) > 0. Intuitively, before the changes in expenditures, technological
change in the health care sector would have been unprofitable, and as the market size
passes a certain threshold (in this case equal to J-1 (A - 1)1 Ar), innovation jumps
up from zero to a positive level. While this is theoretically possible, we believe that it
is unlikely to be important in the context of the health care sector, since as discussed
earlier in the main text, throughout the 20th century technological change in the
health care sector was positive and in fact quite rapid (Cutler and Meara, 2003).
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2.6 Appendix B: Robustness
In this Appendix, we provide several robustness checks of our baseline estimates,
particularly focusing on whether our causal estimates of the effect of income on health
care expenditures might be spurious and whether they may be underestimating the
income elasticity of health care expenditures. In the interest of brevity, we focus our
discussion on the robustness of our main dependent variable: hospital expenditures.
Appendix Table A6 summarizes results from the alternative specifications shown in
the previous tables as well as results from the main alternative specifications pursued
below, for each of the components of hospital expenditures analyzed in Table 5.
2.6.1 Exclusion Restriction
The exclusion restriction of our IV strategy is that absent oil price changes, ESRs with
different levels of oil reserves would have experienced the same proportional changes
in hospital expenditures. In Table A3 we explore a variety of alternative specifications
designed to investigate the validity of this identifying assumption. As usual, Panel
A shows the IV estimates, while Panel B shows the corresponding first-stage results.
Column 1 replicates our baseline estimates.
Column 2 shows the results of a natural falsification test: we repeat the baseline
analysis of equation (11) (corresponding to column 1), but also include a 5-year lead
of the instrument, that is, log Pt+5 x I (where Ij again denotes oil reserves in ESR
j). To the extent that our instrument captures the impact of rising oil prices on
the area's income rather than differential trends across areas with different levels of
oil reserves, future oil prices should not predict current income changes. Column 2
in Panel B shows that the first-stage relationship is robust to including the lead of
the instrument. The coefficient on the lead of the instrument is positive and large
(about 60 percent of that on the instrument), though statistically insignificant. The
magnitude of this coefficient raises some concerns about potential serial correlation.
We explore issues of serial correlation in greater detail in the subsection 2.6.3. To
preview, even if there is serial correlation in the first stage, this does not necessarily
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create a bias in the IV estimates. In addition, our robustness checks in the next
subsection show that the statistical and quantitative properties of our estimates are
reasonably robust in alternative specifications that explicitly recognize the possibility
of serial correlation.
The results from the IV estimates that include the five-year lead of the instrument
(both in the first and second stages) are shown in Panel A column 2. The estimate
of income elasticity in this specification remains statistically significant and increases
somewhat in magnitude relative to the baseline in column 1. The negative (and
statistically insignificant) coefficient on the five-year lead of the instrument indicates
that our IV estimates are unlikely to be capturing pre-existing trends.
Column 3 shows the results from an alternative check on our identification strat-
egy, in which we additionally control for interactions between oil prices (logpt- 1 ) and
fixed ESR characteristics. In particular, we control for separate interactions between
log oil prices in year t-1 and each of log hospital expenditures in 1969, log hospital
beds in 1969, log population in 1970, log area income in 1970 and log area employ-
ment in 1970. This "horse race" between our instrument and other interactions of
oil prices and baseline area characteristics is useful for two complementary reasons.
First, it provides additional evidence that it is the interaction between oil price shocks
and availability of oil reserves leading to the source of income variation that we are
exploiting. Second, it indirectly controls for differential pre-existing trends in health
expenditures (and income) across ESRs, which are the main threat to our identifica-
tion strategy. Consistent with the limited differences in various ESR characteristics
shown in Table 2, the results of this horse race show that both our first-stage and
second-stage estimates are robust in magnitude and precision to the (simultaneous)
inclusion of all of these interaction terms. Very similar estimates are obtained when
we include each interaction term one by one (not shown).
Column 4 shows the results of adding region-specific linear trends for the three
Census regions within the South. Column 5 shows the results of adding state-specific
linear trends. These two specifications allow different regions (respectively, different
states) within the South to be on different linear time trends. The first stage is rea-
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sonably robust. The IV estimates decline considerably in magnitude, and in the case
of state specific linear trends, they are no longer statistically significant. Although
this last result raises some concerns about the magnitude and precision of our esti-
mates of the income elasticity, if anything, it suggests that our baseline model which
does not control for state-specific trends might lead to over-estimates (rather than
under-estimates) of this elasticity.
Finally, as another natural and important falsification exercise, we checked the im-
plications of estimating our models on health expenditures data from 1955 through
1969 while assuming that the oil price changes took place 15-years prior (more pre-
cisely, the year 1955 is assigned the oil price for 1970, the year 1956 is assigned to the
oil price in 1971, and so on through the year 1969 which is assigned to the oil price of
1984).5' The period before 1970 shows virtually constant oil prices before 1970 (see
Figure 2). Therefore, if our identifying assumption is valid, we should not see any dif-
ferential changes in health expenditures across areas with different oil reserves prior to
1970, and in particular, we should not see more rapid increases in health expenditures
in areas with greater oil reserves. Column 6 shows the first-stage and reduced-form
results for our baseline specification if we limit it to the 1970 to 1984 period. The
first-stage remains as does the reduced form, though the implied IV estimate is about
one half the size of our baseline estimate (which uses the entire 1970-1990 period).
Column 7 shows the result for the falsification exercise. Reassuringly, this falsifica-
tion exercise shows no evidence of a significant reduced-form relationship between our
instruments and health expenditures; the point estimate is negative (opposite sign
from the "actual" estimate in column 6) and not statistically significant. This finding
supports the validity of the identifying assumption that, absent changes in oil prices,
areas of the South with different levels of oil intensity would have experienced similar
trends in their hospital expenditures.
12The AHA data do not contain information on hospital expenditures prior to 1955, which is why
we could not extend this analysis even further back in time. We report only reduced-form results
for this falsification exercise because we do not have income data for the entire period from 1955
to 1969. Our primary source of income data, CBP, extends back annually to 1964 and is available
irregularly dating back to 1946. However, before 1970 only first quarter payroll and employment
data are available from CBP.
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Overall, we read the results in Table A3 as broadly supportive of our identifying
assumption.
2.6.2 Alternative Specifications of the Instrument
We also explored the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of the
instrument. Table A4 shows the results. Panel A again shows the IV estimates
and Panel B shows the corresponding first-stage estimates. Column 1 replicates our
baseline first-stage specification, in which the instrument is the interaction of the
total oil reserves and the log of the (lagged) oil price, i.e., logpt_1 x I, with again Ij
measured as oil reserves. The remainder of the columns show results for alternative
(plausible) specifications of the instrument; they tend to produce smaller income
elasticities than our baseline specification.
Columns 2 and 3 report results using different functional forms for oil prices.
Column 2 reports results in which the instrument is constructed as the interaction
between the level of (lagged) oil prices and oil reserves (i.e., pt-1 x Ij instead of
logpt- x Ii as in our baseline specification). Column 3 reports results when we
use the log oil price at time t rather than its one year lag (i.e., logpt x Ij instead
of logpti x Ij). With both alternative functional forms for oil prices we continue
to estimate strong first stages and statistically significant income elasticities in the
second stage that are similar to, though slightly smaller than, our baseline estimate
(the income elasticity estimates are 0.49 and 0.64 in columns 2 and 3 respectively,
compared to 0.72 in our baseline).
Columns 4 through 6 report results using different ways of measuring the oil
intensity of the area. Recall that in our baseline specification we proxied oil intensity
of area j by its total (cumulative) oil reserves. Figure 3b shows that the oil reserve
distribution is highly skewed and one may be concerned that using the level of oil
reserves might give disproportionate weight to the ESRs with the highest oil reserves.
Moreover, the effect of oil reserves on the demand for labor, and thus on income,
may be nonlinear, with large and very large oil reserves leading to similar effects on
income when oil prices rise. Motivated by these considerations, in column 4 we report
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results with an alternative measure of 1j, where oil reserves are censored at the 95th
percentile of oil reserve distribution (the instrument is then constructed by interacting
this measure with logpt_1). The results are very similar to the baseline. We continue
to estimate a strong first stage, and a statistically significant income elasticity; the
estimated income elasticity of 0.632 (standard error = 0.205) is only slightly smaller
than the baseline estimate. We also obtain similar estimates if instead we censor oil
reserves at the 90th or the 99th percentiles (not shown).
As another check on possible nonlinearities, column 5 measures oil intensity by
an indicator variable for whether there are any large oil wells in the ESR (i.e., the
instrument is now 1(I > 0)). The first stage is now slightly weaker (F-statistic of
about 8), and the estimated income elasticity rises to 1.10 (standard error = 0.67),
but is no longer statistically significantly at the 5 percent level.
Finally, in column 6 we measure oil intensity as the (de-meaned) mining share of
employment in the ESR in 1970, interacted with an indicator variable for whether
there are any large oil wells in the ESR.13 Our first stage is now marginally stronger
than in the preceding specification (F-statistic of about 11), and we estimate a sta-
tistically insignificant income elasticity of 0.860 (standard error = 0.870).
2.6.3 Serial Correlation and Standard Errors
In our baseline model we cluster our standard errors at the state level; the standard
errors are therefore computed from a variance-covariance matrix that allows both
for arbitrary correlation in residuals across ESRs within a state and for serial cor-
relation at the state or ESR level. However, because we only have 16 states in our
baseline (South only) sample, these standard errors may be downward biased due to
the relatively small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008). As a
simple robustness check, we computed the standard errors allowing for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix at the ESR level (rather than the state level). A possible
53We include the indicator variable for whether there are any large oil wells because mining
employment is defined in the data to include all workers in oil mining, natural gas and coal mining.
The indicator for oil wells is included to separate out high mining share non-oil area-s (such as coal
mining areas of West Virginia).
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disadvantage of these standard errors is that they do not allow for correlation across
ESRs within the same state, which may be important in practice.54 Clustering at
the ESR level increases the standard errors substantially, so that the first-stage F-
statistic is now 5.50 (instead of 16.58 with clustering at the state level). The standard
errors for the second stage are also larger, but our IV estimate is still statistically
significant at the 6 percent level (results available upon request).
Another strategy to correct for potential biases in the standard errors resulting
from the small number of clusters at the state level is the wild bootstrap procedure
suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).55 We performed wild bootstraps
resampling states with replacement. In this case, we find reassuringly similar (indeed
somewhat smaller) p-values to our baseline specification with state-level clustering.56
In particular, using wild bootstraps we find that both the first stage and the second-
stage estimates are statistically significant at the less than 1 percent level (results
available upon request).
An alternative strategy to address concerns about potential serial correlation is to
directly model the dynamics of the error term in our structural equation (10) and then
estimate this extended model using instrumental-variables Generalized Least Squares
(IV-GLS). In all of our IV-GLS specifications we allow for heteroscedasticity in the
second-stage error term; we also experiment with various assumptions regarding the
nature of any autocorrelation. The details of the implementation of IV-GLS and the
procedure for the computation of the standard errors are discussed in Section C. Ta-
ble A5 reports the results. Column 1 shows estimates from our baseline specification,
but using a subsample of our original data; we limit the sample to the 96 (out of 99)
ESRs that have data in the full 21 years from 1970 to 1990. Column 1 verifies that
54For example, a boom in an oil-rich ESR may attract in-migration from other ESRs within
the same state, reducing total payroll income in these ESRs and also potentially affecting health
care expenditures through this and other channels. The result would be a negative correlation in
ESR-level residuals within a state.
55We thank Doug Miller for suggestions and for providing us with a sample code.
561n their Monte Carlo study, Cameron et al find it is important to calculate p-values based on
t-statistics rather than parameter estimates. We also computed p-values using parameter estimates,
and found these to be even lower (thus leading to more precise results) than the results reported
here based on t-statistics.
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this has no notable effect on our baseline results. Column 2 reports IV-GLS results
assuming a common AR(1) autocorrelation coefficient across all ESRs. Column 3
reports results assuming an AR(2) specification of the residuals with common auto-
correlation coefficients. In both specifications the point estimate rises relative to the
baseline, but is also considerably less precise. Columns 4 and 5 report results assum-
ing state-specific AR(1) and AR(2) errors respectively. Here the point estimates are
very similar to the baseline specification both in magnitude and in precision. Overall
we interpret these results as supportive of the robustness of the baseline specification.
As a final strategy to control for serial correlation, columns 6 and 7 include a
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. In column 6, this model is esti-
mated with ordinary least squares and leads to a long-run elasticity of 0.859 (standard
error = 0.213), which is slightly higher than our baseline estimate. However, the least
squares estimator in column 6 is inconsistent because of the presence of the lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side. Column 7 estimates the same model using
the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator. This GMM procedure estimates
the same model in first differences using further lags of the dependent variable as
instruments. This leads to a considerably smaller long-run elasticity (= 0.142, stan-
dard error = 0.080) than in our baseline. Such smaller long-run elasticities make it
even less likely that rising incomes over the past half a century could be the primary
driver of the increase in the health share of GDP in the United States.5 7
571f we estimate our baseline model in first differences (and thus without further lagged dependent
variables on the right-hand side), the results are similar to those reported in column 7 from the GMM
procedure. In particular, the point estimate is 0.078 (standard error = 0.106). As we discuss in
Section C, heterogeneous adjustment dynamics can introduce significant downward bias in first-
difference estimates, and we thus put less weight on this estimate.
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2.7 Appendix C: Econometric Issues
In this Appendix, we discuss a number of econometric issues related to the correction
for serial correlation and dynamics.
2.7.1 Implementation of IV GLS
We now provided details of the implementation of the IV-GLS estimator used in sub-
section 2.6.3. In particular, we use the following procedure for this estimation. First,
we recover estimates of the residuals (jt) from the baseline IV specification. Then
we use these residuals to estimate the autocorrelation coefficients. For example, when
we estimate state-specific autocorrelation coefficients, we run the following regression
of sjt on its lag (sj,t-1) for each state to recover an estimate of the state-specific
autocorrelation coefficient, ,>s:
s t pas6j,t- + jt
These autocorrelation coefficients are used to create adjusted (LHS and RHS)
variables as follows:
Xjt Xjt - sXj,t-1
Yjt - Yjt - Psj,t-i
Finally, to adjust for ESR-level heteroskedasticity, we run IV again using the
adjusted variables above to recover a new set of residuals (9't) and then we create a
weighting matrix ! using these residuals:
T T T
nC = I (NT) (9 diag T (s't) ('), vt.. .. , (s v~)
( t=1 t=1 t=1
where I(-) creates an identity matrix and diag(-) creates a diagonal matrix from a
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vector. Using this weighting matrix, the IV-GLS estimator is given as follows:
OIV-GLS = (X1ZZ1Z- Zn-I l-I'n- lZ'n ~Z'nly
2.7.2 Performance of different estimators with heterogeneous
adjustment dynamics
We now describe results from a simple Monte Carlo study to investigate the per-
formance of various estimators under heterogeneous long-run adjustment dynamics.
Our Monte Carlo results suggest that heterogeneous adjustment dynamics may lead
traditional fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) estimators to underestimate
the true long-run effect. We show that using 3-year averages can reduce this bias.
Reassuringly, our 3-year average results are similar to our baseline results (see Table
12, column 7). The remainder of this section describes the set of our Monte Carlo
study and our results.
We define the following variables for our simulation:
zy = N(O, 1)
ajt = N(0, 1)
xjt = N(O, 1) + zjt + at
6 = N(O, 1)
S= p ajt-i + jt
yjt = xj +1 ajt ± 6j + Eit
where j indexes one of the J panels and t indexes on of the T time periods within
a panel. N(O, 1) represents an i.i.d. standard normal random variable, zjt represents
a valid instrumental variable for xjt, ag is the unobserved variable that induces a
correlation between xzt and the error term in the endogenous fixed effects regression
of yjt on xj, and oj is an unobserved fixed effect. Et is the error term in the model
which follows an AR(1) process (Ipl < 1). We also experiment with serveral other
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ways to construct yjt:
yjt = x,t_ + ag + 6 + Ejt
xy + ag+o6j +e if j < J/2
jt xj,t-1 + agt + 6j + Ejt if j ;> J/2
xgt+ ajt+o6 + Eg if j < J13
Yt xj,tI + at + 6 +ejt if J/3 < j < 2J/3
X,t-2 + ag + J + Ejt if j > 2J/3
We experimented with the following estimators in in our Monte Carlo study:
1. (FE-IV) Fixed effects IV regression of yjt on xjt, instrumenting xjt by zgt
2. (FD-IV) First differences IV regression of (yjt - yj,t-1) on (xjt - x,,t_1), instru-
menting (xjt - xy_1) by (zt - z_,t1)
3. (FE-IV-LAG) Fixed effects IV regression of yjt on og_1, instrumenting xy_1
by zj,_
4. (FE-IV-3YR) Fixed effects IV regression of Qj, on zy, instrumenting zCij, by zj,
(where vj, denotes the three-year averages of og and s represents a three-year
groups of years)
5. (FD-IV-3YR) First differences IV regression of ( j, - ,,) on (zy, - zy,,_1),
instrumenting (zyi, - zy,s-1) by (ij - zy)
Finally, we choose J = 10 and T = 30, and we experiment with three values of p
(0.1, 0.5,0.9).
The results (based on 500 simulations) are given in Appendix Table A7. There are
five panels of results corresponding to each of the five estimators mentioned above.
The resuls are the mean of the estimates across each of the simulations and the
standard deviation of the parameter estimates (in parentheses underneath). The first
panel reports the FE-IV results. As would be expected, the standard deviation of the
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parameter estimates is larger when there are higher amounts of serial correlation. The
second panel reports FD-IV results, where (also as expected) the standard deviation
of the parameter estimates goes down as there is more serial correlation. The third
panel reports FE-IV-LAG results, and the last two columns report the two sets of
3-year average results (FE-IV-3YR and FD-IV-3YR).
Each panel reports results for the same set of four models. The first row is the
standard model where all panels adjust instantly. All estimators except FE-IV-LAG
perform very well (the average of the parameter estimates is very close to the true
value of 1.000). The second row reports results using a model where all panels take
one time period to adjust. For this model the FE-IV and FD-IV results perform very
poorly, while FE-IV-LAG unsurprisingly performs optimally. Interestingly, FE-IV-
3YR still performs reasonably well, though for all degrees of serial correlation the
estimates are roughly 2/3 of the true value.
The final two rows (rows 3 and 4) report results when there is heterogeneity in the
adjustment dynamics (where a random set of panels responds instantly and another
random set of panels does not respond instantly). For all estimators the results are
attentuated away from the true coefficient, but the FE-IV-3YR estimator always
performs best, even when there is substantial serial correlation.
We conclude two things from this simulation exercise: (1) heterogeneous adjust-
ment dynamics can lead standard estimators (FE-IV and FD-IV) to underestimate
the true long-run effect and (2) estimators using 3-year averages appear to be reason-
ably robust to a moderate amount of heterogeneity in adjustment dynamics.
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Appendix Table Al: Hospital Technologies
Years of Fraction
Hospital Technology First Year Last Year Data Adopted
Emergency Department 1970 1990 21 0.998
Histopathology Services 1970 1990 21 0.964
Home care Program / Department 1970 1990 21 0.701
Hospital Auxiliary 1970 1990 21 0.993
Inhalation Therapy Department (Respiratory) 1970 1990 21 0.993
Occupational Therapy 1970 1990 21 0.852
Physical Therapy Department 1970 1990 21 0.993
Psychiatric Partial Hospitalization Program 1970 1990 21 0.727
X-Ray Therapy 1970 1990 21 0.873
Blood Bank 1970 1990 20 0.993
Open Heart Surgery Facilities 1970 1990 20 0.528
Psychiatric Emergency Services (Outpatient) 1970 1990 20 0.788
Psychiatric Emergency Services 1970 1990 19 0.887
Rehabilitation Outpatient Unit 1970 1990 19 0.764
Organized Outpatient Department 1970 1988 18 0.940
Social Work Department 1970 1989 17 0.966
Cardiac Intensive Care 1970 1985 16 0.970
Family Planning Service 1970 1985 16 0.630
Psychiatric Foster And/Or Home Care 1970 1986 16 0.393
Self Care Unit 1970 1985 16 0.503
Premature Nursery 1970 1985 15 0.943
Rehabilitation Inpatient Unit 1970 1985 15 0.592
Postoperative Recovery Room 1970 1982 13 0.993
Electroencephalography 1970 1981 12 0.921
Hemodialysis / Renal Dialysis (Impatient) 1970 1981 12 0.682
Hemodialysis / Renal Dialysis (Outpatient) 1970 1981 12 0.675
Organ Bank 1970 1981 12 0.337
Pharmacy with FT Registered Pharmacist 1970 1981 12 0.974
Pharmacy with PT Registered Pharmacist 1970 1981 12 0.942
Psychiatric Inpatient Unit 1970 1980 11 0.750
Intensive Care Unit (Mixed) 1970 1979 10 0.973
Cobalt and Radium Therapy 1970 1978 9 0.669
Radium Therapy 1970 1978 9 0.837
Cobalt Therapy 1970 1977 8 0.693
Extended Care Unit 1970 1974 5 0.810
Basic Emergency Department 1970 1970 1 0.975
Major Emergency Department 1970 1970 1 0.743
Provisional Emergency Unit 1970 1970 1 0.962
Radioisoptope Facility 1970 1970 1 0.852
Genetic Counseling Service 1971 1990 20 0.441
Radioisoptope Facility (Diagnostic) 1971 1990 20 0.967
Radioisoptope Facility (Therapeutic) 1971 1990 20 0.836
Volunteer Services Department 1971 1990 20 0.956
Psychiatric Consultation and Education 1971 1986 16 0.799
Bum Care 1971 1985 15 0.472
Speech Therapist Services / Pathology 1972 1990 19 0.877
Clinical Psychologist Services 1972 1986 15 0.847
Dental Services 1972 1985 14 0.968
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Podiatrist Services 1972 1985 13 0.796
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 1975 1990 16 0.783
Alcohol / Chemical Dependency (Outpatient) 1975 1990 15 0.742
Skilled Nursing or Long Term Care Unit 1975 1985 11 0.852
Alcohol / Chemical Dependency (Impatient) 1975 1985 10 0.723
Neonatal Intensive Care 1976 1985 10 0.743
Pediatric Unit (Impatient) 1977 1978 2 0.951
Patient Representative Services 1978 1990 13 0.958
Abortion Service (Impatient) 1978 1981 4 0.794
Abortion Service (Outpatient) 1978 1981 3 0.638
Radioactive Implants 1979 1990 12 0.811
Megavoltage Radiation Therapy 1979 1990 11 0.781
Computerized Tomography Scanner (Head or Body) 1979 1990 10 0.859
Pediatric Intensive Care 1979 1985 7 0.773
Cardiac Catheterization 1980 1990 11 0.722
Hospice 1980 1990 11 0.715
Recreational Therapy 1980 1990 11 0.869
Ultrasound Facility (Diagnostic) 1980 1990 11 0.976
Kidney Transplant 1980 1990 7 0.327
Organ Transplant (Other than Kidney) 1980 1990 7 0.377
Chaplaincy Services 1980 1985 6 0.987
Electrocardiography 1980 1985 6 1.000
Intermediate Care for Mentally Retarded 1980 1985 6 0.439
Intravenous Admixture Services 1980 1985 6 0.993
Medical/Surgical Acute Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Medical/Surgical Intensive Care 1980 1985 6 0.998
Newborn Nursery 1980 1985 6 1.000
Obstetrical Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Other Long-Term Care / Intermediate Care Facility 1980 1985 6 0.838
Pediatric Acute Care 1980 1985 6 1.000
Pharmacy Unit Dose System 1980 1985 6 0.990
Psychiatric Acute Care 1980 1985 6 0.953
Psychiatric Long Term Care 1980 1985 6 0.568
General Surgical Services 1980 1985 5 1.000
General Laboratory Services 1980 1985 4 1.000
Health Science Library 1980 1990 3 0.968
Psychiatric Intensive Care 1980 1982 3 0.679
Ambulance Services 1980 1981 2 0.930
Anesthesia Service 1980 1981 2 1.000
Autopsy Services 1980 1981 2 0.989
C.T. Scanner (Body Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.761
C.T. Scanner (Head Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.570
Cancer/Tumor 1980 1981 2 0.894
Electromyography 1980 1981 2 0.826
Hemodialysis (Home Care/ Mobile Unit) 1980 1981 2 0.464
NeuroSurgery 1980 1981 2 0.769
Physical Rehabilitation 1980 1982 2 0.856
Pulmonary Function Laboratory 1980 1981 2 0.987
Toxicology 1980 1981 2 0.983
Intravenous Therapy 1980 1980 1 0.886
Medical/Surgical Acute Care (Inpatient) 1980 1980 1 0.335
Rehabilitation 1980 1980 1 0.953
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Residential Care 1980 1980 1 0.547
Residential Care (Inpatient) 1980 1980 1 0.280
Day Hospital 1981 1987 7 0.822
Pediatric Psychiatric Services 1981 1986 6 0.777
Health Promotion 1981 1985 5 0.964
Optometric Services 1981 1985 5 0.857
Other Special Care 1981 1985 5 0.877
Sheltered Care 1981 1985 5 0.419
Ambulator Surgical Services 1981 1981 1 1.000
Podiatrist Services (Inpatient) 1981 1981 1 0.873
Podiatrist Services (Outpatient) 1981 1981 1 0.835
Hemodialysis Services 1982 1990 9 0.850
Outpatient Surgery 1982 1990 8 1.000
Abortion Services 1982 1985 4 0.825
Pharmacy Services 1982 1985 4 1.000
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment Services 1983 1990 8 0.805
Nuclear MRI Facility 1983 1990 8 0.542
Psychiatric Liaison Services 1983 1990 8 0.819
Trauma Center 1984 1990 7 0.751
Alcohol / Chemical Acute Care (Inpatient) 1984 1984 1 0.903
Alcohol / Chemical Subacute Care (Inpatient) 1984 1984 1 0.852
Birthing Room 1985 1990 6 0.970
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter 1985 1990 6 0.395
X-Ray (Diagnostic) 1985 1989 5 0.999
Unknown Technology 1985 1985 1 0.678
Adult Day Care 1986 1990 5 0.567
Community Health Promotion 1986 1990 5 0.984
Fertility Counseling 1986 1990 5 0.608
Fitness Center 1986 1990 5 0.746
Geriatric Acute-Care Unit 1986 1990 5 0.754
Occupational Health Services 1986 1990 5 0.869
Patient Education 1986 1990 5 0.992
Respite Care 1986 1990 5 0.803
Sports Medicine Clinic / Service 1986 1990 5 0.775
Sterilization 1986 1990 5 0.945
Women's Center 1986 1990 5 0.762
Worksite Health Promotion 1986 1990 5 0.959
Organ Transplant (Including Kidney) 1986 1989 4 0.467
AIDS Services 1986 1987 2 0.926
Continuing Care Case Management 1986 1987 2 0.773
Contraceptive Care 1986 1987 2 0.646
Genetic Counseling Screening 1986 1987 2 0.532
Satellite Geriatric Clinics 1986 1987 2 0.278
Child Adolescent Psychiatric Services 1987 1990 4 0.872
Geriatric Psychiatric Services 1987 1990 4 0.839
Psychiatric Education 1987 1990 4 0.887
AIDS (Outpatient) 1988 1990 3 0.414
AIDS General Inpatient Care 1988 1990 3 0.980
AIDS/ARC Unit 1988 1990 3 0.247
AIDS/HIV Testing 1988 1990 3 0.969
Alzheimer's Diagnostic Assessment Services 1988 1990 3 0.596
Emergency Response for Elderly 1988 1990 3 0.932
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Geriatic Clinic 1988 1990 3 0.496
In Vitro Fertilization 1988 1990 3 0.379
Medicare Certified Distinct Part Skilled Nursing Unit 1988 1990 3 0.886
Organized Social Work Services 1988 1990 3 0.989
Other Skilled Nursing Care 1988 1990 3 0.891
Senior Membership Program 1988 1990 3 0.737
Angioplasty 1989 1990 2 0.708
Arthritis Treatment Center 1989 1990 2 0.485
Emergency Social Work Services 1989 1990 2 0.911
Freestanding Outpatient Center 1989 1990 2 0.686
Hospital Based Outpatient Care Center 1989 1990 2 0.998
Orthopedic Surgery 1989 1990 2 0.972
Outpatient Social Work Services 1989 1990 2 0.939
Bone Marrow Transplant 1990 1990 1 0.301
Cardiac Rehabilitation 1990 1990 1 0.924
Non-Invasive Cardiac Assessment 1990 1990 1 0.970
Positron Emission Tomography Scanner 1990 1990 1 0.267
Single Photo Emission Computed Tomography 1990 1990 1 0.754
Stereotactic Radiosurgery 1990 1990 1 0.415
Tissue Transplant 1990 1990 1 0.432
Notes: This table lists the 172 unique technologies from the AHA annual surveys between 1970 and 1990. For each
technology, this table reports the first year the technology appears, the last year the technology appears, and the
fraction of economic sub-region (ESR)-year observations that contain at least one hospital that has adopted the
technology.
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Appendix Table A2: Results Leaving Out Each State in Census South
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Total Hospital Expenditures
All Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop
South AL AR DE FL FL GA KY LA MD MS NC OK SC TN TX WV
0.723 0.702 0.725 0.695 0.725 0,694 0.838 0.714 0.706 0.655 0.782 0.677 0.823 0.764 0.680 0.461 0.750
(0.214) (0.226) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.219) (0.183) (0.212) (0.272) (0.215) (0.214) (0.235) (0.184) (0.223) (0.222) (0.695) (0.248)
[0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.000] [0.005] [0.021] [0.009] [0.003] [0.012] [0.001] [0.004] [0.009] [0.518] [0.009]
0.968 0.969 0.967 0.969 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.969 0.970 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.969 0.968 0.974 0.969
2065 1877 1918 2044 2054 2002 1900 1897 1939 1981 1939 1918 1897 1939 1918 1813 1939
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
All Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop
South AL AR DE DC FL GA KY LA MD MS NC OK SC TN TX WV
9.245 9.312 9.386 9.182 9.205 9.236 9.347 9.874 8.997 9.007 9.349 8.660 8.892 9.051 9.164 21.641 8.236
(2.216) (2.375) (2.303) (2.222) (2.215) (2.285) (2.356) (2.363) (2.015) (2.221) (2.303) (2.127) (1.678) (2.265) (2.311) (4.879) (1.831)
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.984 0.984
2065 1877 1918 2044 2054 2002 1900 1897 1939 1981 1939 1918 1897 1939 1918 1813 1939
17.41 15.37 16.61 17.08 17.26 16.33 15.73 17.45 19.93 16.45 16.48 16.58 28.09 15.97 15.73 19.67 20.24
Notes: Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (10) by IV in Panel A and equation (11) by OLS in Panel B. In all specifications income and hospital expenditures are
divided by hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) and then logged. First column shows results from our baseline sample of all Southern states between 1970 and
1990 (see column 7 of Table 3 and column 3 of Table 4). Subsequent columns show the results when the state specified in the column heading is omitted from the analysis. Unit of
observation is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year; all regressions include ESR and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for
each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
log(Income)j,
R 2
N
Oil Reserves; x
log(oil price),
R 2
N
F -statistic
Appendix Table A3: Examination of Identifying Assumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Region State 1970-1984 Falsifi-
Baseline 5-year Lead Horse Race Trends Trends Subsample cation Test
Panel A: IV and Reduced Form OLS Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
IV IV IV IV IV RF RF
log(Income);, 0.723 0.992 0.697 0.352 0.131
(0.214) (0.306) (0.283) (0.192) (0.118)
[0.004] [0.005] [0.027] [0.088] [0.286]
Oil Reserves; x 4.980 -3.107
log(oil price),-, (1.656) (4.044)
[0.009] [0.455]
Oil Reserves; x -11.322
log(oil price),5 (7.830)
[0.169]
R2 0.968 0.964 0.970 0.972 0.976 0.966 0.980
N 2065 2065 2054 2065 2065 1471 1487
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
Oil Reserves; x 9.245 8.186 8.219 11.722 13.774 14.172
log(oil price),-, (2.271) (2.157) (2.387) (3.004) (3.951) (3.481)
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
Oil Reserves; x 4.821
log(oil price),1 5  (3.291)
[0.164]
R2 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.985 0.986
N 2065 2065 2054 2065 2065 1471
F-statistic 16.577 14.396 11.853 15.222 12.154 16.571
Notes: Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (10) by IV in Panel A, except in columns 6 and 7 which
show variants of equation (12) estimated by OLS in Panel A; table reports results from estimating variants of equation (11)
by OLS in Panel B. All dependent variables are in logs. In all columns hospital expenditures and income are divided by a
hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. Unit of observation is an economic sub-
region (ESR)-year, and all columns include ESR and year fixed effects. In columns I through 5 the sample is all Southern
states between 1970 and 1990. Column 1 reproduces baseline results (see column 7 of Table 3 and column 3 of Table 4).
Column 2 includes a 5-year lead of the instrument as a control variable. Column 3 includes several additional interaction
terms as control variables in a "horse race"; the interaction terms are the log oil price interacted with each of the following
variables: hospital expenditures in 1969, hospital beds in 1969, population in 1970, wage bill in 1970, and employment in
1970. Column 4 adds region-specific linear time trends for the three Census regions in the South. Column 5 includes state-
specific linear time trends for the 16 Southern states. Column 6 produces the first stage and reduced form results for 1970
to 1984 as comparison to the falsification test in column 7, which "grafts" the same oil price series in 1970 to 1984 onto
the hospital data in 1955 to 1969. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each
state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Appendix Table A4: Alternative Specifications of Instrument
Panel A: IV Results
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Income);, 0.723 0.491 0.640 0.632 1.095 0.860
(0.214) (0.145) (0.194) (0.205) (0.670) (0.870)
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.123] [0.339]
R2 0.968 0.971 0.969 0.970 0.962 0.966
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065
Panel B: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil Reserves x 9.245
log(oil price),-, (2.216)
[0.001]
Oil Reserves; x 0.886
oil price,-, (0.200)
[0.000]
Oil Reserves; x 10.080
log(oil price), (2.467)
[0.001]
max(Oil Reserves, 12.646
95th percentile) x (2.523)
log(oil price),-] [0.000]
1{ Oil Reserves > 0} x 0.041
log(oil price),-, (0.014)
[0.012]
1 (Oil Reserves > 0} x 0.808
Mining share of labor force in 1970 x (0.240)
log(oil price),-, [0.004]
R2 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.983
N 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065
F-statistic 17.41 19.71 16.69 25.12 8.22 11.36
Notes: Table reports estimates of variants of estimating equation (10) by IV in Panel A and equation (11)
by OLS in Panel B. The specifications vary in their definition of the instrument, which is given in the left-
hand column of Panel B. Unit of analysis is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year. All dependent
variables are in logs. In all columns hospital expenditures and income are divided by a hospital-
utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. The sample is ESRs in Southern
states between 1970 and 1990. Column 1 reproduces baseline results (see column 7 of Table 3 and
column 3 of Table 4). 1 (Oil Reserves > 0) is an indicator variable for whether the ESR has any large oil
wells. All columns include ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow
for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in
brackets.
171
Appendix Table A5: IV-GLS and Lagged Depedendent Variable
Dependent Variable: Hospital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged Arellano-
Baseline Dep. Var. Bond
IV IV-GLS IV-GLS IV-GLS IV-GLS IV IV
State- State-
Cluster at Common Common specific specific Cluster at Cluster at
Within-panel serial correlation State AR(1) AR(2) AR(1) AR(2) State State
log(Income),, 0.697 0.963 1.111 0.724 0.770 0.491 0.120
(A) (0.216) (0.505) (0.681) (0.263) (0.287) (0.135) (0.067)
[0.006] [0.057] [0.103] [0.006] [0.007] [0.002] [0.075]
log(Total Hospital Exp.),. 1  0.426 0.154
(B) (0.088) (0.047)
[0.000] [0.001]
Implied long-run effect 0.856 0.142
(A /(1-B)) (0.214) (0.080)
[0.001] [0.077]
N 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 1966 1966
Notes: Table reports results from estimating variants of equation (10) by IV. The sample is all Southern states
between 1970 and 1990. Unit of observation is an economic sub-region (ESR)-year. All specifications include
ESR fixed effects and year fixed effects. In all columns, income and hospital expenditures are divided by a
hospital-utilization weighted measure of population (HUWP) before taking logs. For columns I through 5, the
baseline sample is modified to only include the 96 (of 99) ESRs with data for all 21 years between 1970 and
1990. Column I produces baseline IV results with this modified sample. Columns 2 through 5 report IV-GLS
results. In column 2 , pi is estimated to be 0.585. In column 3, p, is estimated to be 0.508 and P2 is estimated to
be 0.127. In column 4, pi is estimated separately by state; estimated values ofp range from 0.155 to 0.887 with
mean 0.604 and s.d. 0.240. In column 5, pI and P2 are estimated separately by state; estimated values ofp1
range from 0.118 to 0.747 with mean 0.487 and s.d. 0.200, and estimated values ofp2 range from 0.041 to .341
with mean 0.192 and s.d. 0.083. Column 6 includes a lagged dependent variable as a control. Column 7 uses
the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator. In columns 6 and 7 the standard error on the implied long-
run effect is estimated using the delta method.
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Appendix Table A6: Replication of Robustness Analysis for Other Dependent Variables
(1) (2)
Total Total
Dependent Hospital Hospital
Variable: Expenditures Payroll
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
RN/ In-Patient
FTE (RN+LPN) Admissions Days
Number of Number of Open-Heart Radioisotope
Beds Hospitals Technologies Surgery Therapy
log(Income),
N
log(Income)j,
N
log(Income)j,
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Income),
N
log(Income),
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Income),
N
(9)
-0.132
(0.221)
[0.558]
2065
(9)
-0.095
(0.161)
[0.564]
2065
(9)
-0.160
(0.272)
[0.565]
2065
(10)
-3.163
(11.334)
[0.169]
849
(10)
-1.154
(3.929)
[0.187]
849
(10)
-2.450
(9.014)
[0.194]
849
Panel A: Baseline Results (reproducedfrom Table 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.723 0.934 0.039 0.329 -0.430 -1.034 -0.698 -0.552
(0.214) (0.233) (0.222) (0.089) (0.193) (0.488) (0.455) (0.358)
[0.004] [0.001] [0.862] [0.002] [0.042] [0.051] [0.146] [0.144]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel B: No Population Adjustment (see Table 4, column (4))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.801 0.953 0.311 0.266 -0.025 -0.451 -0.217 -0.395
(0.155) (0.167) (0.175) (0.072) (0.138) (0.324) (0.295) (0.262)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.096] [0.002] [0.861] [0.184] [0.474] [0.152]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel C: Per Capita Population Adjustment (see Table 4, column (5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.665 0.920 -0.161 0.415 -0.728 -1.468 -1.053 -0.667
(0.263) (0.282) (0.297) (0.112) (0.265) (0.645) (0.584) (0.447)
[0.023] [0.005] [0.595] [0.002] [0.015] [0.038] [0.092] [0.156]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel D: State-level Results (see Table 4, column (6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.550 0.865 -0.119 0.326 -0.333 0.258 0.294 -0.028
(0.230) (0.187) (0.181) (0.095) (0.187) (0.204) (0.212) (0.287)
[0.030] [0.000] [0.520] [0.004] [0.095] [0.226] [0.186] [0.924]
326 326 326 251 326 311 326 326
Panel E: State GSP instead of Income, Census South (see Table 7, column (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.451 0.709 -0.098 0.274 -0.273 0.212 0.241 -0.023
(0.160) (0.126) (0.154) (0.100) (0.160) (0.165) (0.172) (0.236)
[0.013] [0.000] [0.534] [0.015] [0.109] [0.218] [0.182] [0.924]
326 326 326 251 326 311 326 326
Panel F: State-level Results, All US. (see Table 7, column (3))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.740 0.863 -0.086 0.407 -0.188 -0.009 0.109 0.098
(0.359) (0.398) (0.244) (0.112) (0.342) (0.268) (0.395) (0.295)
[0.045] [0.035] [0.726] [0.001] [0.585] [0.973] [0.783] [0.741]
1015 1015 1015 777 1015 967 1015 1015
Panel G: State GSP instead of Income, All U.S. (see Table 7, column (4))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.568 0.662 -0.066 0.331 -0.144 -0.007 0.084 0.075
(0.263) (0.298) (0.189) (0.102) (0.264) (0.205) (0.303) (0.225)
[0.036] [0.031] [0.728] [0.002] [0.588] [0.973] [0.783] [0.7401
1015 1015 1015 777 1015 967 1015 1015
Panel H: Drop States with No Large Oil Wells (see Table 10, column (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.700 0.852 -0.042 0.487 -0.630 -2.089 -1.816 -1.098
(0.368) (0.378) (0.544) (0.124) (0.305) (0.578) (0.626) (0.513)
[0.106] [0.065] [0.940] [0.008] [0.085] [0.011] [0.027] [0.076]
1070 1070 1070 815 1070 1019 1070 1070
Panel : ESR-level Results. All U.S. (see Table 10, column (3))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.804 0.882 0.030 0.503 -0.330 -0.598 -0.595 -0.383
(0.633) (0.557) (0.352) (0.126) (0.406) (0.439) (0.605) (0.320)
[0.210] [0.120] [0.932] [0.000] [0.420] [0.180] [0.330] [0.237]
4915 4914 4915 3749 4915 4681 4915 4915
Panel J: 1970-2005 + state-specific linear time trends (see Table 10, column (5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.853 0.935 0.591 0.281 -0.038 -0.486 -0.064 -0.650
(0.439) (0.565) (0.761) (0.063) (0.197) (0.230) (0.350) (0.410)
[0.071] [0.119] [0.450) [0.000] [0.850] [0.052] [0.858] [0.134]
3547 3546 3547 3058 3547 3449 3547 3547
Panel K: Decadal Panel (see Table 12, column (6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.794 0.921 0.071 0.625 -0.510 -1.562 -0.771 -0.728
(0.411) (0.541) (0.548) (0.250) (0.306) (0.846) (0.689) (0.491)
[0.073] [0.109] [0.898] [0.025] [0.117] [0.085] [0.281] [0.159]
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
(9)
-0.191
(0.325)
[0.560]
4915
(10)
-2.135
(9.394)
[0.302]
1906
(9) (10)
0.039 N/A
(0.110)
[0.729]
2164
(11)
1.083
(2.575)
[0.545]
262
(II)
1.537
(3.467)
[0.259]
262
(11)
1.894
(3.297)
[0.278]
262
(11)
N/A
(11)
N/A
(11)
N/A
(II)
N/A
(11)
2.996
(10.381)
[0.377]
128
(11)
1.292
(7.234)
[0.168]
503
(11)
N/A
(9) (10) (11)
-0.311 N/A N/A
(0.355)
[0.396]
296
173
(9) (10)
0.819 N/A
(1.672)
[0.631]
322
(9) (10)
0.673 N/A
(1.323)
[0.619]
322
(9) (10)
1.054 N/A
(1.367)
[0.444]
101
(9) (10)
0.812 N/A
(1.023)
[0.431]
1011
(9) (10)
-0.047 -2.760
(0.237) (22.066)
[0.850] [0.299]
1070 399
log(Income),
N
log(Income);,
N
log(Income),
N
log(Income);,
N
log(Income),
N
log(Income),,
N
log(Incom),,
N
log(Income),
N
log(Income)#,
N
log(Income);,
N
Panel L: 3-year Averages (see Table 12, column (7))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.826 0.954 0.235 0.259 -0.369 -0.719 -0.614 -0.635
(0.231) (0.216) (0.169) (0.101) (0.175) (0.429) (0.434) (0.371)
[0.003] [0.001] [0.185] [0.022] [0.052] [0.115] [0.178] [0.107]
690 690 690 592 690 690 690 690
Panel M:. Include 5-year Lead (see Table 13, column (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.992 1.188 -0.023 0.360 -0.563 -0.979 -0.824 -0.761
(0.306) (0.263) (0.224) (0.086) (0.271) (0.588) (0.592) (0.518)
[0.005] [0.000] [0.918] [0.001] [0.056] [0.117] [0.185] [0.163]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel N: Horse Race (see Table 13, column (3))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.697 0.748 0.117 0.284 -0.617 -0.380 0.084 -0.676
(0.283) (0.284) (0.275) (0.142) (0.278) (0.346) (0.318) (0.397)
[0.027] [0.020] [0.678] [0.065] [0.044] [0.290] [0.794] [0.110]
2054 2053 2054 1565 2054 1956 2054 2054
Panel 0: Region-specific linear time trends (see Table 13, column (4))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.352 0.439 0.053 0.262 -0.014 0.279 -0.740 -0.382
(0.192) (0.254) (0.287) (0.062) (0.127) (0.071) (0.371) (0.210)
[0.088] [0.104] [0.855] [0.001] [0.913] [0.001] [0.065] [0.090]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel P: Oil price in levels (see Table 14, column (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.491 0.648 -0.038 0.230 -0.258 -0.657 -0.506 -0.393
(0.145) (0.135) (0.127) (0.061) (0.119) (0.298) (0.294) (0.243)
[0.004] [0.000] [0.768] [0.002] [0.047] [0.044] [0.106] [0.127]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel Q: Oil price at time t instead of t-I (see Table 14, column (3))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.640 0.823 0.103 0.342 -0.315 -0.996 -0.605 -0.469
(0.194) (0.233) (0.222) (0.104) (0.171) (0.458) (0.403) (0.306)
[0.005] [0.003] [0.649] [0.005] [0.085] [0.046] [0.154] [0.147]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel R: max(Oil Reserves, 95th Percentile) (see Table 14, column (4))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.632 0.888 -0.032 0.336 -0.410 -1.025 -0.711 -0.459
(0.205) (0.227) (0.206) (0.095) (0.187) (0.482) (0.454) (0.335)
[0.008] [0.001] [0.879] [0.003] [0.045] [0.050] [0.138] [0.190]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel S: Has Large Oil Wells Dummv (see Table 14, columh (5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.095 1.377 0.076 0.297 -0.169 0.078 0.014 0.384
(0.670) (0.661) (0.507) (0.210) (0.416) (0.753) (0.681) (0.505)
[0.123] [0.055] [0.883] [0.177] [0.691] [0.919] [0.984] [0.459]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel T: Oil Wells Dummy x Mining Share ofLabor Force in 1970 (see Table 14, column (6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.860 0.975 -0.219 0.189 -0.391 -0.236 0.005 -0.113
(0.870) (0.805) (0.484) (0.162) (0.450) (0.877) (0.871) (0.584)
[0.339] [0.245] [0.658] [0.262] [0.399] [0.792] [0.995] [0.849]
2065 2064 2065 1576 2065 1967 2065 2065
Panel U: Lagged Dependent Variable (see Table 15, column (6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.856 0.951 0.157 0.048 -0.373 -0.505 -0.638 -0.611
(0.214) (0.181) (0.156) (0.019) (0.168) (0.518) (0.414) (0.353)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.331] [0.024] [0.042] [0.344] [0.144] [0.104]
1963 1961 1963 988 1963 1768 1963 1963
(9)
-0.110
(0.159)
[0.499]
2065
(10)
-1.392
(8.824)
[0.479]
849
(9) (10)
-0.173 -3.064
(0.210) (13.207)
[0.423] [0.240]
2065 849
(9) (10)
-0.145 -2.717
(0.225) (10.449)
[0.527] [0.237]
2065 849
(9)
-0.322
(0.343)
[0.362]
2065
(9)
0.344
(0.604)
[0.577]
2065
(10)
0.597
(6.238)
[0.458]
849
(10)
-1.141
(9.114)
[0.278]
849
(9) (10)
-0.114 N/A
(0.239)
[0.641]
1963
Notes: This table shows robustness results across all of the dependent variables in Table 5 (Panel A reproduces baseline results in Table 5 for comparison). The table and column
number in each panel heading references the specification that is being shown; see notes in main tables for details on the various specifications. In all panels, the first column replicates
the robustenss analysis shown in the referenced table for total hospital expenditures. In all panels, the dependent variable in columns 4, 8, and 9 is not adjusted for population. Standard
errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. In some panels, there is not enough
variation to estimate the Cox proportional hazard models in columns (10) and (11); we place "N/A" in these cells. We do not include robustness tests for the IV-GLS results in Table 15
because several of the alternative dependent variables are missing data for various years, making estimation of the AR(I) and AR(2) coefficients difficult because of the "gaps" in the
panel data set. The results reported in Panel U (lagged dependent variable specification) are the implied long-run effects.
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(9) (10)
-0.162 N/A
(0.255)
[0.534]
690
(9) (10)
-0.175 N/A
(0.321)
[0.594]
2065
(9) (10)
0.314 N/A
(0.226)
[0.187]
2054
(9) (10)
-0.040 -2.699
(0.134) (11.844)
[0.769] [0.312]
2065 849
(11)
N/A
(11)
N/A
(11)
N/A
(11)
2.023
(6.711)
[0.239]
262
(II)
2.089
(3.380)
[0.191]
262
(1)
2.016
(7.030)
[0.242]
262
(11)
2.003
(3.490)
[0.255]
262
(11)
-0.669
(4.904)
[0.631]
262
(11)
-0.212
(3.217)
[0.869]
262
(11)
N/A
Appendix Table A7: Monte Carlo Simulation Results
FE-IV FD-IV FE-IV-LAG FE-IV-3YR FD-IV-3YR
p =0.I p =0.3 p =0. 9  p =0.1 p =0.3 p =0.9 p =0.1 p =0.3 p =0.9 p =0.1 p =0.3 p =0.9 p =0.1 p =0.3 p =0.9
yj, =x 1 ,+a,+bj+ej, 1.008 1.009 1.012 1.010 1.009 1.009 -0.041 -0.038 -0.033 1.020 1.026 1.032 1.029 1.032 1.034
(0.094) (0.097) (0.127) (0.111) (0.102) (0.095) (0.111) (0.117) (0.141) (0.181) (0.220) (0.352) (0.228) (0.243) (0.245)
yj, =x,,.;+aj,+ j+,vj, -0.033 -0.031 -0.029 -0.490 -0.491 -0.491 0.993 0.996 1.001 0.626 0.632 0.638 0.496 0.499 0.501
(0.138) (0.143) (0.158) (0.127) (0.120) (0.115) (0.089) (0.095) (0.124) (0.228) (0.260) (0.378) (0.291) (0.310) (0.324)
yj t =Xj,+aj,+6j +6j, 0.482 0.484 0.486 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.479 0.482 0.486 0.810 0.816 0.821 0.743 0.746 0.748
or xj,.;+ai,+6j+Ej, (0.135) (0.139) (0.159) (0.155) (0.149) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) (0.166) (0.229) (0.258) (0.371) (0.294) (0.312) (0.322)
y, =xj,+aj,+c+j+ej, 0.307 0.309 0.311 0.161 0.161 0.160 0.309 0.311 0.316 0.626 0.632 0.637 0.480 0.483 0.486
or x,.;+aj,+6j+,-j, (0.139) (0.144) (0.163) (0.153) (0.149) (0.146) (0.147) (0.151) (0.168) (0.257) (0.284) (0.388) (0.313) (0.330) (0.340)
or xp1.2 +afl +o;+ep
Notes: This table reports results from the Monte Carlo study described in Appendix (Section C). Each cell displays the mean of the parameter estimates from 500 simulations; standard
deviation of parameter estimates is reported below in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
Does the Moral Hazard Cost of
Unemployment Insurance Vary
with the Local Unemployment
Rate? Theory and Evidencel
(Joint work with Kory Kroft, UC-Berkeley)
It is commonly accepted that higher unemployment benefits prolong unemploy-
ment durations (Moffitt 1985, Meyer 1990, Chetty 2008). Most of the evidence for
this "moral hazard effect" comes from empirical studies that do not distinguish be-
tween changes in benefits when local labor market conditions are good and changes
in benefits when local labor market conditions are poor.1 If the moral hazard cost of
Unemployment Insurance (UI) depends on local labor market conditions, this may im-
ply that optimal UI benefits should respond to shifts in local labor demand. However,
'We would like to thank Jonathan Guryan for providing excellent comments. Notowidigdo
gratefully acknowledges the National Institute of Aging (NIA grant number T32-AG000186) for
financial support.
1Chetty (2008) shows that it is misleading to interpret the behavioral response to UI benefits
as a pure moral hazard effect, as part of the observed response could be coming through liquidity
effects. In Section 3.2.1, we investigate the importance of liquidity effects and find no evidence that
accounting for liquidity effects significantly alters our main results.
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there exists little empirical evidence on measuring how local labor market conditions
affect the moral hazard cost of UI, since many of the studies that conduct a welfare
analysis of UI do not consider whether and to what extent UI benefits should vary
with local labor market conditions (Baily 1978, Chetty 2006, Chetty 2008, Shimer
and Werning 2007, Kroft 2008).2 As Alan Krueger and Bruce Meyer (2002, p64-65)
remark:
[F]or some programs, such as UI, it is quite likely that the adverse
incentive effects vary over the business cycle. For example, there is prob-
ably less of an efficiency loss from reduced search effort by the unemployed
during a recession than during a boom. As a consequence, it may be op-
timal to expand the generosity of UI during economic downturns ... Un-
fortunately, this is an area in which little empirical research is currently
available to guide policymakers.
Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office writes that the availability of long-
term unemployment benefits "could dampen people's efforts to look for work, [but
that concern] is less of a factor when employment opportunities are expected to be
limited for some time."3
In this paper, we conduct both positive and normative economic analyses to in-
vestigate how local labor market conditions affect the moral hazard cost of UI. On
the positive side, we consider a standard job search model and show that the model
implies a steady-state relationship between the disincentive effect of UI and the un-
employment rate. We first consider workers who set a reservation wage and face
an exogenous arrival rate of job offers. In this version of the model, the relation-
ship between the unemployment rate and elasticity of duration with respect to the
UI benefit level is theoretically ambiguous; however, when we calibrate the model
using realistic parameter values selected from the literature, the duration elasticity
2Nicholson and Needels (2006) discuss how worsening labor market conditions in the U.S. in the
1970s and 1980s triggered large, policy-driven, increases in benefit payments.
3The CBO quote is pulled from the following URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR2010030804927-pf.html.
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is positively correlated with the unemployment rate.4 This analysis suggests that
the moral hazard cost of UI increases with the unemployment rate, contrary to the
speculation of Krueger and Meyer (2002) as well as existing UI policy in the U.S. and
many other developed countries.
We extend the search model to encapsulate the more realistic scenario where
workers affect the job finding rate by increasing search effort. In this model with
an endogenous job offer arrival rate, the elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to the UI benefits is the sum of behavioral responses of (a) reservation wages
and (b) search effort. We show that whether moral hazard rises or falls with the
unemployment rate depends on the relative importance of these two behavioral chan-
nels.
Recent empirical work on the behavioral responses to social insurance programs
find that more generous benefits do not lead to higher wages (see Card, Chetty, and
Weber 2007). Given that higher UI benefits raise durations, this leads us to suspect
that the search effort channel is empirically more important than the reservation wage
channel. We examine this question by calibrating the search model with endogenous
search effort and considering how variation in local labor market conditions affects
the duration elasticity. For different ranges of parameter values, the elasticity can
be either positively or negatively related to the unemployment rate. This ambiguity
is coming entirely through the search channel - the reservation wage component of
the duration elasticity is always increasing with the unemployment rate. We thus
conclude from our model and calibrations that the relationship between the duration
elasticity and the local unemployment rate is ultimately an empirical question.
To empirically test how the duration elasticity varies with the local unemployment
rate, we exploit variation in UI benefit levels within states over time and interact the
effect of UI benefit generosity with the state unemployment rate. 5  Our findings
4Additionally, we show that we can resolve the theoretical ambiguity by making assumptions on
the distribution of wages. If the distribution of wages has a non-increasing hazard rate (as would
be the case if wage offers had a Pareto distribution), then the duration elasticity will be increasing
in the unemployment rate.
51n ongoing work we are constructing variation in state unemployment rates that is driven by
plausibly exogenous shifts in local labor demand by following the procedure in Bartik (1991).
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indicate that the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefits
is significantly lower when the local unemployment rate is high. In our preferred
specification, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefits is
0.741 (s.e. 0.340) at the mean unemployment rate. However, a one standard deviation
increase in the unemployment rate (an increase of 1.68 percentage points) reduces
the magnitude of the duration elasticity by 0.239 to 0.502 (a decline in magnitude
of 32.3%). To interpret this finding as evidence that the moral hazard cost of UI
falls with the unemployment rate, we conduct a variety of robustness tests to address
concerns that the interaction effect we estimate is driven by compositional changes,
unobserved trends, sample selection, and liquidity effects, and find no evidence that
any of these concerns are primarily responsible for our effect. We therefore conclude
that the association between the duration elasticity and the local unemployment rate
indicates that the moral hazard cost of UI varies systematically with local labor
market conditions.
Finally, we show that when the moral hazard cost of UL depends on local labor
market conditions, this has important implications for the welfare consequences of
UI. We develop a simple formula for the optimal level of unemployment benefits
which takes into account how the behavioral response to UI benefits varies with
local labor market conditions. The formula is stated in terms of our reduced-form
parameter estimates and is thus in the spirit of the "sufficient statistics" approach
to welfare analysis (Chetty 2009). The primary advantage of this method is that it
can be implemented with relatively few parameter estimates.' Furthermore, these
parameters can often be empirically estimated using a credible quasi-experimental
research design. One disadvantage of this approach is that it is not well-suited to
out-of-sample counterfactual analysis because the sufficient statistics are only valid
for relatively "local" changes in the policy-relevant parameters. Using our reduced
form empirical estimates to calibrate the optimal UI formula implied by our model,
we find that a one standard deviation increase in the local unemployment rate leads
6We cannot conduct a full sufficient statistics analysis without reduced-form estimates of how
the consumption smoothing benefits of UI vary with local labor market conditions. We hope that
future work will build on Gruber (1997) and investigate this reduced-form effect.
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to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the optimal replacement rate. To give a sense
of the magnitude of this policy change, it is roughly equivalent to a one unit change
in the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the model (e.g., from y = 2 to 7y = 3).
Several recent papers explore theoretically how UI benefits should vary with the
unemployment rate (Kiley 2003, Costain and Reier 2005, Sanchez 2008 and Andersen
and Svarer 2009). These papers differ in several respects. First, these papers take
a structural approach to welfare analysis by imposing functional form assumptions
characterizing how labor demand shocks affect search, while we take an approach in
the spirit of the "sufficient statistics" literature, allowing us to use our reduced form
estimates to calibrate our model. Second, our welfare analysis does not place any
restrictions on the model primitives and is therefore valid for a wide range of under-
lying mechanisms which cause the duration elasticity to vary with unemployment.
Third, these studies are primarily calibration analyses; they do not empirically esti-
mate how the duration elasticity varies with local labor market conditions. Lastly,
since these papers are mostly based on search models with no reservation wage deci-
sion, they do not highlight the distinction between the reservation wage and search
effort elasticities. 7
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the
search model and describes both the agent and planner problems. Section 3 presents
our empirical analysis which estimates how the behavioral response to UI varies with
unemployment. Section 4 considers the welfare implications of our empirical findings.
Section 5 concludes.
3.1 Theory
In this section, we describe the setup of a standard continuous-time, infinite-time
horizon, job search model. The model closely follows Shimer and Werning (2007).
7This paper also contributes to a large empirical literature on the behavioral responses to UI
by providing empirical evidence on how the elasticity of duration with respect to the benefit level
varies with the unemployment rate. There are several papers in this area that indirectly relate to
our work (Moffitt 1985, Arulampalam and Stewart 1995, Jurajda and Tannery 2003, and Roed and
Zhang 2005).
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We make a number of simplifying assumptions for tractability. First, we focus on
benefit level, not potential benefit duration, although the latter is clearly an important
policy parameter.8 Second, the model does not allow workers to save or borrow.
Thus an unemployed worker's only way to smooth consumption across states is the
unemployment insurance agency.9 Third, we omit leisure. Forth, we assume that
workers are homogeneous. Finally, we work in a partial equilibrium setting with
no firms. In ongoing work, we are working to relax each of these assumptions and
evaluate the robustness of our results to these extensions. We begin by considering a
version of the model where the job offer arrival rate is exogenous. We then extend the
model to allow for endogenous search. In both cases, we characterize the structural
relationship between the moral hazard cost of UI and unemployment. We then exploit
this relationship to show how the welfare gain of UI varies with unemployment.
3.1.1 The Agent and Planner's Problems
Agent's Problem With Exogenous Arrival Rate. Consider a single worker that who
has flow utility given by U(c), where U' > 0, U" < 0. The worker's subjective
discount rate is given by r > 0. The worker maximizes the expected present value
of utility from consumption
EJe-rtU(c(t))dt (3.1)
0
If the worker is unemployed, she samples wages exogenously at rate A from a
known distribution function, F(w). The distribution function possesses all of the
properties that guarantee a solution exists. Workers who accept a wage offer com-
mence employment immediately. Employment is assumed to end exogenously with
separation rate s.
If the worker is unemployed, she receives and consumes an unemployment benefit
8Shimer and Werning (2007) find that socially optimal UI policy is infinite duration, constant
benefits in both a hand-to-mouth model and one with free access to savings and lending.
9Since we assume that consumption during unemployment is equal to the UI benefit level and
consumption during employment is equal to the net wage, there is full consumption-smoothing across
time, within states.
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denoted by b. When the worker is employed, she earns a wage w and pays taxes
equal to T which is used to finance unemployment benefit payments. Thus, her
consumption is equal to her net wage, w - r. 10
Finally, we assume that the model is stationary. Thus, A, s, F(w), b, T and r
are all assumed to be independent of time. The expressions that we derive in this
paper depend on this assumption. For example, if there is duration dependence such
that the reservation wage varies in response to the failure to find a job, then the
expressions below will not be valid. Empirically, we do not find evidence of duration
dependence in our data.
Worker Behavior. We now characterize worker behavior subject to a particular
policy (b, T). Let V be the value function (maximal expected lifetime utility) of
an unemployed individual and let V(w) denote the value function of a worker who
accepts a wage offer of w. The workers solves the following:
00rV, = U(b) + A jn max{V(w) - V, OjdF(w) (3.2)
rV(w) U(w - T) + s[V - V(w)] (3.3)
where rV is the (per period) flow value of being unemployed, which is the con-
sumption value plus the expected capital gain of getting an acceptable wage draw in
the future (i.e., the "option value"). An employed worker earns w - T and then at
rate s loses her job and changes states, which she values at V - V(w). Rearranging
equation (3.3) results in the following expression:
U(w - T) + sV
r+s
The reservation wage, WR, satisfies V(wR) = V, implying that V(wR) = U(WR -
10We do not model the worker's intensive labor supply decision. Since workers supply labor
inelastically in our model, taxes are non-distortionary.
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T)/r.n Substitution yields the following expression:
U(WR - T) U(b) + A Iw[U(W - T) - U(WR - r)]dF(w) (3.4)
r + S R
Equation (3.4) is a standard expression in search models, which implicitly defines
the reservation wage. The left-hand side of this equation represents the flow utility
of accepting a wage offer of WR. The right-hand side is the flow utility of rejecting a
wage offer of WR and waiting for a better wage draw. Note that 1/(r + s) represents
the expected present value of a unit of income until a job ends. If there were no
risk of job loss, this would be equal to 1/r which is the value of a perpetuity with
payment of $1. Therefore, the risk of job loss effectively increases the discount rate.
The job finding rate, p, is equal to the product of the job offer arrival rate and
the probability of receiving an acceptable wage offer, A(1 - F(wR)). The station-
arity assumption implies that p does not depend on how long the agent has been
unemployed, meaning that we can express expected duration, D, as i/p.
Planner's Problem. We consider a social planner whose objective is to maximize
an unemployed worker's utility, V,. We restrict the class of feasible policies to those
where the unemployment benefit level, b, and the employment tax, T, are constant.
We assume that the worker may receive UI benefits so long as she is unemployed.
The planner's policy must satisfy a balanced-budget requirement which means that
expected benefits paid out equals expected taxes collected, Db = .2 The right-
hand side is roughly equal to the expected tax collected from the worker when she is
employed. We solve the planner's problem in two steps: first, we show how the effect
of UI on durations depends on unemployment; second, we exploit this relationship
to show that the optimal benefit level chosen by the planner depends on the level of
unemployment.
" Note that V(wR) =U == V(w) - V = u("-)-u(w-r). Also, V(wR) = w(w""-r)+sV,
U(wn?-T)+sV(w n) __ U(wln--r)
r~s r12 One may wonder why taxes are discounted, but unemployment benefits are not. This is because
the government must pay benefits currently to a worker who is unemployed and receives taxes later,
when the worker becomes employed.
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3.1.2 Moral Hazard and Unemployment
In this reservation wage model, the moral hazard effect depends on responsiveness of
reservation wages to benefits (Shimer and Werning 2007). This suggests evaluating
this comparative static to see how the elasticity of duration with respect to the benefit
level relates to the unemployment rate.
For simplicity, we start with the case where individuals are risk-neutral. Later,
we will show how our main results generalize to the case of risk-averse workers. De-
fine u = ' as the fraction of time a worker is unemployed or the unemployment
rate." The following lemma provides a simple expression for how the reservation
wage responds to the benefit level.
Lemma 1 For r = 0 and U" ~ 0,
O u (3.5)Ob
This result is obtained by differentiating equation (3.4) with respect to the benefit
level and applying Leibniz's rule for differentiation under an integral sign." This
expression is similar to the result obtained by Chesher and Lancaster (1983).' They
were primarily interested in estimating the reservation wage and duration elasticities.
In contrast, we are interested in using the search model to uncover the structural
relationship between these elasticities and the unemployment rate.
There are several points worth making about expression (3.5). First, it implies
we can measure the responsiveness of the reservation wage to changes in benefits in
an extremely simple way - all that is needed is data on the unemployment rate. 16
13 Note that u and D have a 1-to-1 mapping in this model since D = 1/p fully determines u, given
S.
14 Note that we will always slightly underestimate 9 =___ = u*. The approximation errorOb -r~s~p -
is likely to be small. To see this, note that when the unit of time is one month, p - .46, s - .04
(Shimer 2007) and r .004 (Shimer and Werning 2007). Since r is about 1/10 the size of s in
practice, the error (u* - u)/u* = .09 * (1 - u). Thus, the error is bounded above by 9%.
i"In their model, s = 0 implying employment is an absorbing state. Since they do not observe
p/r in their data, they express this in terms of the reservation wage, the conditional expected wage,
and the unemployment benefit level. Specifically, p - wQ .r x-wI?
16'Estimating the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level requires addi-
tional information on benefit levels and reservation wages, at a given unemployment rate.
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For the U.S. over the period 1999-2009, u E [3.8%, 10.1%].17 Feldstein and Poterba
(1984) find empirically that aR E [13%, 42%]. As we show below, the marginal
effect is higher when agents are risk-averse, which means that these estimates imply
that risk aversion is relevant.
Second, each individual can be thought of as having her own "unemployment
rate" since she optimally chooses her re-employment probability, p, to some extent.
However, data limitations prevent us from calculating this expression at the indi-
vidual level. Thus, in practice, we rely on the average unemployment rate across
individuals.18
Third, note that we are not expressing the individual's decision problem explicitly
in terms of the unemployment rate to see how it affects her behavior. This is different
from decision problems that explicitly model the impact of aggregate variables on
individual outcomes.19 Rather, the result follows from the fact that the search model
implies a steady-state relationship between the responsiveness of the reservation wage
to benefits and the unemployment rate.
To see the intuition for this expression, let's consider the effect of a benefit increase.
The key insight is that this increases benefits in every period that an agent remains
unemployed. In a bad labor market, an agent is more likely to be unemployed for a
long time, holding the reservation wage constant. Therefore, she stands to gain more
at the margin from the increase in benefits than would be the case in a strong labor
market where she is likely to become employed in the near future. Thus when benefits
are increased and local labor market conditions are poor (i.e., local unemployment
rate is high), an agent who is unemployed will need a higher wage to induce her into
the workforce than would be the case for an agent who faces very favourable local
labor market conditions.
Recognizing that WR is a measure of the private welfare of the unemployed (since
Vu = V(wR) oc U(WR - )), then an implication of this result is that a marginal
"Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
18In ongoing work, we are constructing unemployment rates across observable demographic groups,
using microdata from the CPS.
19For example, consider the consumer utility maximization problem where individual demand
depends on the market price, which is determined in equilibrium.
186
increase in benefits increases the unemployed's private utility more when unemploy-
ment is bad. Note however, that from a social welfare perspective, what matters is
the consumption smoothing benefit of UI which is positive only when the agent is
risk-averse, as shown formally below.
We have shown that we can unambiguously determine how the responsiveness of
reservation wages to benefits varies with unemployment. The following proposition
considers how the duration elasticity varies with unemployment:
Proposition 2 For r 0 and U" ~ 0,
ED,b O(wR)ub (3.6)
where O(WR) f!,4QR is the hazard rate (or failure rate) of the wage offer distribu-
tion.
Proof. Differentiating D = 1/p with respect to b yields the following:
OD A f(wR) 9wR
=WDob p ab
=O(WR) aWR D8b
O(wR)uD (3.7)
where the last line follows from Lemma 1. The result follows by multiplying 9 by
b and dividing by D. m
This expression is positive so that an increase in b raises wR and increases D. The
fact that benefits increase unemployment does not necessarily mean the individual
is worse off. Since she chooses to be unemployed longer, by revealed preference,
she must be better off from a private welfare standpoint.20 Expression (3.6) shows
that the duration elasticity depends on three factors: (1) the hazard rate of the wage
offer distribution, (2) the unemployment rate and (3) the unemployment benefit level.
20 This does not imply that social welfare is increased since the agent imposes a negative externality
on the government's budget. We return to the normative implications below.
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How the duration elasticity varies with the unemployment rate depends crucially on
how O(WR) varies with u.
We assume that F does not vary directly with the unemployment rate.2 1 In order
to sign this effect, we need to know how WR varies with u and how O(WR) varies with
WR. 2 2 Consider the relationship between wR and u. The first thing to recognize is
that WR and u are jointly determined and therefore are not causally related." This
implies that their relationship will in general depend on the underlying sources of
variation.2 4
Because &(WR) depends on the shape of the wage distribution, the relationship#9WR
between the unemployment rate and the duration elasticity in a reservation wage
model is theoretically ambiguous. According to Van den Berg (1994), most of the
distributions used in structural job search analysis have hazards that are decreasing
in WR, O(WR < 0. In that case, then the model unambiguously predicts that the
moral hazard cost of UI increases during recessions, in contrast to the hypothesis of
Krueger and Meyer discussed in the introduction. We have also calibrated the model
when wages are distributed log-normally, and we also find that the duration elasticity
is positively related to the unemployment rate. 2 5
Since the job offer arrival rate is exogenous, the relationship between the unem-
2
'This assumption is consistent with the large macroeconomics literature that provides evidence
showing that wages are acyclical (Bewley 1999).
22Chesher and Lancaster (1983) show that when the wage offer distribution for w > b is Pareto,
'(wR) < 0. On the other hand, when it is Normal, '(wR) > 0. More generally, any distribution
that is log-concave will have a non-decreasing hazard function (see Burdett 1981).
23This casts doubt on research that empirically estimates the relationship between unemployment
or unemployment duration and reservation wages. As Jones (1988) points out, job search theory
implies that most variables influencing employment probabilities given the reservation wage can be
expected to also influence the reservation wage and as a result, the exclusion restriction is likely to
be violated.
"As an analogy, consider the relationship between the equilibrium values of price and output. A
positive demand shock increases price and output, so that the two variables are positively corre-
lated. A negative supply shock on the other hand, increases price and lowers output, so that the
two variables are negatively correlated. Variation in unemployment driven by local labor market
conditions (e.g., variation in A) will cause the responsiveness of the duration elasticity to local labor
market conditions to depend on a . In this model, a"' > 0.
2 5The log-normal distribution does not have a monotonic hazard rate, so we cannot sign the
association between the duration elasticity and the unemployment rate analytically. However, for
a large range of plausible parameter values, we consistently found that the association was positive,
just as when the wage offer distribution was Pareto.
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ployment rate and the duration elasticity is determined solely through changes in
reservation wage response. Below we consider a more realstic model where workers
also choose search effort to affect the job offer arrival rate. Before we turn to this
richer model, we briefly consider the case where workers are risk-averse, and we carry
through the assumption that workers are risk-averse for the remainder of this section.
Risk Aversion
With risk aversion, it can be shown that for small values of r
OWR U'(b)
Ob U'(wR - T)
Relative to the risk-neutral case, the marginal effect is amplified by the ratio of
marginal utilities since b < wR - r and U" < 0. Intuitively, a risk-averse agent values
a guaranteed stream of unemployment benefits more than a risk-neutral agent and so
is more sensitive to variations in her certain income. This also implies that
= O(WR) Db D
Ob 8~b
U'(b)
U'() O(wR)uD (3.9)
U'(wR - T )
Therefore,
U'(b)
ED b UW -T)O(WR)ub (3-10)
' U'(wR - r
Thus, relative to the risk-neutral case, the duration elasticity is amplified by the
ratio of the marginal utilities when unemployed and employed, respectively.
Incorporating Endogenous Search
The search model shows that UI benefits raise unemployment durations since they
put upward pressure on reservation wages, which in turn reduces the probability
that a worker gets an acceptable wage offer. Some empirical studies, however, have
found that increases in benefits do not affect the distribution of accepted wage offers,
implying that the effect on reservation wages is small (see Card, Chetty, and Weber
189
2007).26 In this section, we allow for the possibility that individuals can affect the job
offer arrival rate through costly search effort (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005).
This provides an additional channel through which UI benefits can increase the length
of unemployment spells.
Let search effort be denoted by e and let the arrival rate be given by A(e), where
A' > 0 and A" < 0. In this case, it can be shown that
ED,b = O(WR) &bW b - 6(e) Oeb (3.11)
where 6(e) - . Clearly, how the duration elasticity varies with unemployment
depends crucially on how 5 varies with u in addition to how t9 ' varies with u.
Thus, adding search intensity to the model potentially changes how moral hazard
varies unemployment. The first part of expression (3.11) is simply the duration
elasticity with no search decision. The second term of expression (3.11) shows that
the duration elasticity with search depends on how UI benefits distort search effort
(g) as well as on how the arrival rate varies with search effort (6(e)). The key
"behavioral" parameters of this expression are awR and L; the terms O(wR) and 6(e)
primarily depend on the economic environment and are only indirectly affected by
the behavioral effects.
To analyze the marginal effects in this expression, we need to study the optimality
conditions for search and the reservation wage. We assume that the search cost,
denoted by $P(e), is strictly increasing and convex and is separable from consumption
utility.2 7 To simplify the algebra, it will be convenient to define the surplus function
P(wR) Tf[U(w - r) - U(WR - T)]dF(w). This represents the difference between
the optimized values of employment and unemployment. Intuitively, it measures
a worker's expected utility when employed relative to her "reservation employment
260ne can show that the expected wage satisfies E,[wlw ;> WR] WR + - .w Thus, if
benefits do not affect average wages, they must not affect reservation wages.
2 7While the separability between search and consumption simplifies the analytics, it may be the
case that unemployed individuals affect the job offer arrival rate by changing consumption. This
formulation would affect the welfare analysis. In ongoing work, we are studying the effects of
incorporating this generalization.
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utility" - the utility she receives at the wage she is just willing to accept to become
employed.
We will use the following property of the surplus function, &Sa(WR)p DWR
F(wR))U'(wR - T). This is negative since holding the distribution of wages fixed, a
worker gets less surplus when her reservation utility is higher. We show below that
WR> 0 implying a (WR) < 0. Intuitively, an increase in unemployment benefits
raises the value of unemployment and hence the reservation wage, and in turn lowers
the expected net surplus from employment. In a consumer demand setting, this
would be represented by an inward shift of the demand curve which lowers consumer
surplus for a fixed market price. Note that one can also show that a (wR) < 0.OA
Intuitively, a higher arrival rate increases the option value of unemployment. The
implicit equation for the reservation wage can be written compactly as
A(e)
U(WR - T) = U(b) - O(e) + p(wR)
r + S
The optimal e can be found by maximizing U(WR - T). The first-order condition
assuming an interior optimum is
A'(e)
01'(e) = S(WR) (3.12)
r + S
Thus, the optimal search level equates the marginal cost of effort (left-hand side)
with the marginal value of effort (right-hand side). The marginal value of effort
depends on the marginal increase in the likelihood of obtaining a job in response to
an increase in effort and the expected discounted surplus of getting a job. Note
that searching harder only affects the likelihood of getting an offer, but does not af-
fect expected income, conditional on getting a job.28  The model therefore predicts
that a positive shift in local labor demand increases search intensity of the unem-
ployed. In other words, search intensity in this model is negatively correlated with
unemployment.
-
28This follows from the assumption that search effort affects only the arrival rate, not the wage
distribution.
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Substituting this equation into the reservation wage equation yields the following
expression:
A (e)
U(WR - r) = U(b) + , V'(e) - V(e) (3.13)
The conditions (3.12) and (3.13) comprise a system of equations, which implicitly
(and jointly) determine the optimal reservation wage and the optimal level of search
effort, as functions of the level of UI benefits. We can differentiate this system with
respect to b to solve for oR and a.
Proposition 3 Assume r is small. The marginal effects with endogenous search
intensity satisfy
&WR 
_ U'(b)
b (3.14)
De 6(e)(1 - -)U(b) (3.15)
Ob n(e) - O (W(m)
Proof. See Appendix A. *
First, consider the expression for OW. Note that adding endogenous search effort
does not change the formula for how the reservation wage responds to the benefit
level. However, og still depends on search effort indirectly through u and WR.
Next, consider the expression for e. Note that ( < 0; that is, an increase in
benefits lowers the marginal gain of search since it decreases expected surplus from
employment, (wR). The magnitude of this decrease in search effort is determined
by three factors: (1) the initial shift in the marginal benefit curve (-6(e)(1-u)U'(b)),
(2) the slope of the marginal cost curve (Y') and (3) the slope of the marginal benefit
curve (A"(e)O(W))
To interpret the shift in the marginal benefit curve, recall that the marginal benefit
curve as a function of effort is given by W (WR). Therefore, the shift in response to
a change in the level of benefits, for a fixed level of effort, depends on the magnitude
of A,(e) and also on how p(WR) responds to a change in benefits. The first term which
relates to 6(e) illustrates that the location of the curve matters for the size of the shift.
Intuitively, a small value for J(e) implies that the arrival rate does not respond much
to a marginal increase in effort, lowering the level of the marginal benefit curve and
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essentially placing a bound on how distortionary benefits can be. To see why the
employment rate 1 - u matters, consider the case where s -> oo, so that u = 1. In
this case, there is no chance of actually being employed so workers essentially put
no weight on expected surplus from employment. That the shift depends on U'(b)
follows since this term characterizes how <p(wR) responds to the benefit level.
That 9 depends on the slopes of the curves follows from any standard marginal
analysis. If @" is large at a given level of search effort, this means that marginal cost
curve is inelastic. As a result, a given reduction in the marginal benefit curve due
to an increase in benefits has less of an impact on search effort. Similarly, the effort
response depends on the slope of the marginal benefit curve, which is pinned down
by A". A small value for A" implies that the marginal benefit curve is more elastic;
hence a reduction in benefits have a larger effect on search.
Examining expression (3.15), we can see that a decline in local labor demand can
impact the distortionary effect of UI benefits on search through it's effect on 6(e)(1 -
u).29 Clearly, a negative labor demand shock is going to increase the unemployment
rate, so the sign of the effect ultimately depends on how the shock affects 6(e). As
a reminder, 6(e) represents the percentage change in the job offer arrival rate from
an additional unit of search. A larger value of 6(e) means that search is more
productive. Thus, the key determinant of the comparative static is whether search
is more productive on the margin in a weak or strong local labor market. In a weak
market, we would expect A(e) to be small, which would act to increase 6(e). On
the other hand, A'(e) is also likely to be smaller which lowers 6(e), so the net effect
depends on the rate at which A'(e) falls relative to A(e). As Kiley (2003) discusses, it
is possible to specify functional forms so that the net effect can go either way. As a
result, the question is ultimately an empirical one. We calibrate the model below by
assuming a particular functional form, A(e) = A+Ae. Here A'(e) falls at rate 1 with A
and A(e) falls at rate e+ Aa. So, the net effect depends on whether e(1+ AL) >1
With this functional form assumption, A" = 0 giving
29It is possible that the recession affects the term (eP(wR), although signing this effect seems
less intuitive.
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De 
_U'(b)
-- = -- 6(e)(1 - u)
b "(e)
To see what this implies about the duration elasticity, let's plug the marginal
effects into the elasticity formula 30 :
UDb - O(W + U'(b) - (3.16)
U'(wR -- 7) (e)
This expression shows that whether moral hazard increases or decreases in a reces-
sion depends on the relative strength of the reservation channel and search channel.
We present a calibration in the next section that is an attempt to disentangle these
two channels and also show independently how they vary with the unemployment
rate. 31
3.1.3 Calibrating ED,b
Our expression for ED,b demonstrates there are two channels by which unemployment
can impact moral hazard. This section evaluates the duration elasticity numerically
by calibrating the model in the previous section. The calibration sheds light on
the plausible quantitative impact of the local unemployment rate on the duration
elasticity before turning to the empirical results.
Functional Form Assumptions
In what follows, we rely on Chesher and Lancaster (1983), Shimer (2007) and Chetty
(2008). A unit of time for the calibrations is a week. For all of these calculations,
we assume r = 0.
Wage Offer Distribution. We assume wages are distributed log-normally, with
mean weekly wages of $300 and the standard deviation of weekly wages is $240. In
30Note that this is the partial elasticity, which captures the effect of a change in benefits on
expected duration, holding taxes constant.
311n future work, we will allow the distribution of wages to also vary with local labor demand
conditions.
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the Appendix, we follow Chesher and Lancaster (1983) and assume that the wage
offer distribution is Pareto.
Arrival Rates. We assume that the arrival rate takes a linear form, A(e) = A+Ae.
Separations end exogenously at rate s. Shimer (2007) reports estimates for the job
finding and separation probabilities. There is a simple connection between the rates
and probabilities. To see this, note that the probability that a worker has not found
a job after a spell of length t is P = e-Ht, where H = A(1 - F(wR)). Therefore
the job finding probability is 1 - P e(1H)t. It follows that the job finding rate
is - log(1 - P). There is a similar connection between the separation probability
and the separation rate. Shimer (2007) finds that the average monthly separation
probability in the US from 1948 to 2004 is 0.035. This delivers a separation rate of
.02. Converting this to a weekly rate yields s = .00387.
UI Benefits. Assume benefits are equal to b = r x E[w]. Following Chetty
(2008), we take r = 0.5. For these simulations, we assume no taxes, so T = 0.
Preferences over consumption. Assume that U(c) = ', where y > 0 is the risk
aversion parameter (As - -> 1, U(c) -- > log c). We follow Chetty (2008) by choosing
= 1.75.
Search Effort. We let search costs as a function of effort be denoted by V)(e) =
#+" , where # is a scaling parameter. The elasticity of search costs with respect to
search effort is 1 + K. So a higher K increases the marginal cost of search and lowers
search effort.
Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the results from our calibration. The experiment we consider
is to exogenously vary the term A in the fuction A(e) = A + Ae. Each column in
the table represents a different value of A. To shed some light on the underlying
mechanisms, we report the total duration elasticity in equation (3.16) as well as each
of the two terms that comprise the duration elasticity, separately.
In Table 1 we choose a low value of A (= 0.02). Looking across the second row
(eF" ), it is clear that an increase in A increases the responsiveness of reservation
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wages to UI benefits. The third row (ED,b) shows that an increase in A increases the
responsiveness of search effort to UI benefits. Since both move in the same direction,
the duration elasticity also increases as A increases, causing the duration elasticity to
be increasing in the unemployment rate. As a result, in this calibration, the moral
hazard cost of UI increases with the unemployment rate.
Table 2 reports results choosing a higher value of A (= 0.1). In this table,
we can see looking across the second row (ER b) that an increase in A increases the
responsiveness of reservation wages to UI benefits, just as with Table 1. However,
unlike Table 1, the third row (ED,b) of Table 2 shows that an increase in A decreases
the responsiveness of search effort to UI benefits. In this calibration, the search
effort effect dominates the reservation wage effect, so that the duration elasticity
also decreases as A increases, causing the duration elasticity to be decreasing in the
unemployment rate. As a result, in this calibration, moral hazard decreases with the
unemployment rate.
This analysis demonstrates the importance of incorporating endogenous search
intensity, and that the precise way in which local labor market conditions affect
the returns to search effort ultimately determines whether moral hazard increases or
decreases with the unemployment rate.
We now turn to what these results imply for optimal policy. In practice, to
examine how moral hazard varies with unemployment, we do not need to separately
identify the responsiveness of the reservation wage and search intensity to benefits; we
only need to identify the duration elasticity. This motivates our empirical strategy,
described later, which explores how the duration elasticity varies with the unemploy-
ment rate. The next section presents a welfare analysis to show how the optimal
benefit level varies with the local labor market conditions.
3.1.4 Welfare Analysis: Optimal Unemployment Benefits
The social planner solves the following problem
max V,
b,r
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s.t. Db =
r + s
Since V = U(wR -r)/r, the planner's problem is simply to maximize the worker's
after-tax reservation wage, WR - T. The following theorem characterizes the optimal
benefit level.
Theorem 4 The optimal benefit level satisfies the following condition:
U'(b) - U'(wR - T) =Db (3.17)
U'(wR - T)
Proof. See Appendix A. *
An instructive derivation of this first-order condition is as follows. 32 Let y =
U'(b) be the amount such that, the government is indifferent between giving $1
U'(WR--r)
to someone who is unemployed and g to someone who is employed. Next, consider
a $1 increase in benefits. This has a mechanical effect on UI expenditures and a
behavioral response. The mechanical effect, M, is given by Ddb. The change in
expenditures due to behavioral responses, B, is given by 'jbdb = ED,b db. To obtain
the optimal benefit level, we must equalize the expenditure effect, M + B, with the
welfare effect. A simple application of the envelope theorem implies that the welfare
effect is given by gM. That is, each additional dollar raised by the government to
finance UI benefits reduces on average social welfare of the employed by 7M. Thus,
at an optimum, (1 - 9)M + B = 0. Rearranging this equation delivers the result.
The test for the optimality of UI benefits compares the difference in consump-
tion between an unemployed worker and a worker employed at her reservation wage
with the moral hazard cost of social insurance. This is slightly different than the
consumption-based test in Chetty (2006) as the consumption smoothing measure
here corresponds to the difference between the lowest acceptable level of consump-
tion while employed and consumption while unemployed, rather than the difference
between average consumption while employed and unemployed. The reason for this
difference is due to the difference in the maximand in the social planner's problem.
32This derivation closely follows the derivation of the optimal top tax rate in Saez (2001).
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In Chetty (2006), the maximand is expected utility. Thus, the social planner trades
off consumption utility between the states of employment and unemployment. In
this model, the maximand is an unemployed worker's utility. The social planner
trades off current consumption utility with the change in utility (surplus) that occurs
if the worker becomes employed.
Two final points are worth mentioning. First, since consumption when employed
exceeds the net reservation wage, the optimal benefit level in this setting is lower than
the optimal benefit level if the planner was interested in maximizing expected utility.
The reason is because insurance is more valuable when the state of nature has yet to
be realized. Finally, in practice, eD,b will not be zero, so we will have b < WR - r.
The Optimal Benefit Level and Unemployment
To see how the optimal benefit level varies with the unemployment rate, we need
to consider how both sides of equation (3.17) vary with unemployment. Since we
already considered how the moral hazard cost of UI varies with unemployment, let
us focus our attention on how the consumption smoothing or insurance effect varies
with unemployment. Unemployment has an effect on the left-hand side of equation
(3.17) that operates through the balanced-budget constraint. To see this, consider
the case where UI benefits are not distortionary. The government budget constraint
implies that for r = 0,
07 U
Bb 1 - u
Thus, when unemployment is high, more taxes need to be raised to finance a
given level of benefits. This shows that the insurance effect depends indirectly on
labor market conditions. In particular, this implies that benefits should fall when
unemployment increases. To see this, note when unemployment increases for a given
level of benefits, to satisfy the balanced-budget condition, taxes must increase on the
employed. This lowers the marginal utility of consumption for the employed relative
to marginal utility of consumption for the unemployed (e.g., WR - T is reduced); in
order to restore optimality, benefits need to be reduced. Andersen and Svarer (2009)
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label this a "budget effect" since the effect comes purely from the need to satisfy the
budget constraint.
Let us consider how the optimal benefit level b* varies with the job offer arrival
rate A(e). This is given in the following collary.
Corollary 5 The effect of a change in the offer arrival rate on the optimal benefit
level is given by
F)O(WR-T \D~b&b* 
_ U"(wR 
- ED,b + U'(wR - T (318)
0A U"(b)
The proof follows from differentiating condition (3.17) with respect to A(e). The
first term in expression (3.18) represents the budget effect. Since U" < 0 and
a(w-R > 0, the budget effect causes benefits to be lower when unemployment is
higher. The second term is the effect on distortions. If the moral hazard effect
of UI increases with the job finding rate (when unemployment is low), this term
causes benefits to be higher when unemployment is high. Thus, the net effect of
unemployment on the optimal benefit level depends on the relative strengths of the
budget effect and the distortion effect. Once we have empirical estimates of how
the duration elasticity varies with local labor market conditions, we can use the
estimates to calibrate the social planner's optimal UI problem to compute how UI
benefit levels should optimal respond to local labor market conditions. The next
section describes our empirical strategy which estimates how the duration elasticity
varies with unemployment.
3.2 Estimation Strategy and Data
Our empirical strategy consists of two parts: (1) graphical evidence and nonparametric
tests of survival curves and (2) semi-parametric estimates of proportional hazard
models (Cox models). The empirical strategy closely follows Chetty (2008).
We use unemployment spell data from the SIPP spanning 1985-2000. We impose
the same restrictions as in Chetty (2008): we focus on prime-age males who (a) report
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searching for a job, (b) are not on temporary layoff, (c) have at least three months of
work history, and (d) took up UI benefits. We focus on two alternative proxies for
individual's actual UI benefits: (1) average benefits for each state-year pair and (2)
maximum weekly benefit amount. In ongoing work, we are working to implement
an instrumental variables hazard model, where the goal is to construct a simulated
instrument which isolates policy variation in individual UI benefits that is driven
purely by change in UI laws (Gruber 1997).
3.2.1 Graphical evidence and nonparametric tests
We begin by providing graphical evidence on the effect of unemployment benefits on
durations. We split the sample into two sub-samples, according to whether individ-
uals begin their unemployment spell in states with above-median unemployment or
in states with below-median unemployment. Each year we define the median unem-
ployment rate across states. We categorize a state as having either above or below
median unemployment that year. We assign unemployment ratess to unemployment
spells based on the unemployment rate in the state that the individual resides in
when the spell began, using monthly data on state unemployment rates. We also
categorize unemployment spells based on whether the UI benefit level in a given state
and year is above or below the median UI benefit level for that year.
Figures 1 and 2 show the effect of UI benefits on the probability of unemploy-
ment for individuals in above-average and below-average unemployment state-years,
respectively. In each figure, we plot Kaplan-Meier survival curves for individuals in
low-benefit and high-benefit states.3 3 The results in figure 1 show that the curves are
fairly similar in both low-benefit and high-benefit states when the unemployment rate
in a state-year is above the median unemployment rate. The curve in high-benefit
states is slightly higher, indicating that UI benefits may marginally increase benefits,
but a nonparametric test that the curves are identical does not reject at conventional
33Following Chetty (2008), the plotted curves are adjusted for the "seam effect" in the SIPP panel
data, but the test that the survival curves are identical is fully nonparametric and does not make
this adjustment.
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levels (p = 0.156). By contrast, in figure 2 the curves are noticeably different; in par-
ticular, the durations are significantly longer in high-benefit states, and the difference
between the survival curves is strongly statistically significant (p < 0.001).
These figures show that the moral hazard effect of UI benefits depends crucially
on whether unemployment is high or low. In particular, our findings suggest that
the effect of UI benefits on durations is not statistically significant when the unem-
ployment rate is high but is strongly statistically significant when the unemployment
rate is low.14  These comparisons are based on simple comparisons across spells. It
is possible, however, that the characteristics of individuals vary with unemployment
rate in a way that would bias these comparisons. To investigate this potential bias,
the next subsection reports semi-parametric proportional hazard models which in-
clude a rich set of individual-level controls. The results from the hazard models are
broadly consistent with the results based on these figures.
3.2.2 Semiparametric Hazard Models
We investigate robustness of graphical results by estimating a set of Cox proportional
hazard models in Tables 4 through 8." Each table reports results with alternative
sets of control variables in the columns. The baseline estimating equation is the
following:
log di,s,, = at + a. + /1 log(bi,,,t) + #2(log(bi,,,t) x Us,t) + i3 3 ,, + Xi,s,,2 + ei, , ,t (3.19)
where di,,,t is the duration of the unemployment spell, at and a, represents year and
state fixed effects, bi,,,t is the unemployment benefit for individual i at start of spell,
Us,t is the state unemployment rate at the start of the spell and Xi,,,t is a set of (possi-
34We have also looked at the subsample of workers with above-median liquid wealth, and we find
broadly similar results (see Appendix Figures Al and A2). These results suggest that liquidity
effects are not primarily accounting for the differential duration elasticity between high and low
unemployment, which is broadly consistent with our results in Table 7, described below.
35We are looking into alternative semiparametric hazard models to broaden the scope of the
empirical analysis. Concerns have been raised that Cox models may not be reliable in the presence
of ties. As such, we are going to report Han-Hausman estimates which are more reliable when the
number of ties is large relative to the sample size.
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bly time-varying) control variables.3" The unemployment rate at the start of the spell
is de-meaned so that the coefficient #1 gives the elasticity of unemployment durations
with respect to UI benefits at average levels of unemployment. The coefficient on
the interaction term (#2) gives the incremental change in the duration elasticity for
a one percentage point change in the state unemployment rate.
Before turning to our regression results, we present descriptive statistics in Table
3. The table presents summary statistics for the overall sample and the two sub-
samples used to create figures 1 and 2. One can see that in high unemployment
states, average income, education, the fraction married, UI benefits, are all lower
than in low unemployment states. Individuals are also slightly older in these states.
Since the distribution of observables is different across the two samples, one question
that arises when considering how the duration elasticity varies with unemployment
is whether this relationship is coming from "selection" (i.e., compositional changes
in the unemployed population due to changes in the local labor market conditions)
and how much of it is coming from an actual change in the behavioral response.
This will depend on the extent to which the duration elasticity varies directly with
demographics, which we investigate in detail in Table 6 below.
The main results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) of Table 4 reports results
of a specification broadly similar to the previous literature (Moffitt (1985), Meyer
(1990), Chetty (2008).3' This specification controls for age, marital status, years
of education, a full set of state, year, industry and occupation fixed effects, and
a 10-knot linear spline in log annual wage income. The results indicate that the
elasticity of durations with respect to the UI benefit level is -0.651 (s.e. 0.318) and
the estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.041). Column
36The notation of the estimating equation is a simplified presentation of the actual model. The
actual (latent) hazard rate is the true left-hand side variable, but is not actually observed in the data;
additionaly, there is a flexible (nonparametric) baseline hazard rate which is also estimated when
fitting the Cox proportional hazard model. Following Chetty (2008), we fit a separate baseline
hazard rate for each quartile of net liquid wealth, although our results are similar when a single
nonparametric baseline hazard rate is estimated instead.
37The results are not identical to Chetty (2008) because of slightly different sample restrictions,
the inclusion of the state uemployment rate as an additional control, and becauase we estimate a
more flexible baseline hazard function (where we nonparametrically estimate a separate baseline
hazard for each quartile of net liquid wealth).
202
(2) reports estimates of equation (3.19) above. This column includes the same set
of controls in column (1) and estimates the same hazard model; the only difference
is the addition of an interaction term between the UI benefit level and the state
unemployment rate. The coefficient on the interaction term (32) represents the
change in the duration elasticity for a one percentage point increase in the state
unemployment rate. The results in column (2) show an estimate of #2 of 0.142 (s.e.
0.068). The bottom two rows show an alternative way to interpret the interaction
term. These rows report the duration elasticity and one standard deviation above
and below the mean unemployment rate. At one standard deviation below the mean,
the duration elasticity is 0.502 (s.e. 0.326), while at one standard deviation above the
mean the duration elasticity is 0.980 (s.e. 0.388). These results imply that the moral
hazard effect of UI varies significantly with unemployment, and that the magnitude
of the duration elasticity is decreasing with local labor market conditions.
Robustness Tests
Alternative Measures of Interaction Term. Table 5 reports results which replace the
interaction of UI benefit generosity (average weekly benefit amount) and the state
unemployment rate with alternative measures of each variable in the interaction term.
Each row reports alternative measures of the interaction term.
The first row of Table 5 reproduces our baseline estimates for comparison. The
second row replaces the state unemployment rate with a dummy for whether or not the
unemployment rate is greater than the median state unemployment rate in that year.
This specification corresponds more closely to the nonparametric results presented
above. The third row replaces the average weekly benefit amount with the maximum
weekly benefit amount. The maximum weekly benefit amount corresponds more to
a specific policy parameter that states directly adjust from time-to-time. Thus,
the robustness of the estimates to the use of this measure is likely to shed some
light on whether the variation in average weekly UI benefits is plausibly exogenous
(conditional on state and year fixed effects). The estimates of the interaction term
is similar in magnitude to the baseline specification.
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Finally, in the last three rows, we report results that are based on two separate
measures of the unemployment rate. The search model predicts that variation in
the unemployment rate due to an increase in the job separation rate should have a
similar effect on the duration elasticity as a reduction in the job finding rate. To
test this hypothesis, we follow the methodology proposed in Shimer (2007) which
estimates the job finding and job separation rates, based on gross unemployment and
employment flows. Shimer shows that the job finding probability F satisfies the
following equation:
ut+1 = (1 - Ft)ut + ut+1
F = 1 - t+1 ut+1 (3.20)
Ut
where ut is the number of unemployed workers in period t and us+1 is the number
of unemployed workers at the end of the period who were employed at some point
during the period. Thus, with data on the unemployed, we can construct a measure
of the job finding probability and job finding rate, ft - log(1 - F). 38 Next, Shimer
shows that the job separation rate, st, satisfies
__ (1 - e-ft-st)stI + eft-tut
ft + st
where it ut + et and et is the number of employed workers in period t. Given the
empirical measures ft and st, we construct the following two "unemployment rates":
Uf 
s + ft
__Stus
st +7
where the bar means that they are average values during the sample period. The
unemployment rates up, u, measure variation in unemployment coming purely from
381n practice, data on ut?±1 by state is not publicly available. Thus, we make a simplifying
assumption by assuming that L is identical across states. In ongoing work, we are constructing
short-term unemployment using microdata from the CPS.
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variation in ft and st, respectively. Rows (4) and (5) in Table 5 report results from
interacting benefits with these two measures separately, and row (6) reports results
from including both measures together. This allows us to see separately how variation
in unemployment rate coming from the separation rate and the job finding rate affect
the duration elasticity. Interestingly, we find that the effects in the two rows are
fairly similar to the baseline specification and also fairly similar to each other (the
p-value of the test that the two interaction terms in row 6 are equal is 0.731). Thus
we conclude that the variation in unemployment rate affects the duration elasticity
regardless of whether that variation is coming from the job finding rate or the job
separation rate.
Composition Bias and Selection on Observables. As explained above, the ob-
servation that the duration elasticity varies with unemployment can in principle be
explained by two possibilities: first, a change in a given individual's job finding or
job separation rate directly changes her responsiveness to benefits. Alternatively, if
there is heterogeneity in moral hazard across demographic groups and the distribu-
tion of demographics of the unemployed varies with the level of unemployment, then
this compositional change could be responsible for the change in the average duration
elasticity. To test how much of the magnitude is coming through this compositional
channel, we report estimates of our baseline specification where we add interactions
between benefits and the demographic controls in the baseline specification: age, mar-
ital dummy, years of education, occupation fixed effects, and industry fixed effects.
If the estimates of the interaction term in the baseline specification is mostly due to
compositional changes (among demographic groups with different duration elastici-
ties), then we would expect to see a reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient on
the interaction between benefits and unemployment. Table 6 shows that our main
result is quite robust to including such controls. Looking across columns, we see
that adding interactions between demographics and benefits does not change the co-
efficient on our main coefficient of interest (the interaction term) in any substantive
way. This appears to be primarily due to the fact that the duration elasticity does
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not appear to vary greatly with observable demographics. 39
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity. Recent work by Chetty (2008) raises a concern
with interpreting the duration elasticity as a pure moral hazard effect. He presents
compelling evidence that part of the observed duration elasticity is due to a "liquidity
effect." This suggests that the interaction term which we estimate in our baseline
specification could plausibly represent a liquidity effect which varies systematically
with local labor market conditions. We deal with this concern in two ways. First,
we note that if it was the case that liquidity effects vary with local labor market
conditions, we believe it is likely that liquidity constraints will tend to be more bind-
ing when local labor market conditions are poor. This will cause our estimates
of how moral hazard varies with local labor market conditions to be downward bi-
ased, making it even more likely that the moral hazard cost of UI decreases with
the unemployment rate. Second, we report results in Table 7 which directly address
concerns about liquidity constraints. Column (1) reports our baseline specification
for comparison. Columns (2) and (3) report results for subsamples where liquidity
effects are likely to be less important. Column (2) focuses on the subsample of un-
employed workers without a mortgage, while column (3) focuses on the subsample of
unemployed workers in the 3rd and 4th quartiles of net liquid wealth. In both cases
the coefficient on the interaction term is larger than in the baseline. The last two
columns report results which include a full set of liquid wealth quartile dummy vari-
ables interacted with a combination of occupation fixed effects, industry fixed effects,
unemployment duration, and the UI benefit level. The results consistently support
the interpretation that the moral hazard cost of UI decreases with the unemployment
rate.40
Alternative Specifications and Controls. Finally, we report additional results in
39 0f course, the duration elasticity could vary with unobservable characteristics, though we cannot
test this directly. To the extent that the distribution of these unobservable characteristics varies
with local unemployment, then our estimates will include the effect of unobserved compositional
changes in the sample of individuals experiencing unemployment spells.
40 To save space, we do not report the interactions between the UI benefit level and the wealth
quartile dummies in column (5), but the coefficents are very similar to Chetty (2008), implying that
including local unemployment rate and its iteraction with UI benefit does not alter inference on the
importance of liquidity effects.
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Table 8 which vary the specification and the set of controls. In column (2), we
include region-specific linear time trends and show that our result gets stronger.
Column (3) includes a full set of region fixed effects interacted with year fixed effects.
Identification in this specification is coming from only from variation in benefits within
region-year cells. In column (4), we include state-specific linear time trends. Our
main results are fairly robust to these alternative specifications. Finally, columns (5)
drops the control variables; the coefficient on the interaction terms fall in magnitude
by 33% and is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.162).
3.3 Calibrating the Welfare Implications
Our empirical findings suggest that moral hazard decreases with the unemployment
rate. To see what this finding implies for optimal policy, we now calibrate the optimal
UI level implied by our model, following the spirit of the "sufficient statistic" approach
to welfare analysis. To review, this method requires using the reduced form empirical
estimates as inputs into the optimal UI formula.
Our search model implies the following structural relationship for the duration
elasticity:
ED,b U , O(R)ub + ( e)) ( 2 --
U'(WR - T) V) ube)
One can think of ED,b = h(u), where h( is non-linear. In order to exploit our
empirical estimates, we assume that h( be locally approximated by a linear function
of u. A first-order Taylor series expansion of h(u) around u = u yields:
dED,b(ff)
ED,b(U) ED,b(U) + du X (u -- )
This can also be derived directly from our reduced-form estimating equation
(3.19):
log h = a + #1 log(b) + #2 log(b) x (u - U) + e (3.21)
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With this specification,
dilog h
ED,b(U) dlogb)h /1 + 02 X (u - H)d log (b)
Thus, 13 = ED,b(H) and 02 D . Our empirical results imply that 0l=
-0.741 and #2= .142. To analyze the welfare implications, we will assume that the
budget effect can be ignored.4 1 This requires assuming that WR - T does not vary
with u. In practice, whether the budget effect is likely to bind is related to whether a
change in unemployment is temporary or permanent. If the change in unemployment
is transitory, it seems safe to assume that the government wouldn't alter financing
arrangements. On the other hand, moral hazard varies with unemployment regardless
of whether or the change in unemployment is temporary or permanent.
Recall, the consumption smoothing benefit of UI
U'(b) - U'(wR - T)
U'(wR -- T)
Assuming preferences are given by u(c) = 2, the consumption smoothing benefit
is given by
b-1
(WR - T
Thus, substituting this into (3.17), we get:
WR- T> =01 + 2 x (U -)
To be consistent with the calibrations above, we maintain the same parameter
values.4 2  Note that at these parameter values, WR - T ~~ 400. Plugging in the
parameter values and solving for b yields
400
(1 + ED,b)1/1.75
41Incorporating the budget effect increases the complexity of the model and makes a tractable
solution less easy to obtain. In ongoing work, we are working to incorporate this effect.
42In our data, U = 6.7%.
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where ED,b= 0.741-0.142 x (u-6.6%) At u = 6.7%, b* = 291 implying an optimal
replacement rate of 72.8%. At an unemployment rate of 8.4% (roughly one standard
deviation above the mean unemployment rate), b* = 317, implying a replacement rate
of 79.2%. Thus, we see that variation in the unemployment rate can substantially
affect replacement rates. Table 9 presents the optimal benefit level and replacement
rate, for a range of unemployment rates. The basic lesson to emerge from the table
is that plausible variation in the unemployment rate generates wide variation in the
optimal level of UI. To give a sense of the quantitative importance of this variation,
the magnitude is roughly equivalent to a one unit change in the coefficient of relative
risk aversion in the model (e.g., from -y = 2 to y = 3).
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a standard search model and have shown that it
implies a relationship between the moral hazard cost of UI and the level of unem-
ployment in the local labor market. This relationship is theoretically ambiguous and
depends on the relative strengths of two behavioral channels: the search channel and
reservation wage channel. This motivated our empirical strategy which estimated
how the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level
varies with the unemployment rate.
Our empirical findings indicate that moral hazard is lower when unemployment is
high, consistent with the speculation of Krueger and Meyer (2002) who claimed that
there is likely less of an efficiency loss from reduced search effort by the unemployed
when local labor market conditions are poor. We have also shown how one can use
the empirical relationship between the duration elasticity and the unemployment rate
to calibrate a simple optimal UI formula.
We view the concept that the moral hazard cost of social policies may vary with
local labor market conditions as possibly very general. It is plausible that the dis-
incentive effects of other government policies may also be lower in times of high
unemployment. For example, if the labor supply response to tax changes is lower
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during recessions, the deadweight loss of income taxation could vary with aggregate
labor market conditions.
While we focused on the UI benefit level as the policy parameter, in practice,
the potential benefit duration is extended during times of high unemployment. In
ongoing work, we are studying theoretically how government should optimally set the
potential benefit duration. This will naturally depend on the responsiveness of UI
durations to changes in the potential duration parameter. We hope that this analysis
will hopefully shed light on the federal supplemental benefits programs in the U.S.
and other developed countries.
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3.5 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.
Start by differentiating the optimal condition for search with respect to b
Be A"(e) &e
=r + s Ob10) + A'(e) Bp(WR) 
1WR
r+S aWR 8b
Note that A" < 0, @' > 0, and aW(W") < 0 so that sign(g) # sign(9R).
totally differentiating the reservation wage equation with respect to b yields
DwR
U'(wR - T) b= U'(b) +
DWR
U'(wR - T) Ob = U'(b) ±
Oe A(e)
b A/(e)
Oe A (e)
Ob A' (e)
"(e)("/(e)-@ ( e ) 
)
A /(e)
r + s P(UR)7
where the last line made use of the FOC. Lets substitute in using the the equation
above:
U'(wR-T) 9b
U'(wR -T) 8bW
U'(wR - )DWR
U'(wR - T) 8DbROb
OWR
Ob
OWR
8b
U(b) + A(e) A'(e) Dp(WR) 9WRA'(e)r+s OWR Ob
U,(b) + A(e) 09,O(WR) &WR
r+s OWR db
=U'(b) A(e) (1 - F(wR))U'(wR
r +S
U'(b) - p(e) U'(wR
r+s
aWR
- i) Rb
U'(b) r+s
U'(wR - T)r+s+p(e)
U'(b)
U'(wR - T)
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Next,
9WR
-T ab
U'(wR - r) WR (1 + ) = U'(b)
ab r +S
A"()
r +
r + s 8 (R
A"(e)
- S (wR))
De
= A(e) D(0(WR) U'(b)
r+s p(e) &WR U'(wR-T)
A'(e) p(e)
A(e) r + s + p(e)
~X(e)
A(e) (1 - u)U'(b)
6(e)(1 - u)U'(b)
-b ~g(e) 
- A"(e)
Proof of Theorem 4.
The first-order condition for the optimal benefit level is:
OWR &WR aT &T
+ -r =0
For simplicity, we assume that DWRaT = OwR/Db and hence aD/r = BD/&b."
This implies that
c r
9WR 
_ 
__
_ b ~ 1+b -Db)
Also, using the planner's budget constraint, we can write
Or D(1 + ED,b)
Ab 1- DeD,b
Thus, at an optimum:
OWR D
- b + D(1+ED,b)Ne ao slt+d s
Note that for r small, this reduces to
DwR
= u(1 + ED,b) (3.22)
If the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, a marginal increase in
benefits raises the worker's after-tax reservation wage and so is welfare-improving. In
43This is true if individuals have CARA preferences.
212
Therefore,
( /(e)(? "(e)
( "(e)
other words, current benefit levels are too low. Note that this test doesn't quantify
how much benefits should increase or decrease. This depends on how the left-hand
side and the right-hand side respond to a change in benefits.
Substituting equation (3.14) into equation (3.22), we get
U'(b) = U'(wR - T)(1 + eD,b)
Intuitively, U'(b) represents the marginal benefit of raising consumption while
unemployed by $1. The benefit increase means that taxes must be raised by more
than $1 due to the behavioral response which reduces consumption in the employed
state. Rearranging this expression delivers equation (3.17).
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Calibration A:
0.1
4.4%
b 0.17
1.42
b 1.59
Table 1
Moral Hazard and
0.09 0.08
4.9% 5.6%
0.18 0.19
1.49 1.58
1.67 1.78
the Unemployment
0.07 0.06
6.7% 8.3%
0.21 0.24
1.70 1.82
1.91 2.07
Notes:
eDMI~h R R ),b =-0W) -ED,b = Db D,b
The model is calibrated under the following assumptions:
1. Wages are log-normally distributed with mean=300 and standard deviation=240
2 A(e) = A +Ae, A =0.02
3. s = 0.003868
4.r =b/E[w ]=0.5
5. U(c)= ci/(1-y), y = 1.75
6. p(e)= pe I+K/(I+K), TO.06,K = 0.2
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x
U
WR
D,.
e
D,
ED,
Rate
0.05
11.0%
0.29
1.90
2.19
Calibration B:
Table 2
Moral Hazard and the Unemployment
x 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06
u 5.1% 6.3% 7.9% 9.4% 10.4% 10.7%
e 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.57 0.62 0.648D,b
e 1.79 1.72 1.38 0.76 0.24 0.048D,b
CDb 2.12 2.11 1.86 1.33 0.86 0.68
Notes:
D, =6(iiwR b ,b D-e)-b,Ob D Fb
The model is calibrated under the following assumptions:
1. Wages are log-normally distributed with mean=300 and standard deviation=240
2 A(e) = A + Ae, A = 0.1
3. s = 0.003868
4.r =b/E[w]=0.5
5. U(c)= c 1~/(1-y), y = 1.75
6. p (e)= (p elK/(1I +K), (p = 0.045, K = 0.18
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Rate
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
State Unemp. Rate
Full Sample < Median
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
State Unemp. Rate
> Median
Mean Std. Dev.
Annual Income ($000's) 20.925 13.570 20.769 12.863 21.012 13.952
Age 37.165 11.066 36.699 11.113 37.426 11.034
Years of Education 12.171 2.877 12.151 2.820 12.183 2.909
Marital Dummy 0.616 0.486 0.610 0.488 0.619 0.486
Weekly Benefit Amount ($'s) 163.33 26.80 163.98 25.71 162.96 27.39
Replacement Rate 0.491 0.082 0.492 0.080 0.490 0.084
Unemployment Duration (weeks) 18.510 14.351 17.158 13.757 19.267 14.620
Number of Spells 4307 1545 2762
Notes: Data are individual-l evel unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. Final sample of unemployment
spells is described in main text.
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Table 4
How does Moral Hazard vary with the
State Unemployment Rate?
(1) (2)
log(Average UI WBA) (A) -0.651 -0.741
(0.318) (0.340)
[0.041] [0.029]
log(Average UI WBA) x (B) 0.142
State Unemployment Rate (0.068)
[0.038]
State Unemployment Rate 0.008 0.009
(0.017) (0.016)
[0.655] [0.598]
log(Average UI WBA) x 0.004 0.003
Unemployment Duration (0.009) (0.009)
[0.674] [0.707]
Age -0.017 -0.017
(0.002) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000]
Marital Dummy 0.208 0.208
(0.040) (0.040)
[0.000] [0.000]
Years of Education 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
[0.489] [0.499]
Number of Spells 4307 4307
Post-estimation: (A) + a x (B) -0.502
(0.326)
[0.124]
Post-estimation: (A) - x (B) -0.980
(0.388)
[0.012]
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results
from estimating equation (19). Data are individual-level unemployment spells from
1985-2000 SIPP. Final sample of unemployment spells is described in the main
text. Dependent variable is always the log of the individual unemployment duration
(in weeks). All specifications include state, year, industry and occupation fixed
effects, 10-knot linear spline in log annual wage income, controls for national
unemployment rate and national unemployment rate interacted with the log of
Average UI WBA and a control for being on the seam between interviews to adjust
for the "seam effect." The Average Ul WBA is the average weekly benefit amount
paid to individuals claiming unemployment insurance. All columns estimate
nonparametric baseline hazards stratified by quartile of net liquid wealth. The final
two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the duration
elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below
average. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in
brackets.
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Table 5
Alternative Measures of Interaction Term
Hazard Model Results Post-estimation
(A) (A) x (B) (B) (A) + a x (B) (A) - u x (B)
(1) (A) log(Average UI WBA) x -0.741 0.142 0.009 -0.502 -0.980
(B) State Unemployment Rate (0.340) (0.068) (0.016) (0.326) (0.388)
[0.029] [0.038] [0.598] [0.124] [0.012]
(2) (A) log(Average UI WBA) x -1.200 0.898 0.000 -0.301
(B) 1 {State Unemployment Rate > Median} (0.378) (0.262) (0.038) (0.310)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.996] [0.331]
(3) (A) log(Statutory Maximum UI WBA) x -0.269 0.120 0.004 -0.067 -0.471
(B) State Unemployment Rate (0.314) (0.053) (0.018) (0.337) (0.316)
[0.392] [0.024] [0.815] [0.842] [0.136]
(4) (A) log(Average UI WBA) x -0.625 0.079 0.025 -0.525 -0.725
(B) State Unemployment Rate (Finding) (0.313) (0.108) (0.032) (0.280) (0.392)
[0.046] [0.462] [0.435] [0.061] [0.065]
(5) (A) log(Average UI WBA) x -0.694 0.170 -0.004 -0.424 -0.964
(B) State Unemployment Rate (Separation) (0.326) (0.070) (0.020) (0.316) (0.372)
[0.034] [0.016] [0.829] [0.179] [0.010]
(6) (A) log(Average UI WBA) x 0.209 0.026 -0.516 -1.034
(B) State Unemployment Rate (Finding) (0.115) (0.031) (0.314) (0.423)
-0.775 [0.068] [0.407] [0.101] [0.015]
(A) log(Average UI WBA) x (0.344) 0.243 -0.003 -0.389 -1.160
(B) State Unemployment Rate (Separation) [0.024] (0.081) (0.019) (0.328) (0.403)
[0.003] [0.890] [0.236] [0.004]
Number of Spells 4307
Notes: All rows report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (19); each
column reports separate parameter estimate. Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. See
Table 4 for more details on the baseline specification. The median unemployment rate across all states in sample is
calculated separately each year. The Average UI WBA is the average weekly benefit amount paid to individuals
claiming unemployment insurance. The State Unemployment Rate variables in rows (4) and (5) isolate variation in the
unemployment driven by variation in the job finding rate and job separation rate, respectively. These variables are
constructed following the method in Shimer (2007); see main text for details. The final two columns report linear
combinations of the parameters. The standard deviation in the unemployment rate (a) is 0.0168. In row (2) we set
a=1.0 becasue the interaction term includes a dummy variable rather than a continuous measure. Standard errors,
adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parentheses and
p-values are in brackets.
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Table 6
How Much Do Demographics Explain Why Moral Hazard Varies
with the State Unemployment Rate?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Average UI WBA)
log(Average UI WBA) x
State Unemployment Rate
State Unemployment Rate
-0.741
(0.340)
[0.029]
0.142
(0.068)
[0.0381
0.009
(0.016)
[0.598]
log(Average UI WBA) x Age
log(Average UI WBA) x Marital Dummy
log(Average UI WBA) x Years of Education
Number of Spells
log(Average UI WBA) x Occupation FEs
log(Average UI WBA) x Industry FEs
Post-estimation: (A) + a x (B)
Post-estimation: (A) - a x (B)
-0.719
(0.337)
[0.033]
0.141
(0.068)
[0.040]
0.008
(0.016)
[0.610]
0.007
(0.008)
[0.398]
-0.742
(0.339)
[0.029]
0.142
(0.068)
[0.037]
0.009
(0.016)
[0.598]
-0.718
(0.334)
[0.032]
0.140
(0.067)
[0.037]
0.008
(0.016)
[0.611]
0.020
(0.180)
[0.912]
0.049
(0.025)
[0.052]
4307 4307 4307 4307
-0.502
(0.326)
[0.124]
-0.980
(0.388)
[0.012]
N
N
-0.483
(0.327)
[0.139]
-0.955
(0.383)
[0.013]
N
N
-0.504
(0.324)
[0.120]
-0.980
(0.389)
[0.012]
N
N
-0.482
(0.320)
[0.132]
-0.953
(0.382)
[0.013]
-0.628 -0.618 -0.577
(0.347) (0.359) (0.349)
[0.070] [0.085] [0.098]
0.143 0.136 0.138
(0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
[0.042] [0.048] [0.043]
0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
[0.605] [0.596] [0.606]
0.008
(0.010)
[0.428]
-0.046
(0.210)
[0.827]
0.051
(0.031)
[0.099]
4307 4307 4307
Y
N
-0.388
(0.329)
[0.238]
-0.867
(0.400)
[0.030]
N
Y
-0.389
(0.336)
[0.246]
-0.846
(0.414)
[0.041]
Y
Y
-0.345
(0.322)
[0.285]
-0.809
(0.407)
[0.047]
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (19). Data are
individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. See Table 4 for more details on the baseline specification. The
final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the duration elasticity when the state
unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below average. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Table 7
Moral Hazard and Liquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Average UI WBA)
log(Average UI WBA) x
State Unemployment Rate
State Unemployment Rate
Number of Spells
(A)
(B)
-0.741
(0.340)
[0.029]
0.142
(0.068)
[0.038]
0.009
(0.016)
[0.598]
4307
-0.780
(0.520)
[0.134]
0.419
(0.112)
[0.000]
0.011
(0.024)
[0.636]
2355
-0.609
(0.533)
[0.253]
0.164
(0.127)
[0.196]
-0.004
(0.024)
[0.852]
2170
-0.664
(0.320)
[0.038]
0.158
(0.070)
[0.025]
0.005
(0.017)
[0.771]
4307
0.165
(0.074)
[0.026]
0.006
(0.017)
[0.727]
4307
No mortgage only
3rd and 4th liquid wealth quartiles only
Occupation FEs x Liquid wealth quartile
Industry FEs x Liquid wealth quartile
Unemployment duration x Liquid wealth quartile
log(Average UI WBA) x Liquid wealth quartile
Post-estimation: (A) + a x (B)
Post-estimation: (A) - a x (B)
N Y N N N
-0.502
(0.326)
[0.124]
-0.980
(0.388)
[0.0121
N
N
N
N
N
-0.076
(0.551)
[0.890]
-1.483
(0.555)
[0.0071
Y
N
N
N
N
-0.333
(0.553)
[0.547]
-0.884
(0.594)
[0.137]
-0.399
(0.318)
[0.210]
-0.929
(0.362)
[0.0101
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation
(19). Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. See Table 4 for more details on
the baseline specification. The final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce
the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below average.
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over
time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Table 8
Robustness to Alternative Specifications and Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Average UI WBA) (A) -0.741 -1.010 -1.019 -1.078 -0.787
(0.340) (0.420) (0.480) (0.523) (0.352)
[0.029] [0.016] [0.034] [0.039] [0.025]
log(Average UI WBA) x (B) 0.142 0.157 0.156 0.151 0.095
State Unemployment Rate (0.068) (0.077) (0.124) (0.095) (0.068)
[0.038] [0.041] [0.207] [0.113] [0.162]
State Unemployment Rate 0.009 0.028 0.038 0.029 0.012
(0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015)
[0.598] [0.116] [0.104] [0.134] [0.408]
Number of Spells 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307
Baseline controls Y Y Y Y N
Region-specific linear time trends N Y N N N
Region x Year FEs N N Y N N
State-specific linear time trends N N N Y N
Post-estimation: (A) + u x (B) -0.502 -0.746 -0.757 -0.825 -0.627
(0.326) (0.420) (0.472) (0.551) (0.299)
[0.124] [0.076] [0.109] [0.134] [0.036]
Post-estimation: (A) - a x (B) -0.980 -1.274 -1.281 -1.331 -0.947
(0.388) (0.458) (0.568) (0.542) (0.430)
[0.012] [0.005] [0.024] [0.014] [0.028]
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation
(19). Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. See Table 4 for more details on
the baseline specification. The final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce
the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below average.
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over
time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
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Table 9
Model Calibrations: Optimal UI and the Unemployment Rate
u 3.3% 5.0% 6.7% 8.4% 10.1%
ED,b 1.218 0.979 0.741 0.503 0.264
b* $254 $271 $291 $317 $350
r* 63.4% 67.7% 72.8% 79.2% 87.5%
Notes: All columns report optimal UI benefit levels at various levels of local
unemployment. Subsequent rows report elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to UI benefit level, the optimal UI benefit level (b*) and the
optimal replacement rate (r *). The optimal replacement rate is computed by
dividing UI benefit level by the average wage. See Section 4 for more details
on the computations.
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Table A l
Calibration C: Moral Hazard and the Unemployment Rate
X 0.095 0.09 0.085 0.08 0.075 0.07
u 4.6% 5.1% 5.8% 6.7% 7.8% 9.4%
WR 0.51 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.84 1.01D,b
e 4.47 4.76 5.07 5.37 5.57 5.488D,b
ED,b 4.97 5.31 5.69 6.08 6.41 6.48
Notes:
bR R D,b D,b Db D,b
The model is calibrated under the following assumptions:
1. Wages distributed as F (w) = 1-(w o/w)^(1/a), where w0 = 340 and a = 0.14
2 A(e) = A + Ae, A = 0.02
3. s = 0.003868
4. r = b/E[w] = 0.5
5. U(c) cl'/(l-y), y = 1.75
6. p (e)= (p e+K/(1+K), qp = 0.035, K = 0.1
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Table A2
Calibration D: Moral Hazard and the Unemployment Rate
x 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5
u 7.5% 8.4% 9.0% 9.4% 9.6% 9.7%
WD 1.05 1.17 1.26 1.32 1.34 1.35
D 2.99 2.05 1.17 0.56 0.23 0.08
Db
6 D,b 4.04 3.23 2.43 1.87 1.57 1.44
Notes:
D Rcb, D,b b -D,b Db D,b
The model is calibrated under the following assumptions:
1. Wages distributed as F(w)= 1-(w o/w)A(1/a), where w 0
2 A(e)=A+2e, A=0.333
3. s = 0.003868
4.r =b/E[w]=0.5
5. U(c)= c"~/(1-y), y = 1.75
6. p (e)= p eI+Kl/(1+K), (p = 0.035, K = 0.1
340 and a = 0.14
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Figure 1: Survival Curves Under High Unemployment
Wilcoxon Test fpr Equality: p = 0.156 j
10 20 30 40
Weeks Unemployed
--------- Average UI WBA Below Median
Average UI WBA Above Median
Figure 2: Survival Curves Under Low Unemployment
Wilcoxon Test fbr Equality: p < 2.001
10 20 30
Weeks Unemployed
--------- Average UI WBA Below Median
Average UI WBA Above Median
Notes: Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. Each figure plots
(Kaplan-Meier) survival curves for two groups of individuals based on whether or not Average
UI Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) in individual's state is above or below the median. The sur-
vival curves are adjusted following Chetty (2008), which parametrically adjusts for "seam effect"
by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model with a seam dummy and then recovering the baseline
hazard.
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Figure Al: Survival Curves Under High Unemployment
E
- Wilcoxon Test Tr Equality: p 10~.527 - .
0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
--------- Average UI WBA Below Median
Average UI WBA Above Median
Figure A2: Survival Curves Under Low Unemployment
.,
Wilcoxon Test fpr Equality: p < 0.001
0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
--------- Average UI WBA Below Median
Average UI WBA Above Median
Notes: Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP, with the sample limited
to unemployed workers with above-median liquid wealth. Each figure plots (Kaplan-Meier) survival
curves for two groups of individuals based on whether or not Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount
(WBA) in individual's state is above or below the median. The survival curves are adjusted following
Chetty (2008), which parametrically adjusts for "seam effect" by fitting a Cox proportional hazard
model with a seam dummy and then recovering the baseline hazard.
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